

THE ZIONIST MIND

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THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF ZIONIST THOUGHT

BY
ALAN R. TAYLOR

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For Chris, Peter, and Tim

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PREFACE

The Zionist movement is a product of Jewish secularism in the emancipation era. As such, it comprises one facet of the vast phenomenon of modernization, which began in the West and has in our own time spread to nearly all cultures in the world.

The dynamics of modernization are as yet only imperfectly understood, but it is possible to posit two general principles in the approach to case study. The first is that "modernization" involves a radical departure from "traditional" society, and the second is that the transition creates a dialectical relationship between established and revolutionary modes of existence. These conceptual terms elude precise definition, but gain increasing significance through application to specific instances.

From a general perspective, modernism entails the rejection of cultural systems based on metaphysical speculation and normative social structure. In the West, the modernist revolution began with the scholastic movement and humanism, which sought to free the intellectual dependence of Europe on traditional authorities and modes of expression. The Renaissance developed these initiatives into a comprehensive framework which ultimately transformed the character of Western life. The major themes of the new order included a pronounced mobility of thought, expression, and structure, and an emphasis on empirical examination of the natural world and innovative activism in political and economic processes.

The advent of modernism was not marked, however, by orderly transition from one way of life to another. An intense

dialectical tension was established between what traditional society had understood as its ultimate future and the way modern men regarded the past and their own relationship to it. And since there was not a sharp time division between the two world views, but rather a gradual change over centuries, the conflict of loyalties became intense and precipitated the chain of upheavals and revolutions which have characterized modern history.

The encounter of divergent values assumed a dialectical form in that the proponents of each became deeply involved with each other in a struggle for reconciliation. Both schools recognized that they belonged to a common historical entity, and aspired in different ways to assure the victory of civilization and the humanizing attributes upon which it depends.

The tragic aspect of the encounter lay in the inability of traditionalists and modernists to comprehend the intrinsic value in each other, though both were sensitive to the negative side. The defenders of the old culture could see the fallacies of self-reliance and materialism implicit in modernist philosophy, but were unable to appreciate the worth of empiricism as a tool of criticism and self-analysis. Similarly, the modern school was aware of the intellectual and social limitations of traditional thought, but minimized its contribution to the concepts of human order, which formed the basis of civilization.

Of particular relevance to this study is the attitude of modernism toward history and becoming. As self-conscious activists in an evolving present, modernizers engage in extensive manipulation of what has taken place and what is to be. The past represents an identity of heroic intention repressed by institutional formalism, while the future opens the possibility of heroic fulfilment through institutional reforms. The error which emerges from this formula is that the world of tradition is essentially lost while the world to be is cast in the subjective terms of a still uncertain present. More specifically, modernist historiography distorts the past to suit its own

ephemeral psychology, losing touch with former cultural identities and abandoning the thread of legacy.

In the West, the modernist revolution comprised at the same time a radical departure from existing institutions and a fascination with the past. The study of history became one of modernism's important endeavours, but while the development of scientific historiography stands as a major contribution to empirical thought, philosophy of history suffered from the fallacy of subjectivism. The dominant tendency was to conceptualize the more distant past as an ideal image to be reconstructed, contrasting it with the immediate past as an era of degeneration. The ghost of the Roman Empire, which had been maintained as a living myth in the medieval centuries, was revived by the modernists in a new form. While the imperial idea as a political programme was abandoned, classical culture was reconstructed as a guide to modern life. But the notion of continuity with Hellenistic civilization was really an archaistic fantasy, employed by the early Renaissance to establish a precedent for its wayward inclinations. Though certain aspects of modernism were reminiscent of Greco-Roman culture, an essentially new tradition had been created and its links with the past were more a matter of selective imitation than of actual continuity.

Closely related to modernist historicism is its vision of the future, which is essentially utopian. The present is generally regarded as a transitional period during which reformist and revolutionary activity will prepare the way for a heroic reconstruction. The romantic idealist concepts of nineteenth century thought added marked emphasis to such futurism and permeated our more recent movements with a sense of urgency and dynamic becoming, of violence and dramatic change. This intensified revolutionism demonstrated a pathological side to the modernist ethos, for though revolutionary doctrines maintained the ideal of a just and humanized society, the destructive means adopted to achieve it were at

variance with the goal and often led to overbearing and oppressive regimes.

We are concerned here with the modernist revolution among the Jews, and in particular with the Zionist movement which ultimately dominated it. During the nineteenth century, European Jewry was deeply moved by the concepts of "emancipation" and "enlightenment." The revolutionary spirit which permeated the Western world after 1789 had a profound influence on Jewish thought and experience. Legal emancipation, though never complete, did become the official policy of an increasing number of states, opening the doors to the participation of Jews in all aspects of European life. This evoked a mixed response among the Jews themselves. A sizeable contingent regarded the intrusion of Western culture as a serious threat to the preservation of Jewish traditions, and rejected the suggestion that they share in an alien and mundane culture, while retaining the *Halakah* (religious law) as the guide to Jewish behaviour. An equally significant and even larger number of Jews reacted favourably to emancipation and adopted a variety of modernist programmes and attitudes, often collectively referred to as the Jewish "Enlightenment," or as it came to be known in Eastern Europe, *Haskalah*. Jewish modernism assumed a broad range, including the religious reconstruction movement known as Reform Judaism, an assimilationist cosmopolitanism in which a specifically Jewish identity became almost entirely submerged, Jewish autonomism, the Jewish labour movement, the Hebraist revival, Palestinian colonization and Zionism. The advocates of these various schools believed they held the key to future Jewish development, and engaged in extensive dispute as to ultimate Jewish values and identity and the relationship of Jewish existence to the modern world. The focal point of the argument was the national question: whether or not the Jews comprised a national entity, and if so, what kind of communalism that entailed in the emancipation era. The

traditionalists regarded all of these schools as heretical, and this was essentially true in that all of them were inspired and influenced by facets of Western thought. The deeper question which was posed by the advent of the Jewish Enlightenment, and which remains unanswered to the present, is whether the fundamentals of the Judaic ethos can be retained within the framework of modernist orientation. This is the crux of the continuing search for the rediscovery and rehabilitation of Jewish identity in the age of revolution.

Since Zionism eventually established the ascendant position in the Jewish Enlightenment, its character and role have become the central issue in contemporary Jewish life. Like the other Jewish modernist schools, Zionism developed a social myth concerning Jewish identity and becoming. Ideologically based in the concepts of Jewish nationality, the Hebraic revival, and Palestinian colonization, the Zionists advocated a programme of building a heroic Jewish state, conceived in modernist terms but at the same time aspiring to the virtues of a noble past. The question raised by this ideological formulation is the degree to which it represents a continuity with ancient tradition or encompasses within its own system the broader facets of Jewish experience in the modern world.

The hegemony of Zionism in our own time presents serious problems for Jews and for the world. From a traditional Jewish perspective, the Zionist claim to represent the avenue of "Return" and the totality of the "Jewish People," as depicted in its own concepts of "Zion" and "Israel," involves a distortion of major proportion. In Jewish tradition, "Zion" is the sacramental focal point of Jewish piety, while "Israel" is the covenant community committed to the rule of God as expressed in the Holy Torah. "Zionism," on the other hand, is far removed from these principles, and has been presumptuous in adopting a terminology which does not truly reflect its own modernist philosophy. Similarly, the Zionist claim to

represent "Jewishness" in the modern sense eludes the reality that the Diaspora is not only a continuing but a developing phenomenon, which cannot be confined to a parochial approach to nationality. While the respect for Zionism in Jewish circles has grown out of proportion because of circumstance and intense publicity, it remains that the movement only apparently represents either Jewish tradition or the Jewish Enlightenment.

For the world, Zionism is the root of the Palestine problem, which stands as a challenge to the ethics of law in the post-imperial age. The contradiction between the principle of self-determination and preference for a colonizing movement is the source of Western ambivalence and confusion with regard to Palestine and Zionism. While the West committed itself to home rule as a legal code after World War I, it remained under the influence of earlier predilections, among them the notion of a Jewish "right" to Palestine. In succeeding decades the involved powers failed to resolve the conflict of incompatible commitments, gradually aiding and ultimately accepting the expulsion of the Arab community and the establishment of a Zionist polity in Palestine. In the context of contemporary international relations, the Palestine dilemma has assumed a more prominent position, raising profound questions of equity and order under law.

The present study is designed to investigate the Zionist revolution from a multiple perspective. Following a consideration of Judaic tradition as a system of being, the origins and nature of Zionism will be examined against the background of modern Jewish history. The final chapter is devoted to an analysis of Zionism as an issue confronting contemporary Jewry, the State of Israel, the Arab peoples, non-Jewish systems of thought and the world community. The final purpose is to provide a dimensional view of the Zionist phenomenon, which has aroused much concern, but is still only superficially understood.

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CHAPTER I

THE TRADITION OF ISRAEL

The tradition of Israel¹ is based on an idea of order—a universal order ordained by the Creator and a corresponding social order which men need to become fully human and to establish a dynamic relationship with the divine presence. The conceptual themes are derived from the “religion of Israel,” which was developed by the Hebrews in the biblical period, and from its subsequent transformation by the post-exilic Jews into the system of piety which we know as “Judaism.” These themes evolved gradually in the context of changing historical perspectives, but were nevertheless woven into a cohesive religious ethos which has a unique identity and a distinct *Weltanschauung*.

The formulation of Israelite tradition is the product of the prophetic heritage embodied in the Old Testament and the religious codification which began with Ezra’s restoration of the Law (ca. 458-397 B.C.) and ended with the completion of the *Mishnah* (religious law) by the *Tannaim* (traditioners) during the first two centuries of the Christian Era. Later generations, known collectively as the *Amoraim* (expositors), developed a continuing commentary on these sources, or the *Talmud* (learning), perpetuating the guidelines of the tradition which had been bequeathed to them.

¹ For an authoritative account of Israelite religion, see George Foot Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era, the Age of the Tannaim* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 2 vols.

The Old Testament and the historical development of biblical Israel provide the foundation of Israelite tradition. Against the background of ancient polytheism, the Hebrews effected a departure from primitive religiosity. Their notion of a unique tribal god was gradually refined into the theology of a universal deity transcending the world but actively involved in the rehabilitation of estranged man. The method of God's intervention was revelation of Himself to chosen communities, culminating in the election of Israel. The Covenant thereby established became the crux of history, the way of redemption. Hence the cornerstone of Providence was the continuing relationship between God and His People, maintained through the Torah as revelation and law.

The Torah is the sum of revelation and law, and is reflected not only in the Pentateuch itself, but in all of the Scripture and in the unwritten law or interpretive and practical enlargement of the written Torah. It constitutes at the same time God's gift of illumination in concealment and the way (*Halakah*) through which His People reaffirm their election and assume the role of a Holy Nation under the rule of God. Obedience to the Torah is a response to God's mercy, a humanizing discipline, and a protection from the corrupt values of the common world. Both the biblical and post-exilic Israelites understood their relation to God in this way. The primary difference between them is that while the Hebrews were concerned with developing a tradition of prophetic self-criticism in the context of national history, the Jewish reformers who followed the captivity were more preoccupied with defining a system of personal piety in terms of a national tradition which had become detached from the world.

The central theme of biblical religion is the historical struggle to reaffirm the transcendence of God and the election of Israel against the background of infidelity within and without the community. The tendency of the Israelites to reject their role as "a holy people, a nation of priests" was paralleled by the broader rejection of Israel as a nation by the outside world.

The prophetic message transmitted by the Old Testament forms the heart of a national religious literature deeply concerned with elaborating Israel's mission in history and defining its order under God. It reflects the dynamic history of Israel's encounter with an alien environment and with itself, the incredible movement of an inspired people expressed in communal, geographic, and conceptual terms. The migratory character of the biblical community represents not only the achievement of historical role, but the departure from the anthropocentric orientation of ancient religious tradition. It emphasizes the dramatic movement in search of true order and the path of human fulfilment. The intense dialogue between the people of Israel and God gave direction to this movement, defining purpose in history.

The Land of Canaan became the source of sustenance, the focus of sanctity, and the symbol of fulfilment. But it also provided the basis of Israel's dilemma—the problem of nationhood. The Judaic tradition is “national” in the sense that it asserts the election of Israel as a covenant community with a special relation to God and an ordained role in history. Prophecy was always addressed to the nation as such, seeking to guide its destiny in terms of the Torah and Israel's calling. It was the constitution of the nation as “state” which created difficulties, for the trappings of sovereignty drew the Israelites into the orbit of “normal” polity. This ultimately confounded the transition to an age of reconciliation, which had been the messianic expectation of biblical Israel.

When the Kingdom was founded, prophetic interpretation focused on the issue of “nationhood” as a source of infidelity and confinement. It begins with Samuel's reluctance to establish a “national” political order which threatened to undermine Israel's religious vocation by accommodating it to external custom. Subsequent prophecy challenged the ruling institution for its preoccupation with worldly concerns, and eventually came to view the political structure as a terminal phenomenon. At this juncture, the later prophets—Amos,

Hosea, Jeremiah, and the two Isaiahs—spoke of a reconstructed covenant, establishing a reformed order which would obviate the problem of apostasy. But alongside the question of reform was the more delicate matter of nationality and universality. The refinement of monotheistic thought which developed in the course of political decline made it “clear that a universal god’s interest in mankind cannot be confined to a particular nation.”² More explicitly, as soon as the implications of monotheism “were recognized they were found to collide with the exclusiveness of the reciprocal relation between God and Israel in the national religion.”³ Hence, the reconstructed covenant anticipated in Deutero-Isaiah envisions Israel as the agent of universal enlightenment. The election of Israel remains intact, but it is now interpreted in terms of a mission which far exceeds the limits of Israel. To fulfil its vocation, Israel must achieve, as it were, an “exodus from itself,”⁴ transcending the confinement of nationhood as constituted under the monarchy.

Deutero-Isaiah is the voice of prophetic Israel in Exile. The Babylonian captivity had brought an end to the state, but the religious tradition of the Hebrews had long preceded the rise of worldly polity, and indeed had seemed to conflict with it. The later prophets viewed the political catastrophe as a punishment for Israel’s sins, a refining experience which would result in the reestablishment of right order. The exact nature of the post-exilic covenant was not known, but Jeremiah had spoken of it in these terms:

Behold the days are coming says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke But this is the covenant

² *Ibid.*, I, 226.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 223.

⁴ Eric Voegelin, *Order and History* (Louisiana State University Press, 1956), I (“Israel and Revelation”), 491.

which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts.⁵

The restoration of the Jews by Cyrus was followed by a religious reconstruction which became the basis of Judaism. The formative phase lasted several centuries, beginning with Ezra's reinstitution of the Torah in Jerusalem, and ending with the compilation of the religious law by the *Tannaim*. During this time the Jews underwent a variety of disturbing developments. The most important of these were the successful Maccabean revolt against the repressive Seleucid regime, the intrusion of Hellenistic culture, the apocalyptic movement, and the ill-fated insurrections against Rome. A number of differing factions arose in the context of these events, among them the heretical Christian sect which ultimately formed a separate religion. Yet a distinct and consistent tradition was maintained, providing the foundation of diasporan Judaism.

The new Judaism transformed the character of pre-exilic religion by replacing the old tradition of prophecy with a system of piety based on law. Whereas the prophets had addressed the nation, seeking to guide it toward fulfilment in a durable messianic age, the post-exilic reconstructionists spoke to the saving remnant, emphasizing personal repentance in preparation for final judgement. Judaism remained a national religion in the sense that the continuing election of Israel was central to its theology. But the nationalistic perspective of the biblical period had played itself out with the end of the state. The new outlook did not anticipate progressive movement to an age of national glory, but a refining process in which the individual developed his relation to God through the Torah in preparation for the day of judgement. The messianic age assumed a broader symbolism, signalling the fulfilment of human endeavour and the advent of the resurrection. Hence Judaism became an intensely personal religion

⁵ Jer. 31: 31-33.

without ceasing to be national. Individual piety and national destiny became integral aspects of a common functional process, involving Israel's sanctification, redemptive mission, and eschatological role.

The sanctification of the community of Israel is achieved through the Torah, which, as mentioned above, is the sum of revelation and law reflected in written and oral sources. The Torah is the agent of illumination and guide to behaviour, and consistent with its unitary character, moral prescription and pious observance are regarded as one. They comprise inseparable aspects of divine law as defined in the Torah and correlate the revelation of God's nature and His relation to the people of Israel. There can be no division of moral and ceremonial law, for both reflect the composite sanction of one authority and the integral parts of one obligation. Hence, the construction of Israel as a system of piety directly reflects the order of God as a moral authority, establishing a bond which is statutory in form and directive in substance.

The mission of Israel derives from the fact that God's ultimate aim is not individual salvation, but the reconstruction and redemption of man. Israel's election constitutes a pilot project, in which a chosen community was established in the Holy Land as a focus of sanctity. The Land is therefore in part a redemptive symbol. It is the physical coefficient of the Torah, the gift of dimension in which the response of piety can take place. But it also suggests the figurative dichotomy of redemption and exile, conditions of being which reflect obedience and estrangement. God has consigned Israel to struggle for perfection, forcing it "to expiate its sins by suffering and to work its passage by loyalty in adversity to the Holy Torah."⁶ The Holy Land represents the original establishment of Israel in a sanctified place where it could grow and the future site of its messianic fulfilment. Between these conditions is the "exile,"

⁶ Emile Marmorstein, *Heaven at Bay, the Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 9.

in which dispersed Israel serves "as an instrument for the remedy of the world, a living testimony among mankind to God's reality and to His universal demands."⁷ The exile of the Chosen People corresponds to the alienation of man and its ultimate restoration to the Promised Land as a "Holy People" will signal the redemption of the world.

The final function of Israel is its messianic and eschatological role. Biblical theology had understood the messianic idea as the natural culmination of Israel's history, the fulfilment of prophecy in an eternal age of reconciliation. Judaism introduced a different view. The diasporan exile was regarded both as a witness to man's unredeemed condition and as the framework in which dispersed Israel was consigned to affirm its election as the cornerstone of universal salvation. As one contemporary interpreter has put it:

Since the Exile is the coefficient of being unredeemed, the purpose of the supernatural vocation of the Jew is to make all history alive to its incompleteness. This is no more than to reaffirm that the Jew is a messianic being for whom there is no redemption until all history is redeemed.⁸

Judaism's conception of Israel's hope therefore assumed an eschatological form, replacing the earlier notion of a golden age which was to be national in scope and unmeasured in duration. This served to bridge the gap between the individual Jew, the community of Israel, and the world, providing a messianic basis for a religion which was at the same time personal and national.

The transitional function of diasporan Israel is to achieve the quality of repentance, a corollary to God's ultimate judgement. The vehicle of repentance is adherence to the Torah, as a system of observance and morals and an attitude of mind and will. Though the Torah remains a unitary phenomenon

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Arthur A. Cohen, *The Natural and the Supernatural Jew, an Historical and Theological Introduction* (New York: Pantheon, 1962), pp. 6-7.

of revelation and law, its underlying motif is conformity to the principles of justice, truth, and peace. These are the ultimate criteria of a fully Jewish life.

The messianic age was conceived in a variety of terms. But common to all was the belief that it would follow Israel's transformation and that it would be limited in duration. When God had instilled the spirit of repentance in Israel, he would effect a restoration of his people to the Holy Land. This would be without human instrumentality, though some conceived a messiah figure who would assume the role of a righteous king.

The messianic restoration of Israel was understood to be a supernatural phenomenon, though it would take place in the natural world.⁹ It represented the termination of the "age of toil" and the descent to Jerusalem of the ordered community which has always existed in invisible form above. The new Jerusalem would then become the seat of a universal theocracy in which the Jews would become the priests of the Lord and all men would serve the true God. At that time, Palestine would enjoy a fertility beyond imagination. The supernatural character of this fertility is exemplified by such beliefs as the notion that a single grape would yield many gallons of wine.

Judaism regarded the age of the Messiah as a prelude to the last judgement and the end of the world. It was to be limited in time—the estimates varied from a millenium to less than a century—and it would signify the fulfilment of history and the preparation for the great assize. On the appointed day, the dead would pass through tunnels to the Holy Land, and there be resurrected from a small bone in the spine which was thought to be indestructible. The Jews, having already been restored to Palestine, would occupy a central position in the ensuing judgement of each individual, and then the natural world would give way to an eternal supernatural order in which God's justice prevailed.

⁹ See Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 365–379.

During the Roman siege of Jerusalem in the year 70, a certain rabbi named Jochanan Ben Zakkai requested and was granted permission to conduct a peaceful school of religious study at Jamnia in Palestine. This event provided the institutional structure in which diasporan Judaism became oriented. During the succeeding two centuries, the *Tannaim* completed the substantive development of Judaic religious outlook, and the generations which followed simply elaborated on the themes which were thus passed on to them. The tradition of Israel remained essentially in this form until the "emancipation," which profoundly altered Jewish life and thought.

The primary characteristics of Judaism were its commitment to piety and its rejection of power. The halakic response to the Torah as revelation and command had preceded and outlived the Kingdom, and it had already been demonstrated that the state could not encompass or represent the community of Israel.¹⁰ Hence diasporan tradition was distinctly apolitical, spurning the way of states and emphasizing consistency with its own religious principles. A recent study recalls that "powerlessness" became a corollary to spiritual growth in Jewish thought, and that the politicization of Israel was strongly opposed by the great medieval philosophers, Yehuda Halevi and Moses Maimonides.¹¹ In any event, the diasporan community remained politically quiet in orientation until the "emancipation," eighteen centuries after the fall of Jerusalem. The only exception was the brief period when Judaism became the official religion of the Khazar state, an episode in Jewish history which contributed nothing to Judaic tradition. The continuing emphasis was on the development of a characteristic piety which would maintain the unity of observance and principle, and prepare the community of Israel for its messianic and eschatological role.

¹⁰ Marmorstein, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹¹ Michael Selzer, *The Wineskin and the Wizard* (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

During the centuries following the establishment of Ben Zakkai's rabbinic school, Judaism maintained a continuity of the tradition established by the *Tannaim*. Though the *Talmud* and the practice of religious scholarship which it inspired became the most direct agents of Jewish heritage, the rationalist and mystical schools also remained loyal to the *Mishnah* as the basis of normative Judaism. A notable exception was the heretical Karaite sect, which spurned the *Mishnah* and the *Talmud* in favor of its own interpretations of scripture. Though legalistically oriented, the Karaites were innovative and personally rebellious. They failed to appreciate the progressive growth of tradition, and in so doing "broke the bridge connecting the Biblical past with the present."¹²

The celebrated tradition of Jewish rationalism and religious philosophy which began with Gaon Saadia (882-942) and reached its highest development in the work of Yehuda Halevi (ca. 1086-1142) and Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), remained in full support of the *Mishnah* and the *Talmud*. All three of these scholars disputed the waywardness of the Karaites, and confirmed the validity of religious practice as formulated and transmitted by the *Tannaim* and *Amoraim*. They were also careful to define the limitations of rational inquiry, upholding the supremacy of revelation as the ultimate guide to Israel and the world.

The mystical tradition inaugurated by Nahmanides (1195-1270) and developed by the Cabbalists—most notably Moses ben Shem Tob de Leon (1250-1305)—was likewise committed to normative Judaism as the ultimate authority. The mystics took issue with the rationalist philosophers in terms of approach, emphasizing the interpretation of hidden meanings over intellectual analysis. But both schools acknowledged the common sources of traditional Judaism and rejected the innovation apparent in Karaist thought. They were in search

¹² Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews*, ed. by Bella Löwry (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1956), III, 133.

of theological maturity to meet the challenges of a changing age.

Judaism enjoyed a continuity of development down to the emancipation era. The rise of schools reflected attempts to preserve religious tradition in the context of diversified experience. But the response to external circumstance was for the most part conservative rather than innovative. This facilitated the transmission of a refined system of belief and observance through many centuries with relatively little distortion. It had been and remained the premise of Judaism that the Torah comprised the totality of revelation and law. It was later explained, emphasized, and applied, but never changed or enlarged. Furthermore, Judaism maintained that the people of Israel were endowed with a religious vocation, involving a witnessing function in "exile" and a messianic and eschatological role in the fullness of time. This made it essential that the Jews preserve the system of piety established by the *Mishnah* and developed by the *Talmud*, for otherwise they could not function in terms of the mission assigned to them. Hence, the incentive to remain loyal to tradition was very high, enabling the Jews to perpetuate the unique identity and heritage which had been passed down to them by their forefathers.

The introduction of alien culture among the Jews was a gradual process, almost imperceptible at first but later so substantial that the essence of Jewish identity was threatened with obliteration. Until the Renaissance, dispersed Israel was able to sustain exposure to foreign ideas and varieties of experience without altering the framework of Judaism. Hence, the medieval philosophers and mystics, though responding to external conditions, never lost the thread of tradition. But the unfolding of the modernist revolution in the West ultimately changed the structure of Jewish thought.

Implicit in the new outlook introduced by the Renaissance was the interest in human power. Man's manipulative potential in the natural world became the centre of attention, while

art and empirical science sought to expand the scope of human endeavour. Social and political mobility was emphasized as an agency of change, introducing novel systems of thought and order.

These notions were quite foreign to Judaism, but two aspects of modernism held an appeal which Jews found increasingly difficult to resist. In challenging the status quo, the modernists had vastly increased the possibilities of social mobility and integration. For the Jews this suggested a means of self-development and participation in the life of the external community. The inclination to "normalization" had always existed as the negative side of Jewish experience, but in this case there was a corresponding pressure from the external community to conform. The secularizing non-Jewish world outside the ghetto wanted to absorb particularist elements and to engender pervasive systems of political as opposed to religious loyalty. In time, this included planned programmes of Jewish assimilation, but the danger for the Jews implicit in a fusion of Jewish and Western secular culture remained elusive and often unrecognized. But, however attractive and advantageous accommodation to modern systems may be, the unique identity of Israel would be forfeit in the process.

The transition in Jewish thought begins with a subtle shift toward natural theology. Rabbi Liva ben Bezalel of Prague (1570-1609), whom Martin Buber regarded as the real founder of a specifically Jewish philosophy of history,¹³ was perhaps the first to move in this direction. Though his thinking was rooted in the imagery of tradition, Rabbi Liva was clearly influenced by the naturalism of Renaissance thought. He was specifically concerned with the question of Israel's destiny, and concluded that the exile had prevented the Jews from fulfilling their historic role. Dispersion was a diseased condition, contrary to nature. It enfeebled Israel by depriving it of the natural

¹³ Martin Buber, *Israel and Palestine* (London: East & West Library, 1952), pp. 77-89.

conditions of nationhood—sovereignty and land—and must therefore be considered as a perverted order whereby the Jews had lost sight of their place in history. The Jews must therefore be like other peoples in form in order to be unlike them in function. Thus, the order of election was erected upon the order of creation, and Israel could realize its messianic role only in the context of natural events. Consequently the great task of the Jews was to reconstitute themselves as a people in the Holy Land, for only in this way could they cooperate with God. This was both their right and their duty. Affirmation of the Diaspora was therefore a form of waywardness, and indeed Israel's original disobedience was its hesitation to occupy the Land and to remain in close association with it. The dispersion was viewed as a punishment designed to instill in the Jews a new appreciation of the Land and an impulse to return.

Though Rabbi Liva adhered to the traditional concepts of Israel's election and messianic vocation, he looked for the criteria of Israel's destiny in the world of nature and the guide to Jewish becoming in the activist Renaissance culture of his time. He certainly cannot be considered a modernist or a secularizer, but his willingness to derive theological conclusions from natural data and to suggest human agency in messianic prospectives was an early example of cultural borrowing. Later, increasing numbers of Jewish intellectuals were to develop an interest in Western thought and to reinterpret Jewish character and fulfilment in Western terms.

The seventeenth century witnessed some further development along these lines, encouraged by the rash of millennarian speculation and the spirit of religious tolerance which followed the Thirty Years War. In England a philo-Jewish movement grew up in anticipation of Israel's restoration to Palestine. This was thought to be a preliminary to the founding of the Fifth Kingdom mentioned in the book of Daniel.¹⁴ Manasseh

¹⁴ Graetz, *op. cit.*, V, 23.

ben Israel, a cabbalistic rabbi living in Holland, formulated corresponding notions of apocalyptic development, with the immediate result that Jews were admitted to England for the first time since 1290. But the intrusion of Gentile thought into Jewish historical philosophy, which later deeply influenced the course of Jewish life, was much the most important development.

In Eastern Europe, another significant trend was unfolding. The formerly stable position of Jews in Poland and Russia began to disintegrate during the seventeenth century. In 1648 the Ukrainian Cossacks launched an anti-Semitic campaign as a facet of their resistance to Polish rule. This inaugurated a tradition of persecution in Eastern Europe which added a new factor to the evolution of Jewish outlook in the modern era. The disturbance of the largest centre of diasporan life at a time of profound cultural change and social unrest created a focus of Jewish discontent which could respond affirmatively to new initiatives.

The bizarre episode of the false messiah, Sabbatai Zevi (1626-76), took place against this complex background. That an erratic Jew of Smyrna should suddenly decide in 1665 that he was the Messiah of Israel is not in itself so unusual, but that his claim should be considered credible among both Jews and Christians on a broad scale, and that his movement should continue after his apostasy and death was unprecedented and significant. As a messianic pretender, Sabbatai Zevi aspired, over the objections of the Jerusalem rabbinate, to restore the Jews to the Holy Land, and asserted his prerogative to abrogate traditional law and custom.¹⁵ The responsiveness of a wide and devoted following to such leadership is indicative of seventeenth century Jewry's predisposition for change and movement, however innovative or radical. The Jews of Poland and Russia were particularly drawn to Sabbatianism, and in spite of the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 148-149.

disapproval of rabbinical scholars, heretical messianism persisted into the next century in Eastern Europe.

The adventurist spirit which gained currency in seventeenth century Jewish circles reached an extreme manifestation in the thought of Baruch Spinoza (1632-77). Spinoza borrowed some of the methodology of the medieval Jewish rationalists, but whereas they had employed classical philosophy to validate Judaism, he turned away from the theological approach to knowledge and understanding. His philosophical system is grounded in the rationalism of Descartes, and in suggesting that the creation itself is God and that law and truth spring from natural order rather than from revelation, his view of the world is the converse of that held by Judaism. He regarded himself as a religious philosopher, but considered Scripture a popular form of religious truth, inferior to theoretical speculation. Therefore, he disassociated himself intellectually and emotionally from Jewish tradition and identified with Western secular thought, to which he became a major contributor. His estrangement from the Judaic world was a matter of choice rather than compulsion, and his life is meaningful in Jewish history only in the negative sense that it represents the capacity for wilful alienation.

The restless climate which had begun to disturb Jewish life in the seventeenth century gained momentum in the eighteenth. In Western and Central Europe, the philosophy of emancipation challenged the status quo and prepared the ground for an egalitarian revolution. For the Jews this posed the possibility of social mobility and participation, though the lives of only a few were immediately affected in that age. Yet the world of Jewish tradition was confronted with a problem of choice in the pattern of events which surrounded it. The question was not a matter of antiquarian loyalty, but of preserving a focus of Jewish identity in the context of cultural pluralism. It was to this question that Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86) tried to supply an answer.

Mendelssohn was widely regarded as the bridge between the

seclusion of the ghetto and the life of the world outside. As the advocate of civic emancipation and fidelity to Judaism, trained in both the *Talmud* and Western secular thought, he appeared to reconcile Jewish tradition and modern thought. Mendelssohn regarded himself as fully loyal to both worlds. But whether such a synthesis is really possible remains debatable. The very form in which it was later phrased—"To be a Jew at home and a man abroad"—suggests a kind of double identity in which separate personalities alternately take charge of the soul.

This is not to disparage Mendelssohn or to question his integrity and talent, but to point out the difficulties of merging Judaic and modernist culture. Once a Western education had been superimposed on the Talmudic, and Mendelssohn was received into the intellectual community of Berlin, he became primarily concerned with the philosophical issues then current in European intellectual circles. His first major work, *Phaedon* (1767), used classical Greek rather than Hebrew imagery and employed rational argument to refute materialist scepticism as to the immortality of the soul. Indeed, his works in general "were written for an enlightened German audience, and sought, successfully, to influence it."¹⁶

Mendelssohn did not have any intention of developing his own theory of Judaism, and had certain Christians not questioned his religious affinity, he might never have written *Jerusalem* (1783) to clarify his position on the subject.¹⁷ The content of his thought affirmed Judaism, but the process by which he arrived at religious truth was closer to the Deists, being derived from rational speculation rather than scriptural exegesis. "Only after its rational truth had been demonstrated, is it possible, according to him, to accept biblical revelation."¹⁸

¹⁶ Julius Guttmann, *Philosophies of Judaism*, trans. by David W. Silverman (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), p. 331.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

Eternal truths are available to all men through reason, while revelation represents the transmission of certain messages to a particular people. Hence revelation encompasses only a special category of truth, not available through reason, but also not contradictory to it. Mendelssohn concludes that Judaism is not really revealed religion but revealed law. It is founded on the eternal truths which we come to know through reason, but these apply to all men. Hence the uniquely Jewish content of the revelation to Israel consists solely in the commandments, moral and ceremonial, which the Jews are obliged to observe until they are abrogated by divine ordinance.

Mendelssohn's Judaism is indistinguishable from the tradition of Israel in external form, but diverges from it in orientation. The natural theology he constructed in a position of priority alongside the Torah rejects the idea of revealed religion both as a system of belief and a way of life. In a perceptive analysis, Arthur Cohen has demonstrated the character of Mendelssohn's unorthodoxy:

Whereas Maimonides considered reason to be most pure and uncorrupt where it approaches prophecy and viewed the *halachah* as the regimen which assists the unreasoning to a life pleasing to God, Mendelssohn was to reverse the order, making its reasonableness that which commends Judaism to all men, while reserving the *halachah*, with all its irrationality, for that sectarian expression which differentiates Jew from non-Jew.¹⁹

Cohen also maintains that Mendelssohn "formalized the distinction of Judaism as a religion from Judaism as the community of the Jewish people."²⁰ The consequences of this were far-reaching, for in failing to recognize that the Torah was a complete culture,

Mendelssohn, more than having inaugurated a new era symbolized the irrevocable end of an earlier one. Hence-

¹⁹ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

forward, the union of the natural and the supernatural Jew would be both occasional and exceptional, an aberration and self-conscious dissent from that deep division to which the modern Jew has testified so profoundly and so tragically.²¹

In attempting a synthesis of Judaic and Western values, Mendelssohn unwittingly distinguished separate courses of Jewish development, one falling back on tradition without reference to the modern world and the other seeking a new basis of Jewish life in Gentile secularism. In previous circumstances, Jews had been able to incorporate the valuable elements of alien culture without sacrificing the tradition of Israel.²² Indeed, the resilience of Jewish history derives in part from the capacity of Jews to reformulate the substance of their own ethos in the context of historical change. The pattern of choice was never confined to a decision between stagnation and innovation, enabling the community to survive the state and the Diaspora to resist assimilation. But the modernist revolution imposed itself on Jewish life, forcing it to unnatural alternatives. Ultimately, the incongruities between tradition and modernism were swallowed up in a programme of secular nationalism which became the channel of assimilation. The course of politicization represents the option for "normalcy," the more misleading because it is concealed in Jewish imagery.

The phenomenon by which a particular form of modernism established a nearly monolithic hold over the many facets of Jewish life, secular and traditional, will come under consideration in the succeeding chapters. However, an important element in the transformation took place during the immediate pre-emancipation era and requires mention here. In Eastern Europe, where the disabilities of mounting anti-Semitism had inclined elements of the Jewish community to follow the Sabbatian heresy, a new movement, also related to the *Cab-*

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

²² See Selzer, *op. cit.*, p. 131–132.

bala, appeared in the form of Hasidism. Martin Buber regarded Hasidism as "the last intensive effort in modern history to rejuvenate a religion,"²³ and indeed, so far as Jewish history is concerned, this is essentially true. Hasidic sects sought to reconstruct characteristic Jewish piety as a living system. They breathed a new sense of communalism and purpose into the distressed Jewry of Poland and Russia. However, the world of eighteenth century Eastern European Jews which the *hasidim* sought to influence had already fallen under the spell of pseudo-messianism. Sabbatai Zevi's presumptuous self-appointment and abrogation of traditional observance was revived in a more extreme form a century later by the Polish Jew, Jacob Frank. In 1775 Frank announced that he was the reincarnation of Sabbatai Zevi, the true Messiah. To the following that gathered around him he denounced the *Talmud* and preached a cabbalistic trinitarianism in which he assumed role of Second Person. He also allegedly encouraged sexual license and ritual orgies which led to the excommunication of the sect and the intervention of the state. The Frankists then appealed to the authorities on the basis of their affinity to Christianity, and ultimately they submitted to baptism. The movement was suppressed when it became clear that it was only apparently Christian, but was revived by its founder following his imprisonment and perpetuated by his daughter into the nineteenth century.

Though the Frankists never commanded a majority of Jewish opinion in Eastern Europe, their appearance reflected the climate of unrest and a predisposition toward self-redemption and innovative speculation. Hasidism sought not only to reawaken the spirit of Judaism but also to "decontaminate the seriously diseased body of Messianism."²⁴ But while the *hasidim* did not try to "storm heaven" or "press the end," they were inspired by the *Cabbala* and remained deeply

²³ Buber, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

interested in the mystique of the Land, with all its messianic overtones. Baal-Shem-Tov (1700–1760), the founder of Hasidism, seriously considered a personal pilgrimage, but according to a group of legends was prevented by divine intervention. The message carried in these legends is a warning against the use of contrived magic in regard to Palestine, but later generations of the *hasidim* abandoned this taboo and actively sought to reestablish a bond with the Land.²⁵

Baal-Shem-Tov's great-grandson, Rabbi Nahman of Brazlav (1771–1810),²⁶ injected a spirit of migratory activity into Hasidism. His own visit to Palestine at the age of twenty-six was fraught with symbolic anecdotes suggesting immigration to the Holy Land as a programme of personal self-redemption. The obstacles he encounters on the journey are interpreted as challenges, encouraging the *hasid* to return to the Land through creative action. Hence the obstacles, among which is included the Arab population, exist to be overcome, and in destroying them the Jew rediscovers his holiness.

Though Hasidism remained rooted in the tradition of Israel and never became involved in large-scale programmes of immigration to the Holy Land, the conceptualism which Rabbi Nahman injected into the movement provided a bridge between religious precepts, messianic enthusiasm, and colonization of Palestine. Ultimately, it was the later generations of Eastern European Jewry, whose immediate ancestors were deeply touched by Hasidic thought, which concocted the Zionist idea. And though the pronounced secularism of the Zionist wing of *Haskalah* would have shocked and offended the *hasidim*, the mystique of the Land which they revived and the sense of movement and communalism which they transmitted provided avenues through which modern nationalism could be translated into a Jewish idiom.

On the eve of emancipation, Jewish life in Europe was

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 92–108.

conditioned to a climate of change. Though the majority of Jewish society remained loyal to tradition, regenerative forces like Hasidism lacked sufficient momentum, while experimentation with Gentile values, mass movements, and messianic speculation had gained currency in particular circles. The massive intrusion of Western secular culture which attended the emancipation therefore posed a profound challenge to Judaism as a religious system and a way of life. Throughout the nineteenth century and into our own time, the Jews have sought to meet this challenge in a variety of ways and with remarkable energy. What is perhaps most significant is that the question of what it is to be a Jew remains a matter of concern,²⁷ for the continuity of a specifically Jewish identity does depend upon the way in which "Jewishness" is defined. Historically, Judaism has always been able to survive a multiplicity of interpretations by reaffirming the unique vocation of Israel. Emancipation, however, threatened to envelop the Jewish ethos within a normative secularism by posing the "Jewish question" as a problem of non-conformity. The reaction of Jews was ambivalent, for most sought to participate in Western life while preserving a sense of Jewish identity. Much of the Jewish enlightenment addressed itself to this problem, and ultimately Zionism claimed to have provided a solution. It was on this basis that the Zionists asserted their right to represent the Jewish people, and thus their movement became the central issue in contemporary Jewish life.

The role and function of Zionism can only be properly understood against the background of Jewish tradition and in the context of the Jewish enlightenment. Having dealt with the former in the present chapter, we proceed now to a consideration of the relationship of Zionism to the broad spectrum of modernizing Jewish movements in the nineteenth century.

²⁷ See Selzer, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

CHAPTER II

ZIONISM AND THE JEWISH ENLIGHTENMENT

The Jewish “enlightenment” is a product of the revolutionary era, and constitutes a response to legal emancipation and a popularization of cosmopolitan ideals. The emancipation of all classes and minorities, which had been implicit in the political thought of Locke and the *philosophes*, was institutionalized by the French National Assembly in 1789, though it was not until two years later that this was extended to all Jews without qualification. Subsequently, Napoleon summoned an Assembly of Jewish Notables and a Sanhedrin (supreme court) to clarify and formalize the relationship of Jews to the French nation. At this point, emancipation proved to be a mixed blessing, for the legislation enacted by the Sanhedrin under pressure from the emperor merely confirmed Jewish loyalty to the state and conformity to society, rather than delineating specific rights by which Jews could live according to their own traditions without molestation. Indeed, it became increasingly apparent that Gentile Europe understood Jewish emancipation as a vehicle of assimilation, revealing a veiled anti-Semitism which sought to eradicate the eccentricities of the Jews through a programme of normative secular patriotism.

The French example had been preceded by an essentially condescending tradition of privilege and sympathy in Germany and England. But it was followed by a rash of emancipating legislation, often hesitating and incomplete, in the wake of Napoleon’s conquests. Except for the Hapsburg Empire, the Jews of Central and Western Europe were elevated to full

citizenship by mid-century, and became deeply involved in the social and economic life of their respective countries. The Jewish response to these developments was positive, effecting a transition in the character of Jewish life which assumed a variety of forms and extended far beyond the legal aspects of emancipation.

The aim of the Jewish Enlightenment was to create a hybrid culture which would incorporate the best of both worlds—Jewish and Western. This gave rise to a number of synthetic ideologies designed to bridge the gap between Judaic tradition and secular modernism, but which instead frequently resulted in the accommodation of the former to the latter. In Germany, the disciples of Mendelssohn had revived the Hebrew language to serve as the vehicle of transmitting secular learning. It was not long, however, before they fell back on German instead, undermining Mendelssohn's ideal of building a tradition which was simultaneously Western and Jewish.¹ The so-called "Berliner" culture which developed out of these initiatives had little distinctly Jewish content, and the temporary interruption of emancipation occasioned by the rise of conservatism after 1815 only encouraged the inclination of German Jewry to achieve integration.²

The German-Jewish Enlightenment was not confined, however, to assimilative cosmopolitanism. Indeed, many did become absorbed into the Gentile milieu around them and consciously left Judaism, some converting to Christianity and others forsaking religion altogether. But this did not prevent the continuing search for a cultural synthesis. The most prominent movements in Germany were Reform Judaism and the *Wissenschaft des Judenthums* (Science of Judaism).

The Reform movement began with the liturgical revision of public worship, first suggested by Israel Jacobson and then

¹ Howard Morley Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (New York: Delta, 1958), pp. 49–50.

² *Ibid.*, p. 140.

institutionalized with the founding of the Hamburg Temple in 1818. The innovations in religious service—including the introduction of prayers in German, the abolition of cantillation, and use of the organ—reflected a conformity to Christian practice without any particular rationale other than aesthetic preference. David Friedlander, one of Mendelssohn's outstanding followers, injected a spirit of rational inquiry into these beginnings, providing the intellectual framework for a new theology. During the 1840's, Samuel Holdheim, Abraham Geiger, David Einhorn, Gabriel Riesser, and others developed Reform Judaism into a comprehensive system of religious practice and belief. Geiger was the most balanced and perceptive member of this group, and in combining an appreciation of the past with the enthusiasm for modernization, he was instrumental in relating Reform to Jewish history.

The major premise of the new theology was that Judaism is an evolutionary religion, free to develop in accordance with changing circumstances of successive ages. The character of modern life had made the exclusivist aspects of Judaism obsolete, and therefore the national and ceremonial aspects of Jewish life should be discontinued. Emphasizing Israel's universal role as witness to the living God, the reformers stressed the Bible over the *Talmud* and eliminated the traditional petition for the coming of a personal Messiah and a national restoration in the Holy Land. Israel was defined as a religious community rather than a nation, and the messianic idea was interpreted in a figurative sense as the eternal hope for the redemption of man. The traditional observances were considered relevant only to a former age and were therefore discarded, while the moral law was emphasized as universally and eternally valid. There was dispute over such questions as circumcision and the Sabbath celebration, the more extreme favouring omission of the rite and the transfer of services to Sunday.

A central issue, which was debated at the Frankfurt Conference in 1845, was the degree to which Hebrew should be employed in services. The radicals wanted to keep Hebrew to

a minimum, while the more traditionally inclined element considered its extensive use as essential to the preservation of historical Judaism. The leader of this faction, Zachariah Frankel, finally led a secession from the conference which resulted in the formation of Conservative Judaism. In later years, when Reform went into decline in Germany, this new sect became the dominant one in Central and Western Europe. By combining traditional observance and theological flexibility, it drew adherents not only from Reform congregations but also from the orthodox community, which had developed a more sophisticated orientation under the leadership of Samson Raphael Hirsch.

Ultimately Reform Judaism reached its fullest expression in the United States, where it was first organized in the 1820's by members of the Jewish community in Charleston, South Carolina. In the following decade, Gustav Poznanski came from Germany to head this congregation, and subsequently some of the most prominent members of German Reform migrated to America to direct the movement. Included among these were Max Lilienthal, Isaac Meyer Wise, David Einhorn, Samuel Adler, Bernard Felsenthal, and Samuel Hirsch. In the relatively free atmosphere of American life, they were able to refine and expand Reform theology, bringing it to the apex of its development. The primary doctrines, eventually endorsed by the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh Conferences (1869 and 1885), stressed a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to religion, rejecting forms which had lost meaning and encouraging those which promoted faith and virtue. In particular, the notions of Jewish nationality and political restoration in Palestine were emphatically denied, while primary value was attached to the concept of Israel's election and universal mission.

The Reform tradition in America was most eloquently and comprehensively expressed in the thought of Kaufmann Kohler, who served for many years as president of the Hebrew Union College. The underlying premises of the Reform position were succinctly summarized by him in these words:

...the Torah as the expression of Judaism was never limited to a mere system of law. At the outset it served as a book of instruction concerning God and the world and became even richer as a source of knowledge and speculation, because all knowledge from other sources was brought into relation with it through new modes of interpretation.³

Kohler was perhaps the last of the great apologists of Reform Judaism. Though the movement remained a vital force in the United States, its message became increasingly overshadowed by the material growth of American Jewry and was eventually submerged by Zionism. The intrinsic problem of Reform had been detected in the early days by Geiger. Commenting on the prayer book adopted by the Hamburg Temple, he observed that the principle which guided it was "to reestablish the external conditions of devotion without clashing too much with the current views on prayer, and to remove such passages as were in conflict with the civil position of the Jews."⁴ Though the reformers were consistent with tradition in rejecting a political course for Jewish development, they were inclined to subordinate Jewish to Western criteria as a basis of reconstructing Judaism. The major contribution of Reform was that "by exposing many of the anachronisms and archaisms in Judaism, it liberated the educated Jews of the mid-nineteenth century from a literal belief in the Bible and *Talmud*, and obliged them henceforth to justify their religious tenets on historical premises."⁵

The return to history proved to be a double-edged sword. While it opened a new and valuable perspective by tracing the course and content of Jewish development, it also ran the risk of colouring the interpretation with the flowery and extravagant idealism of the nineteenth century. The historical

³ Kaufmann Kohler, *Jewish Theology, Systematically and Historically Considered* (New York: Macmillan, 1918), pp. 45–46.

⁴ David Philipson, *The Reform Movement in Judaism* (Cincinnati: Ktav, 1967), p. 32.

⁵ Sachar, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

school, known as the Science of Judaism, grew up in close conjunction with Reform, and involved some of the same personalities. Its acknowledged leader, Leopold Zunz (1794-1886), was originally a Reform preacher and in 1819 helped to establish the Society for Culture and the Science of Judaism in Berlin. The primary aims of this organization were to draw the Jews into the orbit of German culture while encouraging a sophisticated approach to Jewish studies. The former programme proved disastrous, since a number of the associates ultimately converted to Christianity and the journal published by the Society was given to Hegelian jargon and esoteric content. Similarly, the attempt to classify and interpolate Jewish literature was so ambitious that most of the members involved in this task quickly lost heart.

Though the Society itself was a failure, the Science of Judaism became a growing tradition. Zunz devoted the remainder of his long life to study of Jewish cultural history. He was able to demonstrate that the religious, philosophical, and poetic writings of the Jews comprised a rich literary tradition, and that there had always existed within Judaism a latitude of interpretive freedom expressed in the tradition of homiletics. The history of Jewish culture therefore did not suggest a rigid formalism but an intellectual resiliency capable of responding creatively to a changing environment. The main lacuna in Zunz's approach was that by emphasizing the Hegelian interpretation of history he lost touch with the uniqueness of Judaic tradition and the pathos of Jewish experience. The messianic vocation of the Jews is enveloped by the dialectical destiny of man, leaving little room for a specifically Jewish philosophy of history.

Other personalities in the Science of Judaism—Solomon Formstecher, Samuel Hirsch, Solomon Steinheim, Nahman Krochmal (1785-1840), and others—remained deeply rooted in post-Kantian idealism. Krochmal, however, represents a bridge to other systems of thought. In seeking “to demonstrate that the history of the Jew and the metaphysics of history are

intimately connected, that the Jew . . . was still at the centre of history,"⁶ he anticipated the later return to a more Judeo-centric formulation of theory.

When the Science of Judaism went into eclipse at the end of the century, two other traditions had already begun to dominate the intellectual climate of the post-enlightenment era. One of these sought to recover the unique spiritual content of Judaism, but by recourse to descriptive analysis and neo-Kantian rationalism rather than Hegelian dialectics. The major contributors to this school—Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903), Herman Cohen (1842-1918), and Leo Baeck (1874-1956)—constructed a Jewish religious philosophy based on a redefinition of Judaism as an ethical system. They were in search of the distinguishing characteristics of a specifically Jewish life, the focus of Jewish consciousness and experience, and felt they had found this in the moral order of Israel. The implications of their inquiry, however, were most profoundly understood by Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929), who moved even further from the historicist prescriptions of idealist thought. Rosenzweig was not concerned with historical becoming as such, but with the particular circumstances of religious understanding, of man's responsiveness to God. What is important about Israel is its ability to affirm God's love through its own obedience and humility, not through its constitution as nation, state, or territory. The totality and glory of Israel did not concern him, but the experience of fidelity in estrangement from the world. In Eastern Europe he found a sense of personal commitment in the context of suffering, which was absent in the "fragmented" Jewish communities of the West. In particular, he rejected nationalism in its modern form as a Jewish mode, for power was not the key to the identity of Israel. What mattered was the refusal to conform, the vocation of Israel as represented in continuing remnants of the Jewish people.

The other side of Krochmal's thought—the reassertion of

⁶ Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

peoplehood and national destiny—was later developed into a Jewish national movement, culminating in Zionism. The nationalists and the neo-Kantians were both concerned with the submergence of Jewish identity, but their respective methods of dealing with it were diametrically opposed. Whereas neo-Kantian Jewish philosophy sought to escape the estrangement of idealist thought by recovering the thread of Jewish spirituality, nationalism borrowed from many sources to build a broad populist movement based in chauvinistic ideology. At the end of the nineteenth century, these two traditions stood as alternate paths of Jewish development. In the course of events which transpired over the succeeding decades, Zionism established a pervasive ascendancy in Jewish circles, but often in generalized and sentimental terms and couched in the premises of various, frequently conflicting, ideologies. But like the other modern movements among the Jews, it is rooted in certain aspects of the Jewish Enlightenment, to which we now turn.

The Jewish national idea as a modern concept was first articulated by Moses Hess (1812-1875). Hess grew up in the assimilationist atmosphere of Germany and during much of his life was unconcerned with specifically Jewish matters. He became active in the socialist movement and was associated with Marx and Engels until he broke with them over their exclusively materialist approach to social dynamics. Ultimately he turned entirely from cosmopolitan pursuits and developed a Jewish philosophy of history.

Hess elaborated his views on the historical role of the Jewish people in his *Rome and Jerusalem*,⁷ published in 1862. It is a compository of Hegelian, socialist, and nationalist thought in the guise of a Jewish system. The title was intended to draw

⁷ Moses Hess, *Rome and Jerusalem, A Study in Jewish Nationalism*, trans. by Meyer Waxman (New York: Black, 1918).

a comparison between the Italian claims to Rome, then a lively issue, and the right of the Jews to centre their national life on Jerusalem. Influenced by racial concepts and the nationalist enthusiasm which had gained currency at that time, Hess subscribed to the notion of distinct ethnic types as the basic components of human society. Since each of these constituents was endowed with unique characteristics, they naturally gravitated toward national orientation as the vehicle of self-fulfilment. But there was a world scheme as well, in which the differing principles of each national type were thrust into a struggle for dominance. Central to this conflict was the Graeco-Jewish dichotomy. Whereas the Greek epitomized the static and disorganized life, the Jew represented the principles of historical evolution and existential unity. These two antithetical positions comprised the basic ideological polarity of history, and the messianic age which was about to dawn—the “Sabbath of History”—would witness the victory of the Jewish idea and the establishment of social harmony among men.

Hess was convinced that modern Western society, based as it was on Greek culture, was unwholesome and degenerate. This was particularly evidenced by the advent of liberalism, which he considered a sentimental feminine cult which doted on the idea of love and was divest of social consciousness. It was therefore essential for the Jews to avoid assimilation by such a culture, but this they could do only by reasserting their uniqueness and by reconstituting their national centre in Palestine. He was particularly critical of the Jewish Enlightenment, which sought to participate in the social and intellectual life of the West and threatened to lose the thread of Jewish identity. Yet Hess’ intellectual orientation was almost entirely without Jewish content. His reliance on Hegelian dialectics and the pseudo-scientific racism of the nineteenth century are as obvious as his misreading of Jewish history and tradition. The kind of national ethos that Hess had in mind for the Jews has no roots in the Jewish past, though he insisted that it did

and he admired the Orthodox on that account. It was really modern Western nationalism applied to the Jews, and therefore a programme as assimilative as most other modernist formulae that came out of the Jewish Enlightenment. The problem in this case was that the *Weltanschauung* of Judaism cannot really be accommodated to the metaphysical speculations of German idealism. Judaism asserts the transcendence of God and the redemption of man through a providential system of covenantal relationships. In this sense, it is God-centred. Idealism, on the other hand, is essentially man-centred. It acclaims the acquisition of divine attributes by communities of men, the descent of the "Absolute" into history. Hegel may have conceived the doctrine in highly spiritualized terms, but later generations of the idealist school translated it into a more anthropocentric philosophy, idealizing communities, classes, and ethnic types, and attributing superhuman qualities to them. Hence, the intellectual synthesis of Moses Hess and the later Zionists was destined to confront the Jews with substantial problems of identity and heritage.

Hess did not have a profound impact on his own age, and it was not until decades later that he was rediscovered by the Zionists. Yet he contributed to the intellectual climate which generated the Jewish national idea.

Another source of Zionist thought was the interest in international Jewish philanthropy which developed especially in England during the nineteenth century. An instance of the blood accusation⁸ in Damascus in 1840 and the increasing disabilities of Russian Jewry were particularly instrumental in fostering concern with the plight of Jews in many parts of the world. Sir Moses Montefiore (1784-1885), a prominent member of the Anglo-Jewish "establishment," was at the centre of much of the philanthropic activity and diplomatic intervention that ensued, although the movement was more significantly a philo-Jewish tradition among Gentiles.

⁸ The perennial anti-Semitic myth that Jews indulge in the practice of murdering Christians for their blood.

One of the interests generated by Jewish philanthropy was the promotion of Jewish settlement in Palestine.⁹ Early in the century the revival of millennarian thought by James Bicheno and others expressed anticipation of the restoration of the Jews to the Holy Land as an apocalyptic sign. This had some precedent in the religiously-oriented philo-Jewish movement of Cromwell's time, and stimulated a receptivity to the idea of Jewish colonization of Palestine as a humanitarian programme. Moses Montefiore took a special interest in the project, visiting the country several times and actively seeking to facilitate Jewish settlement and to ameliorate the condition of existing communities there. The Damascus affair, which shocked the British public, brought the Palestine scheme into politics. In 1840 the Earl of Shaftesbury proposed official endorsement of a colonization programme, and although this was never realized, the subject remained a public issue from this time forward. A number of organizations were formed to further the project: the British and Foreign Society for Promoting the Restoration of the Jewish Nation to Palestine, the Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine, the Society for the Promotion of Jewish Agricultural Labour in the Holy Land, and others. *The Jewish Chronicle* was established at this time by interested Jews and became an important vehicle for the popularization of Palestine colonization in Jewish circles, although many of the articles on the subject were by Christian authors.¹⁰ In France, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, formed in 1860 to improve the moral and material condition of Jews in all countries, also took an interest in Palestine, where it established a number of schools and agricultural training colonies.

Most important among the early British enthusiasts was Colonel George Gawler, former Governor of South Australia.

⁹ See Albert M. Hyamson, *British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine* (American Jewish Historical Society, 1918).

¹⁰ See *Jewish Chronicle and Hebrew Observer*, Jan. 3 and 10, 1862, Nov. 28, 1862, for examples.

Gawler actively campaigned for the establishment of Jewish colonies as the prelude to an autonomous Jewish commonwealth under Anglo-Turkish tutelage. He advocated this idea in several pamphlets and became involved in the work of the Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine, which sought to sponsor an autonomous colony in the Safad-Tiberias region through a concession from the Ottoman Government. Though this endeavour was unsuccessful, the Palestine project gained increasing appeal in Britain and was popularized by clergymen, authors, and statesmen. Prominent in the literature on the subject was George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda*, which stimulated a romantic receptivity to the idea of Israel's return to the Holy Land.

One of the most active supporters in the latter part of the century was the eccentric author and diplomatist, Laurence Oliphant. Following an exploratory visit to Palestine in 1879, he published a practical scheme for gradual Jewish settlement in Transjordan.¹¹ This proposal was seriously considered by the British and Ottoman governments, but was eventually abandoned because of a change in British administration and a sense of caution among Turkish officials as to the ultimate strategic role such a project might entail.

Though Oliphant was widely regarded as a philo-Semite, his biographer, Philip Henderson, suggests that he had no particular sympathy for the Jewish people, and indeed "shared much of the facile anti-Semitism of his time."¹² Though he was apparently quite genuinely moved by the plight of the Russian Jews in the 1880's, his original interest in the Palestine project seems to have been far more political than philanthropic. In a letter to the Marquis of Salisbury, dated November 14, 1878, his views in this regard are put forward explicitly:

¹¹ Laurence Oliphant, *The Land of Gilead, with Excursions in the Lebanon* (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1880).

¹² Philip Henderson, *The Life of Laurence Oliphant, Traveller, Diplomat, and Mystic* (London: Robert Hale, 1956), p. 203.

More than one attempt has indeed been made in this direction [to establish a Jewish colony in Palestine], but they have inevitably failed from the fact that they have been based rather upon the sentimental and religious ground than upon reasons of policy and finance. The present seems an occasion when the strong sympathies of a large portion of the British public might be taken advantage of to secure important political ends, and a substantial financial result. . . .¹³

Henderson concludes from this that "what Oliphant proposed was nothing less than the political and economic penetration of Palestine by Britain, with the Jews used as pawns in the game," while the idea of clothing such a project in the guise of finding a home for the Jews was "typical of the general mixture of motives in this era of colonial expansion . . ."¹⁴

The political content of Oliphant's approach to the Palestine scheme was further developed by Edward Cazalet, a British industrialist who had come into contact with Russian Jewry through business interests. The humanitarian aspect was magnified by the Russian Government's resort to official anti-Semitism in the 1880's, the source of much popular alarm in Britain. In general, however, the idea of Jewish colonization in Palestine was a romantic fad in the nineteenth century. Despite genuine philanthropic and religious concern, and the rather extravagant speculations in terms of imperial interests, the Palestine project remained a projection of Anglo-Saxon culture in the days when romanticism and imperialism had achieved their fullest expression and already begun to ebb. Ultimately, it was significant as an influence on Jewish thought, which it helped to fashion. Just as the other facets of the modernist movement among the Jews had borrowed from Western sources, those who were drawn to the Zionist idea were responding to initiatives and concepts which were not really Jewish in origin. The notion of the imminent restoration of Israel as developed in the nineteenth century was part of the

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

imaginative conjecture which dominated the age. It was conceived in programmatic and essentially patronizing terms. Yet its exterior appearance as a Jewish movement helped it to take root in Jewish minds. Later, the activist element in Western proto-Zionism was assumed by Jewish nationalists, concealing the accommodation to modernist values it entailed. In effect, the historicist messianism which had been created by Western idealists replaced the remnants of Judaic messianism in one segment of modern Jewish life, a development which is seldom recognized or profoundly understood.

The most important source of Zionism was the Jewish Enlightenment in Eastern Europe, where it was known by its Hebrew name, *Haskalah*.¹⁵ Despite the disabilities inflicted upon the Jews of Poland after 1648, they were able to maintain their communal integrity through the *kahal*, or system of self-government which had reached its fullest development in the sixteenth century. The Hasidic movement was also instrumental in preserving the sense of community and in revitalizing religious tradition. However, the gradual dissolution of the *kahal*, the partition of Poland, and the introduction of German-Jewish culture in the latter part of the eighteenth century deeply disturbed the course of Jewish life in this great centre of the Diaspora. Under Russian rule, Eastern European Jewry was virtually deprived of its traditional autonomy and confined to a shifting Pale of Settlement in the Russo-Polish borderland. In the nineteenth century it became increasingly clear that the government was determined to destroy the Jewish community by any means. At first, induced conversion, forced conscription, and other heavy-handed methods were tried. These eventually gave way in the 1840's to a policy of absorbing the Jews into Russian culture by enticing them to adopt a system

¹⁵ See Jacob S. Raisin, *The Haskalah Movement in Russia* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1913).

of secular education. Though the plan was ultimately abortive, it was well-received by the *maskilim* (adherents of *Haskalah*), who came to occupy an increasingly significant role in Russian-Jewish life.

The Jewish Enlightenment was introduced in Eastern Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century by a handful of Russian Jews who had studied in Berlin. Encouraged by the promptings of Western *maskilim* and the spasmodic hints at emancipation by the Russian monarchy, they fashioned themselves in the image of the Berlin intellectuals. The main exception was that they continued to cultivate Hebrew as the language of ideas, although this did constitute a parallel to the Science of Judaism and involved a disdain for the Yiddish-speaking masses.¹⁶

Isaac Baer Levinsohn (1788-1860) was the acknowledged father and dean of *Haskalah* in Eastern Europe, and its leading intellectuals included Nahman Krochmal and Solomon Rapaport (1790-1867). Despite the contribution of the *maskilim* to the advancement of Jewish letters and science, there was a marked tendency among many of them to jettison the legacy of Judaism and "Jewishness" in their endeavour to gain the recognition and acceptance of the Gentile environment. The first notable example of this was the collaboration of Max Lilienthal with the Russian Minister of Public Education, Count Uvarov, in establishing a system of secular schools in the Pale. The intention of the government was gradually to eradicate the peculiarities of Jewish culture by drawing the youth into a non-Jewish orbit under the tutelage of the *maskilim*. When the full extent of this aim became clear, the scheme aborted and Lilienthal immigrated to the United States. Yet Lilienthal, himself of German background, had been warned by the Jewish elders of the plan's real objective,¹⁷ and his refusal to heed this counsel and the support he enjoyed

¹⁶ Sachar, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

among the *maskilim* demonstrates the predisposition of the modernized elite.

With the accession of Alexander II in 1855, official attitudes became more relaxed and the changing character of the Jews became apparent in the growth of affluence, modern education, and social mobility among them. But the tenuousness of the Tsar's policies and their failure to enhance the civil status of the Jews created a pattern of ambivalence in Eastern European Jewish life which became increasingly complex with the passage of time.

In Germany and the West, the Jewish Enlightenment and the doctrine of emancipation were indissolubly linked, comprising a system of mutuality and interaction in response to a transitional age. But in Russia, the relationship between them remained awkward and strained.

The *Haskalah* movement was an extension of its German counterpart, but existed in a more unstable and insecure environment. The deference to modern culture which characterized the reaction of the *maskilim* to Uvarov's overtures was evident in the formation of the Society for the Diffusion of Enlightenment among the Jews, formed in the 1860's by a group of Jewish businessmen and intellectuals. The acknowledged aim of this Society was to encourage "Russification" as a solution to the Jewish problem, and its effect was to set the modernizing intelligentsia even further apart from the Jewish masses. The government responded favourably to this trend, permitting greater freedom of movement to "educated" and skilled Jews. This led to the establishment of cosmopolitan Jewish cliques in urban centres, most notably Odessa. The emancipated elite delegated to itself the role of leadership on behalf of the Jewish community, marking the transfer of directive function from traditional authorities to the *maskilim*. The overall result of these changes was that interpretation of the content and thrust of Jewish experience and history was increasingly assumed by an active minority which was as deeply influenced by Western conceptualism as it was estranged

from the life of the Pale. Though the Jewish "question" remained the primary concern, its understanding of the issues involved was determined by its affinity to secular culture.

The developing role of *Haskalah* was further influenced by changes in the structure of Russian society. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War had a profound impact on the country. The self-confidence which had been generated by the triumph against Napoleon suddenly gave way to uncertainty and introspection. The reforms of Alexander II were an attempt to encourage faith in the government's capacity for effective therapeutic activity, but their very inadequacy only confirmed the need for more radical approaches to the national problem.

The intellectual contingent, which had devoted itself to interpretive exchanges on Russian identity during the previous reign, now transformed itself into an expanding revolutionary class. Oriented in the populist and socialist traditions which had gained currency in Western politics, the new movement sought to infuse a sense of peoplehood and destiny in the Russian masses as the basis of constructing an integrated and egalitarian society. The underlying concern with Russia's political and cultural future expressed in the thought and programmes of the revolutionaries was also evident in the rise of Pan-Slavism. The somewhat self-conscious veneration of traditional values by the earlier Slavophiles was developed by the Pan-Slavs of the 1860's and 70's into a racist doctrine which pictured the Eastern Question as a struggle for ascendancy between irreconcilable archetypes—Slav and German. They avidly endorsed a forward policy in the Balkans and Russian participation in the south Slav liberation movements, demonstrating a recourse to idealized chauvinism as the key to Russia's destiny.

Both the Pan-Slav and revolutionary movements reflected the emergence of a more active approach to Russia's problems—the decline of leadership and the divisiveness of society. They also signified the gradual transfer of directive influence from established authority to the Westernized intelligentsia,

which was groping its way toward a cultural synthesis and a political transformation. Implicit in the social philosophy of each was the reconstruction of the Russian mass under a programme which would be Western in form and Russian in content.

The gravitation of the *maskilim* toward "Russification" in the 1860's drew them into the orbit of radical thought. Simon Dubnow describes the initial phase of this development:

The masters of thought in that generation, Chernychevsky, Dobrulubov, Pisarev, Buckle, Darwin, and Spencer, became also the idols of the Jewish youth. The heads which had but recently been bending over the Talmud folios in the stuffy atmosphere of the heders and yeshibahs were now crammed with the ideas of positivism, evolution, and socialism. Sharp and sudden was the transition from rabbinic scholasticism and soporific hasidic mysticism to this new world of ideas, flooded with the light of science, to these new revelations announcing the glad tidings of the freedom of thought, of the demolition of all traditional fetters, of the annihilation of all religious and national barriers, of the brotherhood of all mankind.¹⁸

This general affinity to radical and iconoclastic thought became gradually qualified as the direction of the *avant garde* movements became more clearly defined in the 1870's. The influence of Slavophile concepts was evident not only in the chauvinism of Pan-Slavic thought, but also in the early phase of the radical movement, which was known as "Populism." The first of the revolutionary organizations, *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom), employed the slogan "To the People" and considered the liberation and awakening of the Russian masses as the basic ingredient in any substantial transformation of society. Though later revolutionaries adopted a more cosmopolitan approach, the populist interpretation remained

¹⁸ Simon Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, trans. by Israel Friedlaender (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916-1920), II, 209.

indigenous to Russian socialism and was clearly manifest in the dominant Socialist Revolutionary Party.

The ethnocentrism of the radical and Pan-Slav movements mirrored a broader tendency in this direction throughout Europe and raised an intricate question as to the possibilities of Jewish participation. At this stage, *Haskalah* split into separate courses of development. One contingent remained committed to the "Russification" tradition championed by Judah Loeb Gordon, employing Russian language journals such as *Razvet* (Dawn) to spread the gospel of enlightenment among the Jewish community. But those concerned with maintaining a more uniquely Jewish programme of activity fell back on Hebrew and Yiddish, respectively, as appropriate modes of expression and cultural orientation.

Ultimately, the Hebraist and Yiddishist interpretations of Jewish experience became dominant in Eastern Europe. They stood as rival schools—one rooted in the romantic futurism of the disillusioned elite and the other remaining close to the life of the *shtetl*,¹⁹ sharing its humour, its tribulations, and its scepticism. Institutionally, the two traditions culminated in Zionism and autonomism, which stood not only as divergent political approaches to the Jewish problem, but as opposite philosophies of Jewish life.

Perez Smolenskin (1842-1885) was the first of the Hebrew revivalists and the direct precursor of Zionism. He made his way from the Pale to Odessa in the 1860's and finally settled in Vienna, where he edited the Hebrew journal *Ha-Shahar* (The Dawn) for many years. Smolenskin consciously sought to establish a middle ground between tradition and *Haskalah*; while his vitriolic criticism of orthodoxy was typical of the *maskilim*, his differences with them were a matter of emphasis rather than substance. He admonished the modernists against selfless imitation, but his own formula for Jewish life was patterned after the political ideologies of his Gentile contemporaries. The doctrine of Jewish nationalism he championed

¹⁹ *Shtetl* were the small towns in the Pale of Settlement.

was really a variation of the common stock of European movements, differentiating the Jews in terms of their culture rather than the uniqueness of their experience and suffering. Though Smolenskin maintained that religion and nationality were inseparable in Jewish tradition, he regarded the national character of Israel as more deeply rooted than its religious history. Israel existed because of national sentiment, not because of the Law, and therefore the Jews were more than a community of belief.²⁰ Indeed, religion is little more than an attribute of national culture in Smolenskin's thought, and in this respect he manipulated Jewish history to suit his own social philosophy. He wanted the Jews to be like all the nations in their collective life and therefore unlike them in the content of their culture.

Eliezar ben Yehudah (1858-1922), the celebrated Hebraist and contributor to *Ha-Shahar*, developed the Jewish national idea within the context of Palestine colonization, which had already been popularized by the *Jewish Chronicle* and the philo-Semites. This added an activist dimension to the doctrine of Jewish nationhood on the eve of renewed persecution by the state, and thereby became an important factor in the formation of early Zionism.

Following the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, the Russian Government decided on a policy of active anti-Semitism as a means of arresting the general revolutionary movement in the country. The problem of security that this raised for the Jews stood in sharp contrast to the tradition of emancipation, which was quite advanced in the West and had begun to take root in Russia. The sympathetic attention of Jewish and liberal opinion the world over was drawn to the plight of Russian Jewry, but most significant in terms of ideas was the impact of these developments on the *maskilim*. The position of Smolenskin and Ben Yehudah became particularly attractive because it embraced at the same time an essentially

²⁰ Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea, A Historical Analysis and Reader* (New York: Doubleday, and Herzl Press, 1959), pp. 145-147.

modern ideology and a programme of rights and self-assertion.

One of the more notable converts to Jewish nationalism in the period after 1881 was Moses Loeb Lilienblum (1843-1910). Lilienblum's life spanned many of the phases of the Jewish intellectual upheaval in the nineteenth century, and reflects the transition to nationalism which forms one aspect of the history of *Haskalah*. Raised in the traditional Orthodox manner, he began his career as instructor in the *Talmud*. In his early twenties, he supported the vogue of religious reform, but later turned completely from Jewish interests and identified with the nihilist cult which had gained currency among the educated youth in Russia. His message to the Jews was curt and revolutionary: "Provide bread! Fresh air! Concern yourselves with the peace and happiness of our suffering brethren and sisters! Save our youth from extinction! Show them the road to life so they may not exhaust themselves blundering in the dark."²¹ What Lilienblum looked to was the transformation of the Jews into a normal people in a world freed from superstition and dedicated to the material welfare of the people.²² He regarded Hebrew as an impediment to the assimilation of the Jews in a free Russia, and the idea of Jewish nationality as absurd.

After 1881, Lilienblum completely shifted his ground, rejecting assimilation as the key to the Jewish future. Having lost faith in the beneficence of the socialist movement, he declared that the Jews would be faced with the same difficulties under a socialist regime as they had experienced under Tsarist rule.²³ Hence there was only one course open to the Jews—the revival of a national life in Palestine. The rise of nationalism among the cosmopolitan *maskilim* was not, however, an inconsistent or unlikely development. In the context of the changing values which characterized the age and the unex-

²¹ Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), I, 126.

²² *Ibid.*, I, 127.

²³ *Ibid.*, II, 162.

pected imposition of external disabilities, nationalism was a logical position for the Jewish modernists of Eastern Europe to assume. Since their concern was to construct a system in which Jewish rights, identity, and enlightenment could be harmoniously realized, the national idea seemed to provide a natural vehicle for the solution of the Jewish "question" in all its dimensions.

The problem with this formula, however, was that it lost touch with the theme of Jewish history and misinterpreted the issue confronting the Jews in modern times. The national orientation of diasporan Jewry had none of the attributes common to the nationalist ideologies of nineteenth century Europe. Judaism was, to be sure, more than a religious ideal, but its communalism was not conceived in political terms. The argument put forward by the early Zionists that the destruction of the *kahal* had undermined the national structure of Jewish life and necessitated its reformulation as a sovereign entity overlooked the intent and character of Jewish autonomy in the past. The old dispensation had been concerned with preserving the integrity of Israel outside the context of external norms. It specifically rejected accommodation to political practice, seeking to maintain the continuity of Jewish witness in an alien world. The concept of Jewish nationalism, on the other hand, was a product of secular culture which happened to suit the emotional needs of the *maskilim* at a particular stage in their experience. And its later popularity in Jewish circles does not alter the fact that with respect to the tradition of Israel and the practice of Judaism over many centuries, it remains an innovation.

A second lacuna in Jewish national ideology was that in emphasizing the Jewish "problem" as a matter of rights, it failed to recognize the more substantial issue of fidelity. The real crux of the Jewish crisis has been the capacity of the Jews to retain the content of Jewish tradition and experience in the face of an alien culture which threatened to absorb them. The function of "civilization" proceeds from the search for a

measure of man, a standard of value which alone makes human endeavour worthwhile and meaningful. It aspires to discipline and obligation rather than prerogative and justification as the source of fulfilment. Jewish tradition rests firmly on this criterion, and its vitality is the product of a continuing effort to maintain the order of Israel. This is not to suggest that the problem of suffering is to be discarded or that isolation is the condition of integrity, but to point out that disability is not the issue of Jewish development. Anti-Semitism is a Jewish concern but a Gentile problem, and as such it cannot provide a satisfactory basis for a specifically Jewish programme. Indeed, Jewish recourse to the politics of emancipation as the ultimate system of value implies a subtle accommodation to the anti-Semitic view that "normalization" is the key to the Jewish "problem."

The repressive policies of Alexander III brought the problem of Jewish persecution to the forefront of world concern. The subject gained prominence in the Western and Jewish press, and stimulated a variety of rescue activity resulting most significantly in a sizeable Russian-Jewish emigration to America. Of equal importance in the long run, though on a relatively small scale at that time, was the emergence of an active national movement which aimed at Jewish colonization of Palestine.

The spirit of practical nationalism was reflected in a small pamphlet—*Auto-Emancipation*—published in 1882 by Leo Pinsker (1821-1891). The thrust of Pinsker's argument was that assimilation was impossible because "Judeophobia" is a hereditary and incurable psychic aberration."²⁴ Nationalism was therefore the only solution to the Jewish problem, and the Jews should locate an appropriate territory in which to found their state, whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Pinsker was opposed to sentimental attachment to Palestine and to the

²⁴ Leo Pinsker, *Auto-Emancipation*, edited by A.S. Eban (London: Federation of Zionist Youth, 1932), p. 19.

belief in a redeeming messiah.²⁵ A complete secularist, he was interested only in the practical aspects of self-emancipation, and in popularizing the idea of territorial statehood.

Coincident with Pinsker's appeal was the *Hibat Zion* (Love of Zion) movement involving a number of societies devoted to the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine. The most important of these was *Hoveve Zion* (Lovers of Zion), which was instrumental in inducing the migration of several thousand in the early 1880's. Though this first *aliyah* (wave) was generally unsuccessful, it did result in the formation of the earliest Zionist colonies, which became the nucleus of Jewish settlement in the country.

Hibat Zion was in no sense a religious movement. Most of the participants were drawn from *Haskalah* and the early nationalist school. One society, known as BILU (from the Hebrew slogan, "House of Jacob, Let Us Go"), was Marxist in orientation and composed of highly Russianized students from the University of Kharkov.²⁶ Though the Hasidic background from which many of the *maskilim* had emerged indirectly influenced *Hibat Zion* through its emphasis on community and mystical interest in Palestine, the real motivation was secular and nationalist. The colonists, moved to adventure by the frustrating circumstances surrounding them, were in search of an environment in which they could develop normal institutions. Palestine was suggested to them perhaps largely because of the romantic interest in the Holy Land which had been generated in various circles during the nineteenth century, though also because of its appeal in terms of national ideology. Certainly, the sympathy and support of Moses Montefiore, Edmond de Rothschild, Laurence Oliphant, and others reinforced their enthusiasm. It is evident, however, that the *Hibat Zion* movement had almost no knowledge of Palestine and little commitment to it in terms of Jewish tradition.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 32.

²⁶ Ismar Elbogen, *A Century of Jewish Life*, trans. by Moses Hadas (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1960), p. 254.

In 1884, the *Hoveve Zion* convened a conference at Kattowitz in Upper Silesia near the converging borders of Austria, Russia, and Germany. This was an event of special significance, since it marked the first international Jewish gathering to deliberate the Palestine question. Leo Pinsker, though himself far from deeply attached to Palestine, served as presiding officer, and his election as its president signified the initial convergence of the national idea and the colonizing programme. The interaction of the two principles was limited at this stage, and the end of the decade found *Hibat Zion* an eclipsed experiment and Dr. Pinsker serving as chairman of the Society for Supporting Jewish Agriculturalists and Artisans in Syria and Palestine, a group devoted to keeping the idea of Palestine settlement alive. But the cooperation between Pinsker and the *Hoveve Zion* was the real beginning of modern Zionism, which became a conscious movement in the next decade and was finally organized by Theodor Herzl in 1897. Though Zionism was hardly a majority Jewish movement, it stood as one of the more dynamic and appealing products of the Jewish Enlightenment at the end of the nineteenth century. In the course of the following fifty years, it gradually established its hegemony in the Jewish world, despite its intrinsic differences with tradition and other forms of Jewish modernism. Its victory therefore comprises what may accurately be called the Zionist revolution.

CHAPTER III

THE ZIONIST REVOLUTION

The developmental framework within which Zionism grew into an elaborate ideology and a comprehensive political system was dominated by three prevailing circumstances which exercised a profound formative influence on the character of the movement. The first is that Zionism was an outgrowth of the Jewish Enlightenment, and as such embraced the contemporary European "ideals of national cohesion and social justice—the mystique of science and technology, the glamour of enterprise, the dignity of manual toil, the inherent virtue of peasants, the cult of physical exercise, the priority of romantic love, the nobility of the daring gesture, and the purity of revolutionary violence"¹ The insistence of its adherents that Zionism represents a return to Jewish values does not alter the fact that Zionist ideology is rooted in the conceptual themes of nineteenth century European thought, and reflects a modernist rather than a Judaic perspective.

Secondly, Zionism began as a minority Jewish movement, though its own premises were predicated on a general concurrence that the Jews comprise a nation legally entitled to Palestine as its rightful homeland. Yet the Orthodox community regarded Zionism as a profane doctrine, while significant segments of the Jewish Enlightenment and the Jewish labour movement rejected it as atavistic or elitist. The circumstance of Zionism's minority status created an awkward relationship

¹ Marmorstein, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

between the movement and the Jewish world. The Zionists approached the uncommitted Jew as a misdirected compatriot, whose loyalties were to be brought into conformity with the Zionist view of Jewish character and destiny through political reeducation. Persistent opposition came to be regarded as either a stubborn conservatism or a concealed form of Jewish anti-Semitism. "Conquest of the communities" became a watchword of organized Zionism in the early years, and reflected the extent to which the Zionist attitude toward Jewish society was both patronizing and manipulative. The inherent problem in this viewpoint was that Zionism assumed the role of an infallible doctrine with regard to which the Jews became a political object without authority or the right of self-determination. This ultimately confined the dimensions of modern Jewish opinion within the framework of a nationalist ideology and dwarfed the more substantial content of modern Jewish religious philosophy, which was in a promising stage of development at the time Zionism appeared.

Finally, Zionism developed in the shadow of an external circumstance which eventually proved the most tragic in existential terms. Palestine had long since ceased to be an essentially Jewish land, and the gradual participation of its depressed population in the Arab revival was coincident with the rise of Zionism. The fact of an overwhelming indigenous Arab majority confronted the Zionists with an imposing ethical problem, which for the most part they chose not to acknowledge. The earlier Zionist writings almost entirely ignored the Arab issue, forwarding the idea of a Jewish national revival in Palestine without regard to the reality that an exclusively Jewish state would entail the expulsion of the existing population. What reference there was to the Palestinian Arabs was generally derogatory and detached, denying their claim to the land and status as a people. The dehumanized image of the Palestinians which the Zionists developed and propagated was instrumental in displacing the moral issue and establishing an aura of legal justification around Zionist goals and activity.

This did not, however, alter the inescapable fact that Zionism was up against a very serious ethical question, the response to which would be a crucial factor in determining the character of the movement.

The diverse and increasingly complex nature of Zionist thought and activity in the ensuing years can be understood only against this circumstantial background. The disputations of Zionist theorists and the policies of the leadership generally relate back to the contradictions and tensions within the Zionist system itself, though the personalities themselves frequently function in terms of a highly selective ideological framework. But it is precisely this idealized self-image which has obscured the actual psychological and intellectual structure of Zionism by holding up a simplified version as the reality.

The Zionist idea emerged gradually in the context of the Jewish Enlightenment and the changing conditions and intellectual climate of nineteenth century Europe. The central themes—both inherited from the West—were the concept of a Jewish nationality and the romance of settlement in Palestine. Nationalism and colonialism were among the dominant political predilections of the age, and developed intense doctrinaire characteristics in the late century. Though neither of these expressions of secular activism has substantive roots in Jewish culture, the messianic interest in Palestine and the sustained communalism of the Jews in dispersion provided an external appearance of Jewish affinity to the Zionist programme. But the primary stimulus to the founding and development of Zionism was the impact of chauvinistic nationalism on the social and intellectual life of the West. The crisis of identity in the industrial age seemed to revolve around the state as representative of viable ethnic communities in which the individual could achieve a sense of purpose and direction. Not only did the national unit hold out the prospect of participation and personal fulfilment, but isolation from it threatened a corresponding alienation in the context of evolving social conditions and ideals.

The general political emancipation introduced by the French Revolution placed the Jewish communities of Europe under the pressure to conform to the emerging patterns of corporate existence, a powerful influence to which the Jews themselves were highly sensitive. Ultimately, the impulse to conform assumed various postures, the most subtle of which was the construction of a Jewish nationalism in the form of the Zionist movement.

The first expressions of Zionism were the development of a Jewish nationalist ideology by Moses Hess and the European Hebraists, and the creation of small colonies by the Lovers of Zion. Subsequent participants in the early movement gradually formulated an extensive body of ideological doctrine, reflecting a variety of approaches to the idea of a corporate Jewish revival in Palestine. The interpretive schools stressed the socio-economic, cultural, and political aspects of the project, and though a divergence of emphasis became quite extreme in some cases, the theme of popular national renaissance remained common to all. The focus of attention for all the Zionists was the transformation of Jewry into a culturally vitalized and socially viable sovereign community centred in Palestine. The values and structure of traditional Judaism were set aside in favour of a revolutionary programme, the guiding principle of which was "negation of the Diaspora."

The component schools of early Zionism first appeared in the period between the decline of *Hibat Zion* and the beginning of the twentieth century. The political aspect, which was implicit in the idea of nationalism as borrowed from the West, had been expressed by Pinsker in his *Auto-Emancipation*, but was not systematically expostulated until the publication of Herzl's scheme. In the meantime, the fundamentals of economic and cultural Zionism were developed by Ahad Ha-Am and Aaron David Gordon, establishing a spectrum of interpretation which political Zionism later incorporated in the process of its own search to control the movement.

Economic or "practical" Zionism began with the adven-

turous and ill-fated Lovers of Zion movement. The appeal of Jewish colonizing activity in Palestine did not, however, prove a passing fancy, and ultimately became the driving force behind the Zionist labour movement. The first to construct a systematic philosophy of Palestinian settlement as the basis of Jewish revival was Aaron David Gordon (1856-1922). Gordon's background was typical of the Eastern European *maskilim*. Born into a devout Jewish family in Poland, he came to reject tradition in favour of the nationalist ideal, which was first popularized in his youth. He was particularly drawn to the Lovers of Zion movement and in 1904 took up residence in Palestine.

Gordon's basic position was that labour is valuable to man for moral as well as economic reasons. Work involves men in creative activity and is the vehicle through which they develop a vital and spiritually quickening relationship with nature. Hence, "A living people always possesses a great majority to whom labour is second nature."² From this principle Gordon deduced what was to him the essence of the modern Jewish problem—the cultural atrophy of the Jews arising from their lack of sustained contact with the soil. The cultural stagnation of traditional Judaism was, for Gordon, the natural outgrowth of an unnatural way of life. Thus, there could be no regeneration of the Jews without a return to labour on the land. The mission of Zionism was the reestablishment of the Jews as a people and a culture through promotion of Palestinian settlement in labour colonies:

... We are charged with the task of regeneration of the nation ... from now on our chief ideal must be labour ... Our future culture ... must grow out of the soil, from labour upon the soil ... [But] back of the ideal of labour there must be the purpose of recreating life ... for labour consists not

² Aaron David Gordon, *Selected Essays*, trans. by Frances Burnce (New York: League for Labor Palestine, 1938), p. 52.

alone as an economic force, but in general, as a force in the creation of the life of the people.³

Gordon's philosophy reflected the current emphasis on vitalism and adventure, stimulated by the popularization of Darwinian concepts and the imperial episodes of the time. The Palestine colonization movement, for which Gordon provided an ideological rationale, was itself a microcosmic manifestation of the contemporary interest in exploration and involvement in political projects overseas, and not in any sense an expression of messianic fervour. Similarly, Gordon's views on labour and culture were derived from a theme developed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henri Bergson, and the pragmatists, and have no specifically Jewish origin. Yet the Zionists believed that they were reasserting a uniquely Jewish ethos in the face of an assimilative environment. The paradox of Zionism, in which Gordon shared, was that its dedication to the preservation of Jewish identity and cohesiveness was at the same time an expression of concern over the problem of assimilation and a reaction against the traditional bases of Jewish life and thought in favour of "normalization" along Western lines. Many of the Zionist thinkers tried to resolve this ambivalence in their philosophic systems, which consequently display the inconsistency which stems from the attempt to reconcile conflicting ideals.

Gordon was devoted to the revitalization of Jewish life in the collective and national sense. The return to the soil was not an end, but a means through which a spiritual and moral renaissance could be achieved. The problem with this system is that it seeks to constitute a specifically Jewish programme of allegiance and collective development without reference to any of the religious precepts of Israel. Like the majority of the early Zionist ideologists, he was exclusively concerned with a populist reconstruction and his ultimate loyalty was to the

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 20, 33, 56, 94.

Jewish people as such rather than to any particular ideal or ethic: "The nation is the prophet; man is the saviour. As for me, I shall trust in the power of the people so long as I shall have faith in man and in life."⁴ This idolization of a national community was common to many of the social and political movements of the West in the nineteenth century, but stands in sharp contradiction to the values of Judaism, which emphasize the transcendence of ultimate purity and Israel's constant need for refinement through humility, self-criticism, and obedience. The question which confronted the Zionists then, and which continues to remain before them today, is whether it is possible to preserve an identity which, though in some sense Jewish, is not really Israelite.

Gordon's contemporary, Ahad Ha-Am (1856-1927), was the founder of a related but separate school which came to be known as "cultural" or "spiritual" Zionism. A profound thinker and talented Hebrew essayist, Ahad Ha-Am is generally regarded as the central figure within Zionism to oppose the movement's tendency to stress the material aspects of Jewish regeneration. In his first article, published in 1889 under the title "The Wrong Way,"⁵ he severely attacked the preoccupation of the early Russian Zionists with the economic rather than the cultural advantages of settlement in Palestine. Later, he became equally concerned with the insensitivity of Jewish colonists to the ethical problem of Arab displacement and the inclination to militancy in the achievement of Zionist goals. But while on the one hand he was one of the most perceptive critics of Zionism in practice, he shared the populist orientation of others in the movement and valued Judaism for its role in the development of national culture rather than its intrinsic worth as an interpretation of reality.

Like Hess, Ahad Ha-Am considered Judaism's great contri-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵ Ahad Ha-Am, *Ten Essays on Zionism and Judaism*, trans. by Leon Simon (London: Routledge, 1922), pp. 1-24.

bution to be its unitarianism, its integration of spiritual and material values. But it was the people themselves who constructed this world view in the course of developing their national life in Palestine through the interplay of mundane and prophetic traditions. The prophets did not come to destroy the state, but to prevent the ascendancy of materialism by reintroducing ethical ideals. This sense of balance was passed on to the Pharisees, who stood between the Sadducees as the party of political materialism and the Essenes, who opposed the state and withdrew from public life. Hence the religious figures and traditions in Jewish history were dedicated to a national life based on unitarian principles, and only when constituted as such could the Jews be considered a holy and a messianic people. In a balanced national life, the Jews would become a super-people, which is in itself the goal of Jewish life and of the world. Today, the shadowy national life provided by Talmudism is obsolete and threatened by disruptive external forces, and therefore the Jews must find some other way to reconstitute and preserve their national status. For Ahad Ha-Am the answer to this challenge was the establishment of a "centre" in Palestine. A new contact with the "Land" based on "Love of Zion" was the only means by which the modern Jews could revive their national life. The return of all was neither necessary nor possible. What mattered was the existence of a regenerative centre in Palestine.

Ahad Ha-Am opposed both the economic positivism of the *Hoveve Zion* and the territorial statism of the political Zionists. They had missed the point by cherishing only the material aspects of national revival, whereas the Jewish national idea had always been based on a blend of material and spiritual considerations. Its distinction was derived from its unitarian approach to life, and since the end was neither exclusively material nor spiritual, the means must involve a combination of settlement in the "Land" and renaissance of the soul. Affirmation of the Diaspora as the foundation of Jewish experience and preoccupation with territorial viability in Palestine were

equally fallacious approaches to the Jewish question. Both involved a compromise with the ways and concerns of the common world, and could not contribute to the modern Jewish revival. Only "Love of Zion" could do that.

The paradox of Ahad Ha-Am's thought was his expression of spiritual ideals in mundane terms. Arthur Hertzberg, who has appropriately dubbed him the "agnostic rabbi," points out that "his religious faith had been shaken by his secular studies, and he could reformulate his Jewish loyalty only by defining and defending it in terms borrowed from his intellectual gods, Darwin, Spencer, and the positivist sociologists."⁶ It is this combination of religious doubt and Jewish loyalty that is most basic in the philosophy of Ahad Ha-Am. Though attracted to secularism, he was convinced of the ultimate importance of intangible over material factors in the course of human development. For Jews, the future lay in a rediscovery of the dimensions of peoplehood. In constructing a spiritual doctrine on the national ethos of an ethnic community, Ahad Ha-Am was inadvertently drawing from the ideology of the Russian populists and Pan-Slavists, whom he consciously abhorred for their anti-Semitism. The Jewish populism which emerges as the central theme in his thought is largely a variation of the idealist doctrines, which the Slavic nationalists had borrowed from the West in the twilight of Russia's imperial age. These, in turn, were converted by the Zionists into national programmes and ideologies which were Jewish in name but Gentile in content.

In an essay entitled "Judaism and Nietzsche,"⁷ Ahad Ha-Am developed the main lines of Jewish populism, which was to become a common denominator of Zionist thought. Taking issue with the primitivism of the more extreme Hebraists, he suggested that the Jews had become a super-people

⁶ Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁷ Ahad Ha-Am, *Essays, Letters, Memoirs*, trans. by Leon Simon, (London: East and West Library, 1946), pp. 76-82.

through moral as opposed to physical fortitude. He agrees with Nietzsche "that the highest moral aim is not the advancement of the human race as a whole, but the realization of a more perfect [*sic*] human type in the chosen few." But he rejects Nietzsche's "Aryan" orientation, his attachment to relative ideals of strength and beauty. Ahad Ha-Am felt that Hebraic values were more profoundly related to the superman idea: "... Judaism has never based its teaching on mercy alone, and has never subordinated its own type of superman to the mass of mankind, as though the whole aim and object of his existence were simply to increase the general welfare of the race." The Jews stand for Ahad Ha-Am as a collective image of the superman, a super-people because of their excellence in the pursuit of truth and justice. Their welfare is therefore an end in itself and the world was created for their sake. Indeed, the Jews themselves have always "regarded their election as an end to which everything else was subordinate, not as a means to the happiness of the rest of humanity."

The notion that Israel's mission is to spread fraternity and well-being among men sprang, in Ahad Ha-Am's view, from the popularization of egalitarian ideals after the French Revolution. Reform Judaism, which had helped to spread this erroneous belief, therefore represented a compromise with the sentimental values of the non-Jewish world and had obscured the higher concept of Israel's election. Ahad Ha-Am saw himself as a Jewish Zarathustra, dedicated to the restoration of a higher ethic among his people. Like Nietzsche, he regarded Christianity as the source of sentimental humanitarianism, which had served to negate the idea of self-transcendence and the image of superior man. To succumb to Christianity meant to subvert the goal of creation and retard the course of history. Similarly, only when the Jews realize again that their only "mission as a people is to be a super-nation in their moral sense," can they resume the historic role which destiny has cast upon them:

There must be one nation whose inherent characteristics make it better fitted than the others of moral development, and whose scheme of life is governed by a moral law superior to the common type of morality, so that it may provide the ideal conditions for the growth of the superman we want. This idea opens up a wide prospect, in which Judaism appears in a new and splendid light, and many of its alleged shortcomings, which the world condemns and our own apologists are at pains to deny or excuse, turn out to be actually evidence of its superiority.

Though cultural Zionism later became known for its moderation and sensitivity to the ethics of the Arab problem, it was initially stated as a populist ideology with metaphysical overtones. Ahad Ha-Am was absorbed in the genius and special destiny of a people, and subordinated religious concepts to social utility. In the absence of a positive assertion with regard to the existence and commandments of a transcendental God, the Jewish people as such assume the attributes of a divine entity in the context of cultural Zionist thought. This contributed to the secular ethnocentrism which Ahad Ha-Am later criticized in practice, but which he originally stimulated.

The writings of Ahad Ha-Am comprise part of a larger body of theoretical speculation which was directed at a relatively small intellectual audience, but had a much broader impact on the movement as a whole. A related, and even more esoteric, school was composed of poets and essayists who conceived of Zionism as a revival of "Hebrew" as opposed to "Jewish" culture. The most prominent among the first representatives of this interpretation were Mica Berdychewski (1865-1921) and Saul Tchernichowsky (1875-1943), in whose works are found early expressions of Zionism.

Deeply influenced by the doctrine of social Darwinism, Berdychewski felt that the Jewish revival depended upon a revolt against the sentimental residue of tradition and a recourse to collective self-assertion. The Jewish problem consisted in the subordination of peoplehood to religion: "The

Jews became secondary to Judaism.”⁸ The Dispersion had played a major role in the submergence of the Jewish folk spirit, and therefore regeneration depends upon rescuing the Jews from their religion: “We must cease to be Jews by virtue of an abstract Judaism and become Jews in our own right, as a living and developing nationality.”⁹ In this vein, Berdychewski advocated a transvaluation of values, for “Jewish scholarship and religion are not the basic values But the people of Israel came before them—‘Israel precedes the Torah.’”¹⁰

The function of Zionism in Berdychewski’s view was to establish a new Hebrew identity, to preside over the dissolution of diasporan culture and establish a folk cult which looked to the pre-Mosaic Hebrews for inspiration. It was the warrior assertiveness of early tribalism that was responsible for the cultural vitality of the Hebrews, and the modern Jews should also live by the sword rather than the book:

There is a time for men and nations who live by the sword, by their power and their strong arm, by vital boldness. This time is the hour of intensity, of life in its essential meaning. But the book is no more than the shade of life, life in its senescence.

The blade is not something abstracted and standing apart from life; it is the materialization of life in its boldest lines, in its essential and substantial likeness. Not so the book.¹¹

It was by prowess that Israel became a people, and only by recourse to prowess can the modern Jews become a people again, transvalued and alive.

The poet Tchernichowsky was equally vituperative in his attack upon traditional Judaism: “I was the first to free my

⁸ Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

soul that groaned beneath the agony of generations.”¹² Like Bérdychevski, he conceived the Jewish renaissance as a return to primitive Hebraic culture:

my spirit burst its chains and turned again toward the living earth . . . I kneel to life, to beauty, and to strength . . . which they, the dead-in-life, the bloodless ones, the sick, have stifled in the living God, the God of wonders of the wilderness, the God of gods, who took Canaan by storm before they bound him with phylacteries.¹³

In later poems, Tchernichowsky refined his ideas to articulate a Jewish philosophy of war and labour which was to become a central theme in Zionist pioneering: “We shall put forth our hands in urging labour, the work that is holy, while grasping the sword. Raise the banners of Zion, O warriors of Judah.”¹⁴ There is also a positive attitude toward martial values as such: “The groan of the slain is music in my ears.”¹⁵ This affirmation of force as an end in itself, as an attribute of a higher type, reflects the extent to which Zionism could become estranged from the pacific stance which Judaism had assumed for two millennia. Yet the new activism held a strong appeal for Jewish youth: “To the new generation of Jews, Tchernichowsky was no longer a stranger. He lived to see his message of uprightness, physical and moral, his call to beauty translated into reality by thousands of reborn Jews. He embodied what at least two generations longed for—freedom and strength.”¹⁶

Berdychevski and Tchernichowsky were agents through which the more dramatic aspects of neo-idealist and social

¹² Ephraim Broido, *Saul Tshernichowsky* (London: Zionist Federation of Great Britain, n.d.), p. 7. From a poem entitled “Before the Statue of Apollo.”

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 8. From the same poem.

¹⁴ Leonard Victor Snowman, *Tchernichowski and his Poetry* (London: Hasefer Agency for Literature, 1929), p. 26. From a poem entitled “To the Volunteers of the People.”

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5. From a poem entitled “In the Strength of My Spirit.”

¹⁶ Broido, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

Darwinist thought were introduced into and became an integral part of Zionism. Though in one sense they were very much on the periphery of the movement and had a direct influence on relatively small intellectual circles, they added an important ingredient to the Zionist synthesis. In later years, when the difficulties and frustrations of building a Jewish state in Arab Palestine had become evident, the attitudes which Berdychewski and Tchernichowsky helped to generate became more pronounced and ultimately basic to the character of the state.

While these strands of secular Zionist thought were in the process of development, a segment of Orthodox Jewry began to find its way into the movement. Though this was anachronistic in the sense that Zionism represents a radical departure from Jewish tradition, the fact that it did occur was very significant in blurring the distinction between Zionism and Judaism, and in preparing the way for extensive Jewish participation in Zionist activity.

The earliest expressions of Zionist leanings in Orthodox circles appeared before Zionism itself was a clearly defined movement, and represent the vulnerability of tradition to the intellectual currents of the West rather than a predisposition of Judaism to Zionist precepts. Yehudah Alkalai (1798-1878) and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795-1874) were the first Orthodox notables to suggest a religious Zionism.¹⁷ Though born in Sarajevo, Rabbi Alkalai spent his childhood in Palestine, where he came under the influence of Jewish mystics. He was later called to a religious post in Serbia, where he developed an interest in the movement for emancipation from Turkish rule. The experience in Palestine and the later contact with Balkan nationalism inclined Rabbi Alkalai to the view that colonization of Palestine was the key to Jewish redemption and that human endeavour was the proper prelude to divine deliverance. Rabbi Kalischer was also impressed with the nationa-

¹⁷ See Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-114.

list movement in Europe, and felt it provided a guide for Jews to follow: "Let us take to heart the examples of the Italians, Poles, and Hungarians" He regarded agricultural settlement in Palestine as a holy mission, and stressed the importance of self-help in the achievement of national redemption.

Alkalai and Kalischer had little influence on Jewish outlook during their own lifetimes, but in challenging the established concept of messianic redemption, they opened the door to Orthodox participation in the Zionist theme. Though stressing the mystique of Palestine as the symbol of Jewish fulfilment, they were moved by the idea of popular resurgence stimulated by the nationalist cult which had come to dominate the social consciousness of post-Napoleonic Europe. Over a generation later, another Orthodox rabbi, Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935), developed the theme of religious Zionism by asserting that secular Jewish nationalism was "an expression of the divine endowment within the Jewish soul and a forerunner of the Messiah."¹⁸ He regarded the reunion of the Jewish people with the "Land" as essential to religious regeneration and advocated the "return" by any means, for "In the Holy Land men's imagination is lucid and clear, clean and pure, capable of receiving the revelation of Divine Truth and of expressing in life the sublime meaning of the ideal of the sovereignty of holiness"¹⁹

Yet the Zionist movement which came into being at the end of the nineteenth century, though cultivating such Jewish interest in Palestine, did not foster a new religiosity, but a Western secular system of values and goals. As Toynbee has perceptively pointed out, "The paradox of Zionism was that, in its demonic effort to build a community that was to be utterly Jewish, it was working as effectively for the assimilation of Jewry to a Western Gentile World as the individual Jew who

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 421.

opted for becoming a Western bourgeois 'of Jewish religion' or a Western bourgeois agnostic."²⁰

The last of the early Zionist schools to emerge was political in orientation and ultimately became the directive force in the movement as a whole. Political Zionism, though it had some roots among the *maskilim* of Russia and Poland, was in its systematic form more a product of the Jewish Enlightenment in Western and Central Europe. The first Zionist thinkers in these regions, such as Moses Hess, had elicited only a marginal response. For despite certain setbacks in the progress of Jewish emancipation, the social and economic condition of the Jews in Germany and the West had been extensively improved and given rise to a large "assimilated" class.

There were certain factors, however, which encouraged the development of Jewish nationalism outside Russia. In the first place, German Jewry was not completely cut off from the Pale and the Jewish revolution that was taking place there. Many of the Russian Jews who wanted a higher education entered German universities, where they became active in transmitting Jewish national ideas. In the 1890's, for example, Russian-Jewish students in German universities founded an organization called the Jewish-Russian Scientific Society, the purpose of which was to combat assimilation.²¹ A second factor was the spread of nationalist, racist, and evolutionist ideas in late nineteenth century Europe. This, combined with the popularization of romantic interest in Jewish colonization of Palestine, helped to generate an attraction to proto-Zionist concepts among Western Jewry. Finally, a latent Zionist following existed in the form of the Jewish masses in Western and Central Europe, which did not enjoy the same privileges as the transformed Jewish middle class and were therefore receptive to a nationalist ideology with a more comprehensive

²⁰ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), VIII, 309.

²¹ Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harpers, 1949), p. 35.

programme of Jewish emancipation. Anticipating the future role of the Jewish proletariat in the Zionist movement, Herzl cast David Litvak, a Jew of humble origin, as the hero of his novel on the future Israel—*Altneuland*.²²

These predispositions aside, the Jewish national idea in the West originated as part of the general search for a more substantial integration of the Jews in European society. Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) was a member of the assimilated Jewish middle class in Austria-Hungary. He received a secular education and entered professional life, first as a civil servant and then as a writer and journalist. Herzl became interested in the Jewish question, not through personal suffering, but ironically, in relation to the almost total absence of anti-Semitic experience in his own life. On the few occasions when he was made the object of anti-Semitic remarks, mostly from strangers in the streets, he was so shocked that he began to reflect privately on the problem of Jewish-Gentile relations.²³ The first plan that occurred to him in this connection was a mass conversion of Jewish youth to Roman Catholicism.²⁴ This was not based on any interest in Christianity as such, but rather an alienation from Jewishness, which had acquired anti-social characteristics in the ghetto.²⁵

The normalization of Jewish life became a driving motive in Herzl's life. Though thoroughly assimilated and seldom reminded that he was a Jew, he felt that Jewish and Gentile resistance to assimilation had erected a kind of invisible ghetto in the "enlightened" atmosphere of nineteenth century Europe.

²² See below, pp. 67-70.

²³ Buber points out that whereas Hess was interested in Israel's destiny, Pinsker and Herzl were mainly concerned with its relations with other peoples. See Martin Buber, *Israel and Palestine* (London: East and West Library, 1952), p. 123.

²⁴ Raphael Patai (ed.) and Harry Zohn (trans.), *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (New York: Herzl Press, and Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), I, 7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

He conveyed this idea in a play appropriately entitled *The New Ghetto*, in which the leading character, like Herzl himself, is impelled by the need to escape the confinement of these new ghetto walls. The Jewish question, therefore, centred on the destruction of the second ghetto. Herzl was convinced that this could not be accomplished with the passage of time, for the emancipation process had gone as far as it could. What was needed was a dramatic action, a new and unprecedented contrivance to finish the task that emancipation and enlightenment had begun but could not complete. It was in this context that the idea of a Jewish state occurred to him.

The basic function of the Jewish state as Herzl conceived it was to complete the assimilation of the Jews on a collective level by giving them the kind of national status which underlay the social organization of other peoples. Max Nordau, one of Herzl's closest associates, put it this way: "[The Zionist movement] has as its sole purpose the desire to normalize a people"²⁶ The deviation of such a position from Judaism's prohibition against accommodation to profane criteria was not an issue for Herzl. He did not view the Jewish problem as the preservation of a distinctive cultural tradition, but as one of social transformation. He shared with some of the proto-Zionist thinkers in Eastern Europe a disdain for the obsequious hypocrisy of the assimilated Jewish middle class, but did not subscribe to their view that Zionism was the basis of a specifically Jewish renaissance. The state was the vehicle through which the new ghetto would be destroyed. Though it was to provide a nationality for Jews, the content of its culture would be Western and its territorial location did not have to be determined by the former connection of the Jews with Palestine. The "mighty legend" could, however, be employed to stimulate interest in Zionism.

Commenting on Herzl's views in this regard, the *Jewish Chronicle* observed that he eschewed the religious and senti-

²⁶ Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

mental idea in regard to Palestine, "except so far as they served the national ideal. For him the religious traditions clustering around the Holy Land were useful only as a valuable manure to shield the precious germinating forces of Nationalism from the starving elements of assimilation, to enrich and fructify them."²⁷

Herzl stands as a controversial figure within the Zionist movement itself. Though his role as founding father and the initial leader has never been questioned, many took issue with him over his pronounced secularism, his mixed feelings about Palestine as the site of the Jewish state, and his emphasis on a political approach to Zionism. This raised the question of the degree to which the various Zionist factions were willing to accept for pragmatic advantages the leadership of a man with whose ideas many of them were in open disagreement.

An understanding of Herzl is made even more difficult by certain contradictions in his own personality. In an article published in 1960, the Dutch Orientalist, Mrs. Van Der Hoeven Leonhard, developed the thesis that there were really two Herzls—the Herzl of the *Diaries*, who was essentially secret, and the public Herzl of the novel *Altneuland*.²⁸ In the *Diaries*, which were not published until twenty-six years after *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl emerges as a political manipulator, given to secret planning, clandestine activities, and reliance on the ultimate decisiveness of military power.

The immediate obstacle to building the Jewish state was the negative attitude toward the idea held by the great majority of Jews outside the nascent Zionist movement. It is for this reason that Herzl approached the project in the tradition of *realpolitik* from the moment he decided to work for its realization in earnest, which was after the Dreyfus case in 1894. The

²⁷ *Jewish Chronicle*, August 11, 1911, p. 14.

²⁸ L.M.C. Van Der Hoeven Leonhard, "Shlomo and David, Palestine, 1907," *From Haven to Conquest*, edited by Walid Khalidi (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 115–124.

Diaries constantly reflect this attitude. The movement and the future state would be governed by the application of what Herzl termed "*negotiorum gestio*," a principle of leadership exercising authority delegated by itself. As Herzl put it succinctly, "I conduct the affairs of the Jews without their mandate, though I remain responsible to them for what I do."²⁹ During the preparatory period, he planned to set up throughout the Diaspora a hierarchy of elite groups, to which he would reveal the project in stages.³⁰ The upper echelon, or Family Council, was to know the entire plan from the outset. A second echelon, established in Jewish centres throughout the world, would also be briefed on the general scheme after being sworn to secrecy. It would then be instructed to select a third echelon, to which the plan of organized emigration would be revealed without mention, at first, of a state. The Jewish masses were to be manipulated by this elite organization, and once they had arrived in the territory of the projected state, they would be recruited into labour battalions along military lines, their training based on a nationalist indoctrination involving patriotic songs and heroic plays.³¹

The aim of this political methodology was the gradual conversion of the Jews to the ideal of Jewish statehood. As a secularist, Herzl did not have any particular attachment to Palestine, and considered parts of the Argentine, the Sinai Peninsula, and Cyprus as more practical sites for the future commonwealth. But he saw that it would be difficult to develop broad Jewish support for political nationalism unless "the mighty legend" of Palestine could be employed. Thus at the first Zionist Congress, convened by Herzl at Basle in 1897, the public aim of the movement became the establishment of a Jewish national "home" in Palestine. The word "home" (*heimstätte*) was used to avoid antagonizing those who had

²⁹ *Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, I, 42.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 80–82.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 38.

reservations about Jewish nationalism, while the selection of Palestine as the site reflects not only Herzl's deference to the Eastern European Zionists but also his sensitivity to the importance of popular appeal.

Yet Palestine was not, as an early Zionist slogan suggested, "a country without a people." Herzl was conscious of the problem posed by indigenous population even before the Basle Congress and its designation of Palestine as the rightful homeland of the Jewish people. He began to record his reflections on this subject in 1895, and concluded that the resistance of local inhabitants in the territory of the projected state would have to be countered by military force. This aspect of Herzl's thought will be treated later in connection with the various Zionist attitudes toward the Arab problem. But it should be noted that here again he stressed the need for a deliberate and organized leadership to guide the programme of settlement and dedicated paramilitary cadres to implement the displacement of the indigenous populace.

Altneuland,³² published in 1902, presents a very different approach. The novel is an imaginary portrait of the Jewish state to come. The initial setting is in Europe, where a disillusioned Gentile, Kingscourt, convinces an equally disillusioned Jewish sophisticate, Loewenberg, that the Jews hold the key to the future; they could show the way for modern man by creating an experimental country which would serve as an example of humanistic values. The idea of the Jews as a dialectical messiah-folk had been developed earlier by Moses Hess and seems to have gained some currency in the proto-Zionistic thought of the nineteenth century. Yet Herzl himself leaned to a less metaphysical doctrine of nationalism—a highly pragmatic and essentially positivist approach to Jewish statehood as a means of normalization. This suggests an element of contrivance in the book. Another incongruity is

³² Theodor Herzl, *Old-New Land*, trans. by Lotta Levensohn (New York: Bloch Publishing Co., and Herzl Press, 1960).

his selection of David Litvak, a Jew of humble origin, as the hero of the Jewish renaissance. There is indeed a sharp contrast between the character of Litvak and the urbane Herzl, who often looked with contempt on the vulgar ghetto types who injected their coarse emotionalism into the deliberations of the congresses. Herzl regarded the Jewish masses as a body to be led and manipulated into conformity with a prescribed image and a particular programme of activity, not as the source of inspiration and ultimate values.

These aspects of *Altneuland* have led some to question its sincerity. Mrs. Leonhard's interpretation is that the novel was written "primarily for the world, not for the Zionists. It had propagandistic aims: Herzl wanted to win over non-Jewish opinion for Zionism."³³ This judgement is substantiated in the biography by Alex Bein, who concludes that ultimately Herzl was disappointed with the influence of *Altneuland*.³⁴ Hans Kohn sees the motive behind the book as an attempt in Herzl's own mind to resolve the conflict between the construction of a Jewish state in the Middle East and the aspirations of the new national movements in Asia, which posed a potential threat to Zionism and the liberal political ideas to which Herzl himself felt committed.³⁵ In any event, there is a sharp contrast between the idealism expounded in *Altneuland* and the emphasis on *realpolitik* which emerges so explicitly in the *Diaries*. Professor Kohn explains the dichotomy as an inherent dualism arising from Herzl's simultaneous affinity for the fashions of contemporary cosmopolitan thought and his conviction that anti-Semitism was endemic in the non-Jew. He refers in this regard to Hannah Arendt's analysis:

³³ Leonhard, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

³⁴ Alex Bein, *Theodor Herzl, a Biography*, trans. by Maurice Samuel (New York: Meridian, 1962), pp. 405, 562, 564.

³⁵ Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," *Palestine: A Search for Truth*, ed. by Alan R. Taylor and Richard N. Tetlie (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1970), p. 30.

The universality with which Herzl applied his concept of anti-Semitism to all non-Jewish peoples made it impossible from the very beginning for the Zionists to seek truly loyal allies. His notion of reality as an eternal, unchanging hostile structure—all *goyim* everlastingly against all Jews—made the identification of hard-boiledness with realism plausible because it rendered any empirical analysis of actual political factors seemingly superfluous.³⁶

Altneuland is perhaps best interpreted as a work which reflects at the same time some of the author's ideals and his sense that it was important to win a broad support for Zionism in the world. The early chapters, which are set in nineteenth century Vienna, depict the upper middle class Jewish community as a society of jaded sophisticates who had rejected their own culture and become a respectable proletariat in Viennese life. Herzl was particularly repulsed by this kind of obsequious assimilation and sought to contrast it with the more seemly attributes of a Jewish state, as portrayed in the later part of the book. David Litvak becomes a champion of the transition from a mode of accommodation in a diasporan setting to one of assertive self-realization in a national context. Yet the whole orientation of the New Society is utterly un-Jewish and glosses over the inevitable conflict with the indigenous population, which had an important stake in its own culture, its self-respect, and its political sovereignty.

The state which Herzl describes in this book is run by Jews, but rests "squarely on ideas which are the common stock of the whole civilized world."³⁷ It "was built not in Palestine, but elsewhere. It was built in England, in America, in France and in Germany. It was evolved out of experiments, books, and dreams."³⁸ This raises the question of the extent to which the commonwealth Herzl had in mind was to be really Jewish

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

³⁷ Herzl, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

in substance, and he was taken to task in this respect by a number of Zionists. It also demonstrates that Herzl's approach to Zionism was essentially cosmopolitan and aimed at orienting the Jews in terms of Western secular culture. He favoured political separation as a means of transforming Jewish character and enhancing the status of the Jews in the world through the formation of a Jewish majority in one sovereign territory.³⁹ But this narrowed the continuity of Jewish identity to a predominantly political course, and suggests a programme of cultural assimilation at variance with the concept of a Jewish renaissance which lay at the root of Eastern European Zionism.

The other major attribute of the Jewish state as Herzl pictured it in *Altneuland* is its enlightened political system. The New Society was to be a pacifist utopia, dedicated to science, without an army, and devoid of racial and religious prejudice. Its basic creed is "Man, thou art my brother,"⁴⁰ and the Arabs live in grateful friendship with the Jewish leadership, for "old quarrels had been resolved into new harmonies."⁴¹ The problem with this vision of the future Israel is that it explains the acquiescence of the Arabs to Jewish rule as a result of the progressive and ecumenical character of the state. It is not, then, really a *Jewish* commonwealth, but a model of enlightened polity which performs an indirect service to Jews in particular and to mankind in general. Not only is the significance of Jewish culture left out of account, but also the affinity of the Arabs to their own traditions is consigned to oblivion. The argument of *Altneuland* thus reflects the ambivalent inclinations and complicated psychology of Herzl, who was at the same time a liberal idealist and a pragmatic politician, a champion of Jewish well-being and a protagonist of Western Gentile culture.

During the formative phase of Zionist thought, the broad residue of Jewish anti-Zionism began to express its objections

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

to the new movement. Despite the endorsement of Zionism by a few Orthodox rabbis, the majority of Orthodox Jewry continued to reject both the concept of human agency as a redemptive force and the secularization of Jewish life which had been introduced by Zionism and other forms of Jewish modernism. The leaders of traditional Judaism had long been sceptical of popular movements which claimed divine sanction. The exposure of Sabbatai Zevi and Jacob Frank as imposters had provided examples of pseudo-messianism, and the more radical character of Zionism made it even more suspect.

The attitude of Orthodox rabbinical circles toward the emergence of organized Zionism was succinctly expressed by Rabbi Joseph Hayyim Sonnenfeld of Brisk (1848-1932) in a letter to a colleague written in 1898:

With regard to the Zionists, what shall I say and what am I to speak? There is great dismay also in the Holy Land that these evil men who deny the Unique One of the world and His Holy Torah have proclaimed with so much publicity that it is in their power to hasten redemption for the people of Israel and gather the dispersed from all the ends of the earth. They have also asserted their view that the whole difference and distinction between Israel and the nations lies in nationalism, blood, and race, and that the faith and the religion are superfluous . . . Dr. Herzl comes not from the Lord, but from the side of pollution⁴²

What was most disturbing about Zionism for Orthodox thinkers was that precisely because it masquerades as a Jewish movement while affirming all the political values of modern Gentile culture, it was the most seductive and therefore the most dangerous form of assimilation. As a contemporary spokesman of this view has put it, Zionism is "the least reputable of a long series of catastrophic pseudo-messianic attempts to

⁴² Marmorstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

forestall the Redemption by human action . . . a heresy disguised in sacred vestments.”⁴³

The adherents of Reform Judaism were equally opposed to Zionism when it first appeared. From its inception, Reform had rejected the concept of Jewish nationalism and stressed the ethical principles and universal scope of Judaism. The Pittsburgh Conference, convened by Kaufmann Kohler in 1885, stressed this position: “We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state.” In 1889 a Central Conference of American Rabbis was established to preside over the continuing development of Reform theology, and over the following thirty years an anti-Zionist platform was reindorsed seven times. A particularly strong version was adopted at the Montreal Conference of 1897 at the behest of a leading Reform rabbi, Isaac Mayer Wise (1819-1900):

...we totally disapprove of any attempt for the establishment of a Jewish State. Such attempts show a misunderstanding of Israel's mission, which from the narrow political and national field has been expanded to the promotion among the whole human race of the broad and universalistic religion first proclaimed by the Jewish prophets We affirm that the object of Judaism is not political nor national, but spiritual, and addresses itself to the continuous growth of peace, justice, and love in the human race, to a Messianic time when all men will recognize that they form “one great brotherhood” for the establishment of God's kingdom on earth.⁴⁴

Reform theology was further developed during the first quarter of the twentieth century, especially in Britain and America. The anti-Zionist position was maintained in this

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.

⁴⁴ Israel Knox, *Rabbi in America: The Story of Isaac M. Wise* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1957), pp. 114–115.

period, based on the premise that Israel's election was not for its own sake, but for the diffusion of truth about God.⁴⁵ Hence, the national tendency was ultimately incompatible with the purpose of election, since it stressed Israel's seclusion and its own glorification. For this reason there was set up in Israel an impulse to break out of national confinement, and finally Judaism emerged "as the butterfly out of the chrysalis of Hebrew nationalism . . ."⁴⁶ Thus, "the great contribution of the Jews to the world's spiritual treasury was made not while the national life was flourishing, but while it was ebbing away."⁴⁷ Zionism, therefore, threatened to reverse the proper course of Jewish history, and by redefining the Jews as a nationality to obstruct the aim and mission of Judaism—to serve as a witness to God in the world.

Also opposed to Zionism was the Jewish autonomist movement in Eastern Europe, which emerged from the activities of the League of Jewish Workingmen, or the Bund,⁴⁸ and was developed into a system of thought by the renowned historian, Simon Dubnow (1860-1941). The Bund was the product of the broader revolutionary movement in Russia, which had weathered the government's counterattack in the early 1880's and reconstituted itself in a more disciplined form. The Jews, who were now concentrated in the cities because of the so-called Temporary Rules (1882) restricting Jewish land tenure, were drawn to the revolutionaries through a common identification with the urban proletariat and the goal of social emancipation. The earlier populist movement had centred on a cult of the Russian people which was implicitly and even acti-

⁴⁵ Claude G. Montefiore, *Outlines of Liberal Judaism* (London: Macmillan, 1923), p. 163.

⁴⁶ Morris Jastrow, *Zionism and the Future of Palestine, the Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism* (New York: Macmillan, 1919), p. 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁸ For a general history of the Bund, see A.L. Patkin, *The Origins of the Russian-Jewish Labour Movement* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1947).

vely anti-Semitic,⁴⁹ but the more sophisticated socialism of the 1890's had shifted its attention to the international class struggle, facilitating the full participation of the non-Russian nationalities.

At first the Bund was exclusively Marxist in orientation, and influenced the formation of the Social Democratic Party, to which Lenin belonged. In 1901, however, the Bund took a position in favour of Jewish national autonomy within the projected Russian socialist state. This temporarily strained relations between the Bund and the Social Democrats but the latter's affirmation in 1905 of the right of non-Russian nationalities to self-government resolved the conflict and the Bund remained an integral part of the Social Democratic movement. It continued to support the idea of Jewish national autonomy, but only as part of the class revolution. This precluded participation in exclusively national endeavours, such as Zionism. Yet the Bund was indirectly effective in spreading the autonomist idea to non-socialist and semi-socialist Jewish groups. In 1905 the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights for the Jewish People was formed on a platform of autonomism without any class commitments. This society drew support from bourgeois and working class elements, and was instrumental in popularizing the autonomist doctrine among Russian Jewry. With the temporary decline of revolutionary activity after the abortive 1905 revolution, the League broke up into its component parts. But the Jewish People's Group, the Jewish National Party, and the Jewish Democratic Group, which were formed following the League's dissolution, all endorsed autonomism and blended it with various political positions from conservatism to socialism.

The Bund and many of the other autonomist factions took issue with the Zionist search for a solution to the Jewish problem independent of more universal social questions. Though

⁴⁹ Simon Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, trans. by Israel Friedlaender (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916-1920), II, 280.

deeply interested in Jewish emancipation, the Bundists rejected the Zionist programme of constructing a Jewish state in Palestine. Their objection was not that Zionism had perverted Judaism's spiritual values, but that it was sentimental, semi-religious, impractical, and exclusivist. The Bundists in particular regarded the Jewish question as simply one facet of the larger global issue of social justice, which could be resolved only by means of the international socialist revolution. Furthermore, since there existed in Eastern Europe a veritable Jewish nation based on the Yiddish language, they looked to an autonomous Jewish enclave within a larger Russian socialist state. The combination of Zionism's allusions to a messianic revival and its secular positivism struck them as anachronistic, and without rejecting the concept of Jewish national institutions, their own variety of nationalism was geared to immediate realities and was devoid of broad claims as to the identity, role, and destiny of the Jewish people as a whole.

Despite the differences between Zionism and autonomism, the Zionists sought to win the support of the Bund and related organizations. In 1906 a Russian Zionist convention meeting at Helsingfors sought to establish a rapprochement with the autonomists by adopting a resolution favouring a combined struggle for settlement in Palestine and the establishment of national-cultural autonomy in the Diaspora: "The Zionist Organization of Russia sanctions the affiliation of the Zionists with the movement for liberty among the territorial nationalities of Russia, and advocates the necessity of uniting Russian Jewry upon the principles of the recognition of Jewish nationality and its self-government in all the affairs affecting Jewish national life."⁵⁰

For a brief period the major socialist faction within Zionism, Poale Zion, agreed to a minimum demand for diasporan cultural autonomy, but this was countered by the newly-formed Jewish Socialist Labour Party (Seymists), which insisted

⁵⁰ Dubnow, *op. cit.*, III, 145.

on a platform of maximum national autonomy in separate areas. With the formation of the League for the Attainment of Equal Rights for the Jewish People, Zionist-autonomist cooperation reached its zenith. But the Zionists were the first to withdraw, proclaiming the principle of diasporan revival incompatible with Zionism's "negation of the *galut* (exile)."⁵¹ Thus ended a brief and uneasy association. Thereafter, the Zionists sought to overcome the autonomist problem by trying to draw its adherents into their own socialist wing. Particularly important in these polemics was Ber Borochov (1881-1917), who justified Zionism in entirely Marxist terms.⁵² But ultimately the two movements remained irreconcilable, and assumed separate and distinct lines of development.

Simon Dubnow became the intellectual leader of the autonomist idea, though he had no connection with the Bund. He took issue with Zionism because it disregarded the greatest triumph of Judaism—its ability to survive the passing of the state and eviction from the homeland. The survival of Judaism in the Diaspora represented the highest form of corporate development, in which spiritual maturity released the people from dependence on state and territory in the pursuit of their national life.⁵³ It was precisely this spiritual stage of cultural growth which the Zionists did not understand, and therefore they could not conceive of a full national life in the Diaspora. Yet the Jews were, of all peoples, the best suited to survival through conditions of autonomy in shifting geographical centres. The Zionist preoccupation with the "return" to Palestine and the construction of common polity was unperceptive and regressive. It was also impractical—and this was Dubnow's second major criticism of Zionism—since the

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, III, 146.

⁵² Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-366.

⁵³ Simon Dubnow, *Nationalism and History, Essays on Old and New Jerusalem*, edited by Kopel S. Pinson (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958), p. 80.

establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine could not effect a national regeneration of global proportions.⁵⁴

Dubnow was not opposed to the building up of Jewish life in Palestine, which he regarded as one of the most important events in modern Jewish history, but he did regard it as absurd to think that the establishment of a small Jewish state in the Middle East could deal satisfactorily with the complicated problem of Jewish national revival in the world. Though the Zionists were of good intention, they had cut themselves off from the great majority of Jewry in their preoccupation with the concerns of settlement in Palestine and their failure to recognize the significance of the broader dimensions of the Jewish renaissance. Even Ahad Ha-Am, who did not stress the concentration of Jews in a sovereign state, had an essentially negative attitude toward diasporan culture and regarded the establishment of a spiritual centre in Palestine and the cultivation of Hebrew as fundamental to Jewish national development.

Simon Dubnow shared with the cultural Zionists a devotion to the Jewish national renaissance, but he regarded this movement as emanating from many quarters, and not from a select elite which has dedicated itself to building a spiritual centre. The continuity of the Jews had been preserved by a refined tradition of nationality which had been developed through centuries of dispersion. And it was in the world, too, that the regeneration of contemporary Jewish life would take place, just as it had on many occasions before. The colonization of Palestine was simply one aspect of the broader movement, not its foundation. Therefore, the most important political activity for Jews in the present age was to secure those rights of autonomy which were necessary to prevent assimilation and encourage cultural revival.⁵⁵

There were other aspects of Zionism which Simon Dubnow found even more troublesome. The political orientation which

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 155–165.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 182–191.

the mainstream of Zionism had assumed, posed the problem of "national egotism," a repressive force which rejects the co-existence of respective nationalities. Prophetically, he distinguished between two forms of nationalism, which decades later became a basic issue in the Israeli state:

National egotism is characterized by strife, hostility and aggression; national individualism fights only in self-defence. The former assumes the form of "national imperialism" and "national rivalry" and stands condemned by the moral principles of humanity. The latter . . . manifested itself either in the form of a political liberation movement . . . or in the defence of the inner autonomy of national minorities On the whole, people always knew in practice how to differentiate between true and false nationalism, between nationalism as a liberating force and aggressive and oppressive nationalism. It is only in theory that confusion of terms in this area still prevails and that clarification and elucidation is needed At present I can only outline in a general way the ethical standards on which Jewish nationalism rests.

There is absolutely no doubt that Jewish nationalism in essence has nothing in common with any tendency toward violence. As a spiritual or historical-cultural nation, deprived of any possibility of aspiring to political triumphs, of seizing territory by force or of subjecting other nations to cultural domination (language, religion and education), it is concerned with only one thing: protecting its national individuality and safeguarding its autonomous development in all states everywhere in the Diaspora.⁵⁶

When Dubnow wrote these words at the turn of the century, he could not foresee the enormous military power and political influence that the Zionist state would one day enjoy. But his comments on Jewish nationalism are particularly significant in the current setting. He remains one of the outstanding Jewish personalities to examine the deepest issues of identity and order which have confronted the Jews in our time. For in Dubnow's thought, the Jewish national idea was closely tied to the prophetic vision of Israel's exodus from itself as a spiritual order

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.

in the world. The recourse to common polity stood for him as the most serious danger facing Judaism in its continuing struggle to maintain those values which alone make it possible to preserve the Jewish nation amidst the vicissitudes of worldly events.

With the transformation of Zionism from an idea into a political organization at the Basle Congress in 1897, the Jewish world was gradually enveloped by what ought to be called the Zionist revolution. The new movement was revolutionary in two senses. Its political activism was unprecedented in diasporan annals, with the exception of the pseudo-messianic episodes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while its secular approach to Jewish nationalism was entirely innovative. The Zionists were also revolutionary in the sense that they were organized as a political elite and sought consciously to redirect the course of Jewish history. Herzl put it very succinctly at the Second Zionist Congress in 1898: "It cannot continue much longer that in enlightened Jewish communities an agitation should be carried on against Zion. . . . We must once and for all put an end to it. . . . I place among our future aims the conquest of the communities."⁵⁷ At the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, Max Nordau, who was Herzl's closest associate, asserted that "this Congress is the authorized legitimate representative of the Jewish people. It is its duty to make Jewish national policy."⁵⁸ These two statements reflect the vanguard role which the Zionists assumed and which established them from the start as an essentially revolutionary force.

By contrast, the anti-Zionist forces among the Jews, which were very substantial in those days, were unorganized and diversified, and were thus a vulnerable target. The Zionists themselves were highly intolerant of the opposition groups; and they sought every means to subvert them. The combination of these circumstances and the changes in Jewish life and

⁵⁷ *Jewish Chronicle*, September 2, 1898, Supplement, p. iii.

⁵⁸ *Jewish Chronicle*, August 28, 1903, Supplement, p. xii.

Middle Eastern affairs which followed World War I ensured the ultimate victory of the Zionist revolution not only among Jews, but in Palestine as well.

CHAPTER IV

FROM BASLE TO JERUSALEM

Following Herzl's death in 1904, the Zionist organization came under the presidency of David Wolffsohn (1856-1914), who exercised an eclectic if uncharismatic influence. Originally from Lithuania, he had settled in Cologne and thus "served as the ideal intermediary between Westerners and Easterners, 'politicals' and 'practicals.'"¹ In other respects also, Wolffsohn "concentrated in his personality many diverse tendencies in the movement."² During the decade of his leadership, Orthodox and socialist parties were formed within Zionism and the disagreement over the relative priority of political recognition and settlement in Palestine was at least partially resolved. Yet there was a certain loss of momentum due to the unaltered status of Palestine, the lack of organizational structure, and the continuing diversity of opinion as to the meaning and practice of Zionism.

The war of 1914 gathered Zionism into the web of historical change and opened a new realm of prospects and possibilities. During the war years, Dr. Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952) established an executive apparatus in England designed to win support of the British Government and to serve as a uni-

¹ Sachar, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

² *Jewish Chronicle*, August 11, 1911, p. 14.

fyng force within Zionism. In actual fact he exerted little influence on Zionist thought, but he did prevent the loose ends of the earlier interpretive polarity from undermining the possibilities of concrete action. His own ideological position was broadly defined, reflecting a combination of East European Zionism, the secularism and political acumen of Herzl, and an affinity to some of the current notions of middle class liberalism. He never really resolved these various dispositions in his own life, but he was able to create the image of an "organic" Zionism and to initiate a new programme of diplomatic activity.

Weizmann's diplomacy was notable for its employment of adaptive and flexible techniques, anchored to an unbending determination. During the war he won many senior British statesmen to the Zionist cause by tailoring his arguments to the mood and temper of each listener. The result of these endeavours was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which followed months of negotiations between the Lloyd George government and the Zionist leadership in England. The Declaration was actually only an ambiguously worded expression of sympathy for Zionist aspirations addressed indirectly to the Zionist Organization and without substance in international law. Yet Dr. Weizmann recognized it as an important initial step, from which further concessions could be obtained. Indeed, the Mandate itself not only endorsed the Balfour Declaration, but established a Jewish Agency under Zionist auspices to implement its provisions.

A recent compendium of official documents on Palestine indicates that Britain's understanding with the Zionists was more extensive than hitherto realized, and that Whitehall did not consider itself bound by the restrictive clauses of the Balfour Declaration protecting the civil and religious rights of the Arab majority in Palestine. Weizmann made it clear to the Cabinet that the aim of Zionism was to establish a Jewish state with a population of four to five million Jews. This was fully understood by Lloyd George and Balfour, who informed the Zionist leader that in using the phrase "national home" in the Balfour

Declaration, "We meant a Jewish state."³

Assurances were given to Arab representatives that the Mandate would protect their interests, but privately Balfour admitted that "in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country."⁴ This later came to mean that the British Government had no intention of allowing self-determination for the Arabs of Palestine, and that in any event, according to Balfour, the Powers had made "no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate."⁵

The open declarations for Arab consumption were always correct and equitable, while the agreement with Zionist leaders was that Palestine should be transformed into a Jewish state. Sir Hubert Young, a senior official in the Colonial Office, summarized the British position in a memorandum on negotiating with the Arab Delegation which came to London in the summer of 1921: "The problem which we have to work out now is one of tactics, not strategy, the general strategic idea as I conceive it, being the gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country becomes a predominantly Jewish State. . . . But it is questionable whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy really means."⁶

In the ensuing struggle between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs, the British Government sought to maintain an external balance in its relationship to the two communities. The Churchill White Paper of 1922 denied that the purpose of the Mandate was to create a wholly Jewish Palestine and set economic and territorial limits on Jewish immigration. It was in this context that Weizmann became the foremost champion

³ Doreen Ingrams, comp., *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict* (New York: Braziller, 1973), p. 146.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

of a flexible Zionist approach geared to a gradual realization of the Jewish state. In preference to a break with British policy, he advocated the refinement of political techniques within the framework of established limitations. By 1930, he had transformed the Zionist executive into an elaborate directive organization and brought leading non-Zionist Jews into Zionist activity by "extending" the Jewish Agency. He was also successful in persuading the British Government to temper the restrictive clauses of the Passfield White Paper (1930), which facilitated the high immigration quotas of the following years.

Weizmann's most important influence on Zionism was the spirit of political opportunism he bequeathed to the movement. An illustrative case in point was his attitude toward the partition proposal of the Royal Commission in 1937. The projected Arab state was to include the Negev, which caused great consternation among the Zionists. Weizmann was equally disappointed at the exclusion of this region from Jewish control, but he counselled the Zionists not to be alarmed, for in any event, the Negev "would not run away," implying that it could be incorporated at a later date. Weizmann thus anticipated an initially small but subsequently expansionist Jewish state, and indicated the methodology to be employed to this end. At later stages in the history of Zionism the techniques and policies he advocated have contributed to Zionism's ever-widening territorial position in the Middle East.

Weizmann's ecumenical influence and diplomatic successes did not, however, preclude the continuing diversity of opinion within Zionism and an active opposition to his own leadership. The more extreme Zionists (Revisionists) were headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), who took particular exception to Weizmann's policies and ultimately formed a separatist faction known as the New Zionist Organization (NZO). Though Jabotinsky is sometimes regarded as a maverick, he remains a major figure in the movement proper and a bridge between the activist spirit of Russian Zionism and the politics of Herzl.

Jabotinsky inherited many strands of Zionist thought which he brought together in a synthetic ideology. He shared with Herzl an ambivalent attitude toward Palestine, for though he lacked a romantic or religious attachment to the Land and supported the project for colonization of al-Arish, he later voted against the Uganda proposal and defended Palestine as the site of the Jewish state.⁷ Yet he had no positive feeling for Jewish culture as such. He admitted that in his youth he "had no inner contact with Judaism," and no interest whatsoever in anything Jewish.⁸ Dr. Weizmann observed that he "was utterly un-Jewish in manner, approach and deportment,"⁹ a significant commentary on Jabotinsky's character.

The rebelliousness of spirit and the deep-seated bitterness to which Berdychewsky and Tchernichowsky gave literary expression were translated by Jabotinsky into the political concept of "Jewish defence." In Russia, in Palestine, everywhere, the Jews needed to protect themselves from a hostile social environment. Therefore, each Jewish community had as a primary task the formation of trained defence units. Jabotinsky devoted most of his life's work to the promotion of this project, an endeavour which reached its zenith in the founding of the Haganah, the Jewish defence organization which later became the nucleus of the Israeli army. Though he continued to take an interest in diasporan communities to the end of his life, he agreed with Gordon that the aim of Zionism was "to make Palestine the mother country and the communities of other countries its colonies—not the reverse."¹⁰ The state to be established was to form the centre of international Jewish defence, the heart of a world-wide paramilitary system.

Jabotinsky was the father of Zionist militarism. He cham-

⁷ Joseph B. Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman, The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story: The Early Years* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), pp. 84–89.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

⁹ Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

¹⁰ A.D. Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

pioned an open and unequivocal adoption by the Zionists of a forward policy based on military strength. He saw Arab resistance as an inevitable problem which Zionism ultimately had to face with might: "...the establishment of a Jewish majority in Palestine will have to be achieved against the wish of the country's present Arab majority."¹¹ Behind this militancy lay an elemental racist populism which was almost exclusively preoccupied with Jewish collectivity. Describing his mission and ultimate dedication, he once said: "My craft is the craft of one of the masons building a new Temple for my supreme God, whose name is—Jewish People."¹²

The cornerstone of Jabotinsky's "Temple" was *Betar*,¹³ the youth organization which he founded and for which he always retained a special affection. Early in his career he differentiated between those immigrants to Palestine who were primarily interested in economic advantage and those who were politically motivated.¹⁴ It was from the latter that Jabotinsky determined to form an activist cadre to offset the tendency to petty colonization, which he feared "would become more precious than the ultimate goal."¹⁵ This was the origin of *Betar*.

The role of *Betar* in Jabotinsky's mind was to set before the young Jewish generation an example of Zionist dedication, a variation of the communist concept of "vigilance." The *Betarim* were not organized in settlement communes, but in paramilitary youth groups prepared to serve the Zionist cause in any political emergency. The ideal to which they aspired was *hadar* (honour and knightliness), a concept which made a deep impression on the younger *Yishuv* during the

¹¹ Joseph B. Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet, The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story: The Last Years* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), p. 324.

¹² Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman*, p. 104.

¹³ *Betar* was the name of the fortress in which Bar Kochba made his last stand against the Romans in 135 A.D.

¹⁴ Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman*, p. 139.

¹⁵ Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet*, p. 416.

mandatory period. Much of the Jewish activism which took place under the British rule in Palestine was generated by the popularization of the *hadar* ideal.

In time, other activist organizations were formed, some under Jabotinsky's own supervision and others independently. Most notable of Jabotinsky's own creations were the Haganah, the Jewish Legion, and the New Zionist Organization. The Jewish Legion was a formal military unit of over five thousand men organized by Jabotinsky near the end of the First World War and attached to the British troops which occupied Palestine in 1918. The purpose of the Legion was that it should form the garrison of Palestine after the war, but this objective was thwarted by the British, who demobilized the unit. The Haganah was organized by Jabotinsky early in the mandate period to provide defence for Jewish settlements near Arab centres. Later, however, it became an extensive Jewish militia secretly supported by the Jewish Agency.¹⁶ The New Zionist Organization was formed by Jabotinsky in 1935 as a rival to the World Zionist Organization. This breach with the established leadership under Weizmann began in 1922, when Jabotinsky resigned from the Zionist Organization in protest against Weizmann's acceptance of the Churchill White Paper. By 1935, Jabotinsky had come to feel that a rapprochement between himself and the Zionist leaders was beyond any hope, and he formalized the break. After the establishment of Israel, the Revisionists, as the members of the NZO were called, rejoined the Zionist ranks, but as the opposition Herut Party.

The most important organizations formed independently of Jabotinsky but in the spirit of his politics were the *Brit Ha-Biryomin* (Union of Zealots), the *Mossad Le Aliyah Bet* (Committee for Illegal Immigration), the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Defence Organization), and the Stern Group. The *Brit Ha-Biryomin*, which was made up largely of *Betarim*, was

¹⁶ Marver Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 28.

the first organization to adopt a comprehensive policy of non-cooperation with the Mandate authorities, and was clearly stimulated by Jabotinsky's ideas. Similarly, Jabotinsky was also the first to recognize the importance of illegal immigration, which eventually won general support among the Zionists. In the late 1930's the Jewish Agency itself established a United Rescue Committee to cooperate with a clandestine organization in Europe known as the *Mossad Le Aliyah Bet*. With the advent of World War II, both official Zionism and a large segment of the Jewish community in Palestine were involved in this "national sport," as Jabotinsky called it.

The *Irgun Zvai Leumi* and the Stern Group were also independent offspring of Jabotinsky. In the early 1930's, a splinter group which styled itself *Haganah Bet* broke away from the Haganah proper and eventually adopted the name *Irgun Zvai Leumi*. The new organization favoured more aggressive tactics than the Haganah had theretofore adopted and launched a programme of "massive retaliation" against Arab resistance to Zionist policy in Palestine. The Sternists in turn became a splinter of the Irgun, advocating even more aggressive implementation of Zionism. Jabotinsky at first took issue with these extremist factions, but by 1939, on the eve of his death, he had essentially adopted the Irgun position.¹⁷

From these developments it is apparent that Jabotinsky is not to be regarded as a marginal figure in the history of the modern Zionist movement. He stands as a key personality in the Zionist synthesis which Herzl started to construct in 1897, a fact which is generally obscured because the Revisionists eventually broke from official Zionism. Jabotinsky played a significant role in moulding the mentality of the young Zionist generation during the inter-war period by setting before it the image of the armed *Yishuv*. But his influence and appeal touched almost all other segments of Zionist life as well. His biographer notes that in pre-war Russia he was "the darling

¹⁷ Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet*, p. 230.

of all the parties.”¹⁸ He represented an uncompromising Zionism, direct and aggressive at a time when equivocation seemed a necessary means of selling Zionism to assimilationist Jews and to the world. Louis Lipsky once said of him: “. . . he reminded us of the goal and made us ashamed of the results.”¹⁹ Others feared that he would give the world the “. . . notion that we Zionists intend to dominate the Arabs of Palestine by force of arms, thus offering our enemies a weapon against us.”²⁰

Even with many of his bitterest rivals in the Zionist movement, Jabotinsky exercised a magnetic attraction. The Labour Zionists sided against him officially, but frequently admired him in private. Ben-Gurion, for instance, “had a sneaking affection for Jabotinsky,”²¹ which the latter returned. Ben-Gurion viewed Jabotinsky as the “Zionist Trotsky,” a purist to the extent of impracticality or ineffectualness. This indeed was rather typical of the general Zionist reaction to Jabotinsky, betraying a certain envy and admiration. Ultimately, Jabotinsky and Ben-Gurion differed mainly on the question of methodology rather than of goals. In the middle of the inter-war period the two held extensive talks with a view to effecting a rapprochement. From Ben-Gurion’s point of view such a meeting of minds could and should be effected. “After the first few encounters,” he wrote, “we were talking to each other as two political Zionists.”²² He even entertained the idea of adopting certain aspects of Revisionist policy, but ultimately had to abandon the search for cooperation because of the objections of the Histadrut, upon which Ben-Gurion counted heavily for support. Yet Ben-Gurion assured Jabotinsky of his

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 251.

continuing private friendship in the following significant and revealing message:

Perhaps our common labours in London were in vain from a public viewpoint. But beyond public affairs . . . it seems to me that we did not waste our time. . . . And if we will have to fight, I want you to know that among your "enemies" there is a man who appreciates you and suffers with you. The hand you felt I wanted to stretch out to you at our first meeting will be there even in the storm of battle, and not just the hand.²³

In more recent years, when Zionism has become a touchy and controversial issue in international politics and law, Jabotinsky and the brand of Zionism he stood for openly have been officially down-graded. But essentially the spirit of his politics pervades the movement today and has been its dominant theme at least since the Biltmore Programme became Zionism's official plank in 1942. At the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905, Jabotinsky outlined his political orientation in these words:

. . . facts of actual life . . . must be measured solely by the criterion of their usefulness to humanity. . . . The moral appraisal of the means and methods used by a fighter must be governed exclusively by the measure of real public good or harm they result in.²⁴

And at the Twelfth Zionist Congress in 1921, he added a corollary to this principle: "In working for Palestine I would even ally myself with the devil."²⁵ This attitude became indigenous to the practical politics of Zionism and is evident in the outlook of Jabotinsky's major rival in the movement—Dr. Chaim Weizmann.²⁶ The Zionist struggle for Palestine

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 253–254.

²⁴ Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman*, pp. 89–90.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

²⁶ Earlier Jabotinsky compared his own and Weizmann's tactics "... which will appear externally as disagreement and strife, but which must develop a common activity within." See Nevill Barbour, *Palestine: Star or Crescent* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1947), p. 57.

was fundamentally Jabotinskian. For Jabotinsky represents the most uninhibited expression of Zionism as a political movement, and in this regard he symbolized an ideological norm toward which much of Zionism's latent disposition naturally gravitated.

A major factor in the shaping of Zionist attitudes was the impending Arab question. Since Palestine was not, as some suggested, "a country without a people," and contained a deeply-rooted Arab population, the project to establish a Jewish state there involved a serious demographic problem. The approach to this issue by various Zionist leaders therefore became an important aspect of ideological development, and remains a matter of basic significance.

The first phase of the Zionist attempt to deal with the existence in Palestine of an indigenous Arab majority with political aspirations of its own was largely theoretical. Herzl began to reflect on the problem at an early stage and adopted the position that it would require force and cunning. The trained political elite whom he had anticipated as the vanguard of the Jewish state would conduct a diplomatic campaign in the West, exploiting "purchased friendships and a Europe weakened and divided by militarism and socialism."²⁷ Meanwhile they would work gradually to bring about the transformation of Palestine in the following manner envisioned by Herzl:

We must expropriate gently the private property on the estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our own country. The property-owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back.

The voluntary expropriation will be accomplished through

²⁷ *Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, I, 51.

our secret agents. The Company would pay excessive prices. We shall then sell only to Jews, and all real estate will be traded only among Jews.²⁸

Anticipating armed resistance by the Arabs once the full extent of Zionist intentions had become clear, Herzl considered a Jewish paramilitary corps essential to the success of the statehood plan. "In the twenty years before it becomes known," he records in his diary, "I must train the boys to become soldiers . . . I shall educate one and all to be free, strong men, ready to serve as volunteers in the case of need."²⁹ All of the youth was to be organized along military lines, in labour battalions or armed units, in preparation for the struggle against the indigenous population whose land was being systematically occupied. Special agents, referred to as "duellers", would "be sent on dangerous missions which the state happens to require. It may be cholera vaccination, or at other times the fighting of a national enemy. In this way the risk of the duel will be retained, and we shall derive wonderful benefit from it."³⁰

Near the end of the novel, *Altneuland*, Herzl remarks that there had been objection to Zionism on the ground that it would become a kind of millennial terrorism.³¹ Indeed, the book itself was designed to allay such fears. But the reflections on the founding of the Jewish state in the *Diaries* and the forms which Zionist activism actually assumed in more recent years seem to substantiate that early concern, and to illustrate the influence which militant attitudes toward the Arabs have had on Zionist thought.

Aaron David Gordon was also concerned with the theoretical definition of Zionism's task in Palestine. As a founding father

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 88-89.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 38.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³¹ Herzl, *Old-New Land*, pp. 258-259.

of Zionist colonization, he was conscious of the Arab factor and sensitive to the ethical issue it posed. Because Gordon viewed the Jewish return to the soil of Palestine as a vehicle of moral and spiritual renaissance, the Arab question could not be put aside. In recognizing the Arab presence on the land, he adopted the code that "we cannot deprive them of their rights but neither can they deprive us of our rights to the land on which we live and labour."³² But this initial recognition of mutual legal claims to the land was gradually transformed by Gordon into a justification of Jewish ascendancy in Palestine. He first establishes competition as the basic legal determinant: "Whoever works harder, creates more, gives more of his spirit, will acquire a greater moral right and deeper vital interest in the land."³³ This doctrine rests on two principles. The first is historical: "Our right to this reasonable form of competition we derive from our historic title to the Land."³⁴ The second is political:

If mastery of the land implies political mastery, then the Arabs long ago have forfeited their title. Turks ruled the country for centuries and now the British are its rulers. If we bar the rights acquired through living on the land and working it, the Arabs, like ourselves, have no other than a historic claim to the land, except that our claim beyond question is the stronger; it cannot therefore be said that we are taking the land from the Arabs. As for rights accruing from occupation and from work upon the land, we, too, live and work upon it. Between us and the Arabs the real difference is based on numbers not on the character of our claim.³⁵

The Jews were morally free to engage in open economic competition with the Arabs for the soil of Palestine, since they

³² Aaron David Gordon, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

had an equal or superior claim to the country. As to the specific method of acquisition, Gordon envisioned a purchase system which would capitalize on the insularity, naïveté, and political indifference of the Arab gentry. This differs from Herzl's scheme only in the moral tenor in which it is proposed:

In buying the land there must be no infringement upon the human rights of the Arabs nor any dispossession of those who actually are working on the land. Rather than wrong them in any way we must be ready to pay two, three, or indeed, many times the value of the land in order to compensate the real owners fully. . . . And even if we have to make other provisions for such holders . . . as for instance, to give them land in another section, and so on, all this we must do rather than infringe in the slightest degree upon their rights. There is no limit to the value of the land for us. It is worth all that it may cost.³⁶

Despite the insistence on moral consideration for Arab rights, Gordon's land policy is fundamentally aggressive. Though legally correct with respect to individual owners, it aims at dispossession so far as the overall Arab population is concerned. On the question of tenure as such, without regard to development, Gordon is not specific, but he did anticipate that ultimately the Zionist colonization programme he had conceived would run up against a collective Arab opposition: "There is one phase of Arab scheming against us which we have failed to evaluate properly . . . namely, the declaration and the insistence thereon that the rights of the Arabs to Palestine come from the fact that Palestine is their national home."³⁷ And he was aware that this national movement was not merely the scheme of a few effendis and nothing more. "... They delude themselves and us who wish to persuade us that the Arab masses, especially the Arab working masses, are or will be on our side against the effendis."³⁸

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

In the final analysis Gordon recognized that the Zionist intrusion into Palestine meant the displacement of the Arabs. Two conflicting national aspirations faced each other on the ancient soil of the Holy Land, and ultimately the fate of the Land would be decided by the party which persevered. Thus, the Zionist ideal was perseverance, a relentless activity on behalf of its own cause. His ultimate moral standard is a comparative evaluation of the Jewish and Arab right to Palestine, rather than an objective consideration of universal moral issues. He sees the return to Palestine as the only key to Jewish rebirth, and Jewish rebirth as the primary goal. Thus his theory of Zionist action is anchored to the reestablishment of the Jew on the soil of the ancestral Land. His moral system hinges on this aim and the Arab question becomes for him a subordinate issue to be judged in terms of its relationship to the more important Jewish question. In this way, he inadvertently invites the Zionists to make war in Palestine, differing from Herzl in the choice of weapons and the ultimate significance of the victory to be achieved. But these distinctions are incidental, for both systems envision the eviction of the existing population as a means of establishing territorial control.

Jabotinsky's Arab policy was consistent with his broader political orientation. Specifically, he brought together in a comprehensive and articulate system the loose strands of Zionist militancy, which were residual or implicit in most Zionist ideological positions. In this respect, he became the most unequivocal interpreter of Zionist theory in action. He differs from Herzl in that he refused to conceal the fundamentally aggressive nature of the task, and he is at odds with Gordon's efforts to justify Zionism's intentions in Palestine through a variety of moral precepts. In this respect, Jabotinsky was the most unambiguous of the Zionist thinkers, for which Ben-Gurion once dubbed him the "Zionist Trotsky."³⁹

Jabotinsky brought into focus the real requirements of

³⁹ Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet*, p. 66.

building an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine. He regarded the Arabs as "a yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy, savage rags."⁴⁰ He agreed with Herzl and Gordon that the Zionists should gradually expropriate the uncultivated lands of the Arab gentry,⁴¹ and entertained the scheme of inducing the masses to migrate to Iraq.⁴² It was clear in his mind that the fulfilment of Zionism would necessarily involve the displacement of the Arab population, and his emphasis on the importance of paramilitary activity defined the primary means by which this end was to be achieved.

Underlying the Zionist attitude toward the Arabs was a combination of distaste and rejection. The negative personal response of Jabotinsky was shared by many of the early Zionists, and it is noteworthy that at the eleven Zionist congresses prior to World War I, there was barely any mention that an Arab population existed in Palestine or that this fact constituted an ethical problem to be resolved. At this and later stages, primary consideration was given to the political and practical measures required to establish the Jewish state. A more elusive question which was left relatively undefined was the territorial scope of Eretz Israel. What is most significant about the conjecture that did take place on this matter, is the implicit disregard for the rights and aspirations of the Arab populace. The territorial issue was therefore a facet of the broader Zionist approach to the Arab problem.

Though the borders of Eretz Israel have never been clearly established, a number of views have been expressed. The guiding principle for Herzl was that "the boundaries of Palestine will be determined by practical considerations."⁴³ But Herzl did develop a general concept in his own mind as to the

⁴⁰ Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman*, p. 54.

⁴¹ Schechtman, *Fighter and Prophet*, p. 53.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

⁴³ *Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, I, 133.

ideal limits of the Jewish state, toward the establishment of which the Zionists should concentrate their energies. Paradoxically, it was in *Altneuland*, a book written largely to dispel apprehension as to the designs of Zionism, that he is most articulate on this question.⁴⁴ The future Jewish state which Herzl depicts in the novel extends far beyond the boundaries of the present Israel. To the north it reaches as far as Beirut, and in one scene the youth board a train en route to summer vacation in the mountains lying just inland from that city. To the east and south "Altneuland" stretches to the Euphrates and the southern boundaries of Palestine and Transjordan, while its western limits are the Mediterranean and Sinai.

Herzl did not expound further on this whole question, largely because his life was cut short at an early stage in the practical history of the movement. But he did bequeath to the Zionists an outline of the territorial quest before them which compared rather favourably with the outer limits of the biblical commonwealth. In 1917, a branch of the Zionist Organization of America suggested a territorial scope of similar dimensions:

... neither Dan in the North, nor Beer-Sheba in the South; neither Jordan in the East nor Canaan and Pelesheth in the West, form the definite frontiers of our land. The mighty Euphrates, the Great Desert spreading towards the Far East, the Red Sea with its two warm bays, the marvelous Mediterranean, Lebanon and Hermon with their eternal

⁴⁴ See Herzl, *Old-New Land*, pp. 66, 129, 235, 255.

The imaginary state which Herzl pictures on these pages contains millions of inhabitants and includes the following cities and regions: Haifa, Tyre, Sidon, Damascus, Tadmor (Palmyra), Beirut, the Euphrates, Mount Lebanon to the Dead Sea, the Mediterranean to the Hauran, the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon, Mount Hermon.

Haas asserts that Herzl's idea of the geography of Palestine was a line north to Beirut, west to Suez and east to Mesopotamia; see Jacob de Haas, *Theodor Herzl, A Biographical Study*. 2 vols. (New York: Leonard, 1927), II, 111.

snows—these, and only these, are the confines of Greater Palestine, our own Palestine, one and indivisible.⁴⁵

Though this interpretation never received any official endorsement, it approximates to what some Zionists have regarded as the appropriate boundaries.

By the end of the First World War, the executive staff which Weizmann set up in London had developed a more precise idea of the area within which the projected Jewish state was to be established. The decisions in this regard had been made at the staff sessions which were held in 1917 in response to the British Government's suggestion that the Zionists prepare a draft of a British statement on behalf of Zionism. At the Peace Conference in 1919, the Zionist Delegation made a comprehensive statement of its territorial position.⁴⁶ It requested that the boundaries of the Palestine Mandate start at a point in the vicinity of Sidon running east to the slopes of Mount Hermon and then south along the west of the Hedjaz railway terminating in the Gulf of Aqaba, leaving the Egyptian frontier to be determined. The memorandum further specified that in the north Palestine must have control of Mount Hermon and the Litani, while in the east it should have access to the fertile planes of Transjordan. We also know that in the 1917 talks the Zionists laid claim to the Hauran as well.⁴⁷

The proposal of the Zionist Delegation represents the territorial aspirations of the leadership at that stage. Though more modest than the earlier romanticized versions, it is clear that the area of Mandate Palestine proper did not coincide with what the Zionists regarded as the site of the future Jewish state. It was for this reason that Weizmann tried unsuccessfully to persuade France to relinquish its claim to southern

⁴⁵ Ittamar Ben-Avi, "No, You Do Not Know the Land," *A Zionist Primer*, ed. by Sundal Doniger (New York: Young Judaea, 1917), p. 67.

⁴⁶ See text in Jacob C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Middle East, A Documentary Record* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), II, 45–50.

⁴⁷ The ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc., *Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), I, 93.

Lebanon,⁴⁸ and that the Zionists in general were disturbed when in 1922 Britain excluded Transjordan from Jewish immigration. In the context of these failures, Weizmann decided to accept the limitations imposed by British authority as a temporary expediency which would permit the gradual fulfilment of the ultimate programme. He had not, however, relinquished Zionism's claim to the whole of Eretz Israel and on a number of occasions during the mandatory period asserted that colonization of Palestine proper would eventually lead to Jewish settlement in the area between Jordan and the Euphrates.⁴⁹ This explains his position in 1937 in connection with the Negev. He was willing at the time to accept the partition proposal of the Peel Commission awarding the Negev to the Arabs on the promise that the Negev could eventually be attached to the Jewish state, and his underlying determination in this regard was later demonstrated in the negotiations surrounding the U.N. partition.⁵⁰

Ben-Gurion followed Weizmann in this approach to the question of the establishment of the state in greater Israel. Addressing the Seventeenth Zionist Congress at Basle in 1931, he pictured Zionism's ultimate settlement in Transjordan:

In eastern Palestine, there are broader and emptier acres, and Jordan is not necessarily the perpetual limit of our immigration and settlement ... without amending the Mandate, we are entitled to ask the right to enter and settle in Trans-Jordan; its closure in our faces neither accords with the Mandate as it stands, nor considers the crying economic needs of a fertile but underpopulated and impecunious region.⁵¹

But like Weizmann he combined a belief in the territorial integrity of Eretz Israel with a conviction that the realization

⁴⁸ Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

⁴⁹ See Meyer W. Weisgal, *Chaim Weizmann, Statesman, Scientist and Builder of the Jewish Commonwealth* (New York: Dial Press, 1944), p. 57.

⁵⁰ Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

⁵¹ David Ben-Gurion, *The Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, ed. and trans. by Mordekhai Nurock (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 35.

of the goal might often involve apparent deviation. Hence, in a speech before the Twentieth Congress in 1937 he applied this doctrine to the question of whether or not the Zionists should accept the partition plan of the Peel Commission: "The Debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. The Debate concerned which of the two routes would lead quicker to this common goal."⁵²

In subsequent years, Ben-Gurion continued to alternate between public denials that Israel intended to expand beyond the 1949 armistice line and assurances to the Zionists that the establishment of greater Israel remained the goal of the movement. A few years after the founding of the state he asserted in his annual address in the Government Yearbook: "It must now be said that the State of Israel has been established in only a portion of the land of Israel."⁵³ By contrast, he assured outsiders on a number of occasions that Israel was fully content with the established boundaries and entertained no idea of future expansion.

The territorial aim of organized Zionism remains an elusive question. In the absence of a clearly defined policy, pragmatic approaches have been implemented against the background of speculative imagery and the politics of "Ingathering." Officially, Zionist leaders have agreed to very limited borders, such as those proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937 and the majority report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1947. In practice, however, they have sought to revise these delimitations. The campaign of 1956 aimed without success at establishing control of Gaza and parts of Sinai, while that of 1967 resulted in a more durable occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and the entire Sinai Peninsula.

⁵² Quoted in Barbour, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁵³ State of Israel, *Government Yearbook*, 5713 (1952), p. 15.

If Zionist expansionism is not a clearly defined policy, territorial increment has in fact been the result of each Arab-Israeli war, and withdrawal was accomplished only in 1957 under pressure from the United States. The occupation of Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory in 1967 has been explained by Israel as a temporary situation pending the conclusion of a general peace. But in the interim, East Jerusalem has been incorporated, Arab homes and villages have been destroyed, and Israeli settlements have been established in various parts of the occupied areas. The initial encouragement of Arab evacuation from the West Bank, frequent suggestions by authoritative sources that the new borders might become permanent, and hesitancy with regard to U.S. peace initiatives have raised further questions as to Israel's ultimate territorial intent.

In the context of an established duplicity of stated aims and actual design, Zionist land policy became an important factor in Arab-Jewish relations in the Middle East. The conquests of 1948 and 1967 are manifestations of a traditional disregard for the rights of Arab tenure. They provide the continuing basis of discord and the barrier to any preliminary consideration of peace. They also represent a significant attribute of the Zionist approach to Jewish sovereignty in an Arab environment. Co-existence requires above all a fundamental respect for one's neighbour, and the absence of such an attitude among Zionist decision-makers forms the basis of a war relationship and the framework of hostility.

If the attitudes and policies of the Zionist leadership and the Revisionists were insensitive to the Arab question, the Mandate years also witnessed the growth of a moderate faction which was acutely aware of the moral issue implicit in the aims and practices of political Zionism in the Middle East. As an opposition, the moderates remained unorganized and ineffective, but they did provide a climate of dissent and a witness to Zionism's departure from established Jewish values. Though neglected in the struggle for control of Palestine, the problem

of Arab rights has emerged again in more recent times as a matter of ultimate importance.

Ahad Ha-Am was among the first of the early Zionists to examine the ethics of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. He had initially opposed certain other trends within the movement. His first essay, "This is not the Way," criticized the tendency of the "practical" Zionists to emphasize the material advantages of colonization. He was equally disturbed by Herzl's cosmopolitanism and regarded the image of the future state portrayed in *Altneuland* as alarmingly devoid of Jewish content. Pinsker stood somewhat higher in his estimation because of the emphasis on Jewish national sentiment. Yet he feared that implicit in Pinsker's system was a recourse to statehood as a normalizing device which would undermine the national and cultural distinctiveness of the Jews and thus defeat the role of Zionism as a regenerative and emancipating ideal.⁵⁴

In general, Ahad Ha-Am regarded the preoccupation with statehood, which formed the basis of political Zionism, as a disruptive force in the Jewish renaissance, destined to introduce false values into the movement. He saw political Zionism as a reassertion of a traditional Jewish inclination to make the body politic dominant above all other interests.⁵⁵ In contrast to this "profane" way in which the instrument is valued in so far as it is a means to an end, he advocated a "sacred" orientation, investing the instrument with a sanctity of its own.⁵⁶

Among the aspects of this "profane" deterioration of the Zionist ideal, that which most deeply disturbed Ahad Ha-Am was the increasingly hostile attitude of the political Zionists toward the Arab population of Palestine. In the essay, "The Truth from the Land of Israel," written in 1891, he observed

⁵⁴ Ahad Ha-Am, "Pinsker and Political Zionism," *Essays, Letters, Memoirs* (London: East and West Library, 1946), p. 186.

⁵⁵ Ahad Ha-Am, "Flesh and Spirit," *Selected Essays*, trans. by Leon Simon (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1912), p. 152.

⁵⁶ Ahad Ha-Am, "Sacred and Profane," *Selected Essays*, p. 41.

of the Jewish colonists: "They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without cause, and even boast of these deeds; and nobody among us opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination."⁵⁷ Much later—during the early years of the Mandate when he had settled in Palestine himself—he came to regard Zionist Arab policy as the stumbling block of the movement. Hans Kohn quotes from one of Ahad Ha-Am's last letters in illustration of this point:

Is *this* the dream of a return to Zion which our people have dreamt for centuries: that we now come to Zion to stain its soil with innocent blood? Many years ago I wrote an essay in which I stated that our people will willingly give their money to build up their state, but they will never sacrifice their prophets for it. And now God has afflicted me to have to live and to see with my own eyes that I apparently erred . . . their inclination grows to sacrifice their prophets on the altar of their "renaissance": the great ethical principles for the sake of which they have suffered . . . without these principles, my God, what are we and what can our future life in this country be. . . . Are we really doing it only to add in an Oriental corner a small people of new Levantines who vie with other Levantines in shedding blood, in desire for vengeance, and in angry violence? If this be the 'Messiah,' then I do not wish to see his coming.⁵⁸

A number of the early Zionist immigrants were equally disturbed by the practices of Jewish settlers in Palestine. The foremost among these critics were Dr. Yitzhak Epstein (1862-1943), Moshe Smilansky (1874-1953), and Chaim Kalvarisky (1868-1947), all of whom were members of the first *aliyah* in the late nineteenth century. What troubled them most was the indifference and hostility of the agricultural *Rishuv* toward the indigenous population. The Zionist colonists were not only ignorant of the local language and customs, but according to Loubman-Haviv, a founder of *Rishon Le-Zion*, they "took control as if they were the masters of the country, so much so

⁵⁷ Quoted in Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," p. 39.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

that they forbade anyone to graze his flocks on the boundaries of their land."⁵⁹

The initial problem was one of cohabitation, in which the Zionists sought first to establish a planter-serf relationship with the *fellahin* and then to displace Arab labour with Jewish.⁶⁰ Though this pattern was broken at times by cordial relations, the alienation between the two peoples became increasingly pronounced. An important factor in this development was the failure of Jewish settlers to recognize the political dimensions of Arab national development. As early as 1907, Dr. Epstein warned his fellow Zionists of this oversight:

Among the grave questions linked with the concept of our people's renaissance on its own soil, there is one question which is more weighty than all the others put together. This is the question of our relations with the Arabs. Our own national aspirations depend upon the correct solution of this question. It has not been eliminated. It simply has been forgotten by the Zionists and is hardly referred to at all in its true form in Zionist literature.

The regrettable fact that our attention could be diverted from such a fundamental question, and that after thirty years of settlement activity it is being talked about as if it is a new topic—all this proves that our movement is unreasonable, that we still treat things superficially rather than exploring them deeply in order to discover what is truly important.

At a time when we feel the love of our homeland, love for every corner of the land of our forefathers, we forget that the people now living in this land also has a heart and a soul. Like all men, the Arab is bound to his homeland by strong ties. The less developed a people is, the stronger the bond between it and its native country, and the harder it is for individual members of that people to leave their villages and their farms.

... We shall commit a grave sin against our people and our future if we throw away so lightly our principle weapons:

⁵⁹ Quoted in Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 60.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63.

righteousness and sincerity. As long as we cling steadfastly to these, we need fear nobody. But if we abandon them, we shall lose all our strength and our courage will fail.⁶¹

The moderate element within Zionism was first organized in the late 1920's as the *Brit Shalom* (Covenant of Peace). The basic premise of this faction was that Zionism should forgo preoccupation with intensive immigration in favour of a political understanding with the Arabs. Later reconstituted as the Ihud Group, it supported bi-nationalism as the path to an honourable Jewish participation in the future of Palestine.

The initial activities of the moderate wing date back to the latter days of Turkish control. Kalvarisky was particularly involved in the early attempts to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Arabs, and in 1914 escorted Zionist leaders to Beirut and Damascus.⁶² Though these visits indicated a clear interest among Arab notables in the possibilities of rapprochement, the Zionist Executive remained aloof, since it "had no concrete proposals to make that could appease the Arabs."⁶³

Another champion of Arab-Jewish understanding was Chaim Arlosoroff (1899-1933), who called for recognition of national consciousness among the Arabs in an article on the May riots of 1921:

An Arab movement really exists—and no matter what sort it is—it will be calamitous if we negate its importance or rely on bayonets, British or Jewish. Such support is valid for an hour but not for decades . . . only one course is open to us: the peaceful one—and only one policy: a policy of mutual understanding. . . . The "strong arm" policy never attained its aim. In a place where forces of such magnitude operate, such movements and vital interests confront each other along the same path—only accord can lead to success. Of course, we have wasted much valuable time, and very likely it would have been possible for us to reduce the antagonism, but even today we can reach only one conclusion:

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

the actual conditions force Jews and Arabs in the same direction, and they therefore must have a policy of accord.⁶⁴

At the Seventeenth Zionist Congress in 1931, Arlosoroff was appointed as head of the Jewish Agency's political department, in which position he became immediately active in organizing talks between Arabs and Jews. The selection of Arlosoroff was particularly expedient as a means of allaying Arab fears, and indeed the response from that quarter was highly favourable.⁶⁵ But though the Zionist establishment in general was at pains to deny any exclusivist intentions, Arlosoroff was the only one to seek an actual accord. Aharon Cohen has noted in this connection that "While Zionist leaders articulated the principles of non-domination, political equality, and accord between the two peoples, they formulated no concrete proposals as the basis for effective negotiations. On this vital question of the relations between the two peoples in Palestine there was no considered or far-sighted Jewish policy on the type of political regime envisaged; without this, no real effort could be made to plan the rapprochement of the two peoples and achieve peace and cooperation between them."⁶⁶

Arlosoroff's activities were therefore undermined by the exclusivist approach of the Zionist establishment. As it was, he was shot down by an assassin in June of 1933, while still in the midst of preparatory work for the development of a co-operative system. Though the responsibility for his murder could never be established, the involvement of the extremist Revisionist faction was suspected by many. Arlosoroff was succeeded by Ben-Gurion, whose declared intention to pursue a policy of cordiality with the Arabs was offset by the failure to build the foundations of amity. As Aharon Cohen has noted, "His statement, like so many other Jewish Agency statements, glossed over the most important element: the question of what

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

basis for accord was proposed by Jewish representatives. The only basis that provided any chance for reaching an agreement—political equality and parity in government among the two peoples, and the establishment of a bi-national framework—was never proposed to the Arabs.”⁶⁷

In 1936, Pinhas Rutenberg (1879-1942), Dr. Judah Magnes (1877-1948), Moshe Smilansky and others once again formulated the outline of a bi-national accord following talks with Arab leaders. This project, however, was rejected out of hand by the decision-making elite of the Zionist community, which opted instead for the partition plan then being forwarded as a solution to the problem.⁶⁸ In subsequent years, the idea of a cooperative arrangement between Arabs and Jews in Palestine was generally dismissed in Zionist circles and ultimately came to be regarded as an overly sensitive approach which conflicted with the fundamentals of Jewish nationalism. After 1948, the Ihud Group itself abandoned the bi-national idea. Yet the problems implicit in an exclusively Jewish programme of political development in Palestine remained a continuing concern.

Perhaps the most keenly aware of the moral issue facing Zionism in latter days of the Mandate, was the venerable Judah Magnes, first President of the Hebrew University. His basic position was that “It is one of the great civilizing tasks before the Jewish people to try to enter the Promised Land, not in the Joshua way, but bringing peace and culture, hard work and sacrifice, and a determination to do nothing that cannot be justified before the conscience of the world.”⁶⁹

Magnes was the last of the great champions of bi-nationalism. Symbolically his own life ended with the creation of the State,

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 266–276.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Norman Bentwich, *For Zion's Sake, A Biography of Judah L. Magnes* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1954), p. 178.

but he left it a legacy of ethical principles which stand as a testament against which the new Israel must measure itself:

Perhaps we have made mistakes. Let us look them in the face and learn from them. We seem to have thought of everything—except the Arabs. We have issued this and that publication and done other commendable things. But as to a consistent, clearly worked out, realistic, generous policy of political, social, economic, educational cooperation with the Arabs—the time never seemed to be propitious.

But the time has come for the Jews to take into account the Arab factor as the most important facing us. If we have a just cause, so have they. If promises were made to us, so were they to the Arabs. Even more realistic than the ugly realities of imperialism is the fact that the Arabs live here and in this part of the world, and will probably be here long after the collapse of one imperialism and the rise of another. If we too wish to live in this living space, we must live with the Arabs⁷⁰

The tradition of moderate Zionism was in one sense overpowered by the *hubris* of victory in 1948, 1956, and 1967. But it continues to serve as a source of self-examination within Israel. The movements of dissent which developed in the post-statehood era were nurtured by the need to reconsider present circumstances. Commenting on the militancy of Zionism in 1948, a Zionist moderate who wrote under the pen name of Reb Binyomin commented: "I did not recognize my own people for the changes which had occurred in their spirit. The acts of brutality were not the worst because those might have been explained somehow or other as accidental, or an expression of hysteria, or the sadism of individuals. Far more terrible was the benevolent attitude toward these acts on the part of public opinion. I had never imagined that such could be the spiritual and moral countenance of Israel"⁷¹ In a similar vein, another moderate, Nathan Chofshi, remarked: "We came and turned the native Arabs into tragic refugees.

⁷⁰ From a speech quoted in Taylor and Tetlie, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁷¹ Quoted in Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," p. 49.

And still we dare to slander and malign them, to besmirch their name. Instead of being deeply ashamed of what we did and trying to undo some of the evil we committed . . . we justify our terrible acts and even attempt to glorify them.”⁷²

The burden of these commentaries was summarized by Moshe Smilansky at the end of his life. With reference to the legalized expropriation of Arab lands in 1953, he observed: “We build palaces . . . instead of paying a debt that cries unto us from earth and heaven. . . . And do we sin only against the refugees? Do we not treat the Arabs who remain with us as second-class citizens? . . . Did a single Jewish farmer raise his hand in the parliament in opposition to a law that deprived Arab peasants of their land? . . . How does sit solitary, in the city of Jerusalem, the Jewish conscience!”⁷³

The attempts of moderate Zionists to encourage Arab-Jewish understanding were submerged in the climate of political agitation which dominated Palestine in the late 1930's. These years witnessed not only the heightening of international tension, but the rapid deterioration of relations between the Palestinians and the *Yishuv*. The Arab community, responding to the marked rise in Jewish immigration, called a general strike in 1936 and became increasingly negative in its attitude toward proposals of reconciliation. On the Zionist side, the plight of European Jewry and the extension of power in numbers and political influence stimulated a drift toward nationalist activism aimed at the establishment of a state. In this context, the spirit of bi-nationalism, which never really matured, gave way to a war relationship which has prevailed ever since.

The operational orientation of Zionism at this time was geared to a four-point programme that further defined the character and thrust of the movement. The major concerns centred on land acquisition, the entrenchment of Jewish labour, immigration, and the development of paramilitary ascendancy.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Zionist land and labour policies were based on Article 3 of the Constitution of the Jewish Agency, signed in Zurich on 14 August 1929:

(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and subject to the provisions of Article 10 of this Agreement, the title of the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

(e) The Agency shall promote agricultural colonisation based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed...⁷⁴

The Jewish National Fund (*Keren Kayemet*) had been established in 1901 for the designated purpose of purchasing lands as the inalienable property of the Jewish people. It was further specified that the lessees of these tracts should employ only Jewish labour, under penalty of fine for each default.⁷⁵ A sister organization, the Palestine Foundation Fund (*Keren Hayesod*) had a similar stipulation: "The settler undertakes to work the said holding personally, or with the aid of his family, and not to hire any outside labour except Jewish labourers."⁷⁶

Though Zionist real estate planning was relatively unsystematic before 1920, the Mandate period witnessed the emergence of a "national land policy" based on the political requirement of establishing a Jewish majority in areas selected for their strategic and economic importance.⁷⁷ The new programme was encouraged by the Jewish Agency Constitution of 1929 and gathered momentum in the ensuing years. Sir John Hope Simpson, whose investigations in 1930 provided

⁷⁴ See text in Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 303–304.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁷⁷ John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation," *The Transformation of Palestine*, ed. by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 129.

a comprehensive analysis of these developments, felt that the whole process of Zionist land purchase and settlement pointed to the gradual creation of an extra-territorial Jewish enclave from which all Arabs were excluded.⁷⁸ This became increasingly apparent later, especially after the Arab strike in 1936, when a strict exclusion of Arab workers in Jewish concerns was implemented.⁷⁹ The general thrust of the entire operation was an undeclared state of war, in which the Zionists sought the systematic alienation of the Palestinians from their land and livelihood.

The Zionist preoccupation with immigration stems both from the premise of a single Jewish national entity and the need to overcome minority status in Palestine. The Mandate provided the first real opportunity to build up the Jewish community in significant proportions. Not only was its guiding principle the fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration, but, as noted above, there was a tacit understanding between the British and the Zionists that the long range purpose of Britain's stewardship was the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state. According to a Turkish census of 1914, the population of Palestine was 689,272 persons, of whom approximately 60,000 were Jews.⁸⁰ This ratio had changed only slightly by the end of 1922, when the British authorities estimated that the Jewish constituency stood at 11% of the total.⁸¹ Twenty-five years later, the Jews numbered 589,341 within a general population of 1,908,775.⁸² This increase in proportional representation was the result of massive immigration, made possible by the relaxa-

⁷⁸ David Waines, "The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance," *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁷⁹ William Polk, David Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, *Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 333.

⁸⁰ Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," Abu-Lughod (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 155.

tion of restrictions in the mid-1930's and the extra-legal operations of the Zionist community.

It was quite natural for the Zionists to take a special interest in the Jewish refugees from Nazi anti-Semitism, and starting in the late 1930's they established in Europe organizations to facilitate the immigration of European Jews to Palestine. But from the beginning, the Zionist approach to the refugee question was political rather than philanthropic, and indeed the Zionists had always taken strong opposition to Jewish philanthropy which did not in some way relate to the political-national solution of the Jewish problem that was the heart of the Zionist programme. Thus, the Zionist operations in connection with the European refugees were geared to political considerations. At the outset, they recognized that any mass rescue operation was out of the question. There were not nearly enough funds for such a task and the promotion of illegal immigration could at best handle only thousands, whereas the refugees numbered millions. Hence they decided at an early date to select from among the dislodged Jewish masses of Europe a fraction to be brought to Palestine. Generally, the criteria used in this hand-picking operation were youth and physical fitness or pro-Zionist leanings.⁸³

That the Zionists resorted to selection in a situation which precluded an inclusive programme is perhaps understandable, though it might seem somewhat callous. But Zionist refugee policy did not end there. After the war had started, the matter of getting Jews out of Europe became more complicated. In fact, the only means by which it could be accomplished in any serious way was by reaching some agreement with the Nazi authorities. It was for this reason that representatives of the Jewish Agency—notably Rudolph Kastner—made

⁸³ See Abraham Revusky, *Jews in Palestine* (New York: Bloch, 1945), pp. 220–221; Ben Hecht, *Perfidy* (New York: Julian Messner, 1961), pp. 18, 21, 101; and Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 38, 55–56.

contact with Eichmann and other Nazi officials early in the war. Briefly, the outcome of the ensuing negotiations was a plan whereby the Zionists agreed to assist the Nazis in facilitating the deportation of Jews to the extermination camps in exchange for the release to them of certain selected Jews to be transported to Palestine. In 1954 this whole matter came into the open at the proceedings in Jerusalem against Malkiel Greenwald, who was acquitted on a charge of libel against Kastner. In the course of the hearings, it became apparent that Kastner actually had made an agreement with the Nazis involving his cooperation in keeping secret the deportation of many thousands of Jews to Auschwitz in exchange for a handful to be released for emigration to Palestine. Eichmann corroborated this in the memoirs he released to *Life* in late 1960.⁸⁴ According to Eichmann, Kastner "agreed to help keep the Jews from resisting deportation to Auschwitz ... and even keep order in the collection camps if I [Eichmann] would close my eyes and let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate illegally to Palestine." With reference to Kastner, Eichmann commented: "...he would have made an ideal Gestapo officer himself."

The Kastner case was picked up largely by Herut sympathizers to discredit Ben-Gurion and the Mapai. But it is more significantly a reflection of Zionism itself. Kastner was an agent of the Jewish Agency and a dedicated Zionist. It would therefore be difficult to hold that his was an isolated case of immoral practice. Actually, it is the only instance which came to light, but we know that it was at least in conformity with the general lines of Zionist policy with regard to the refugees. In the deepest sense, Kastner's action was a product of Zionism's distortion of moral values in the intense struggle to establish the Jewish state.

⁸⁴ "Eichmann Tells His Own Story," *Life*, 28 November and 5 December 1960. See also Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38, 105, 128; Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1954), pp. 15–19, 28–38.

In 1939, the British Government convened a conference in London to attempt a reconciliation between the two communities. The failure of this endeavour led to a unilateral statement of policy, embodied in the MacDonald White Paper, of May 17. The major provision of the declaration was that Jewish immigration was to be restricted to an annual quota of 15,000 for the following five years, after which no further admission of Jews would be allowed without Arab consent.

The MacDonald White Paper created a dramatic break in relations between Great Britain and the Zionists. On all levels, the Jewish community regarded the new policy as a kind of betrayal, warranting an intensive campaign of repudiation. The ensuing drift toward active non-cooperation with the British authorities included a variety of radical changes in attitude and political orientation. The Jewish Agency was reconstituted as a purely Zionist body and shifted its centre of diplomatic operations to the United States. The American Zionist Emergency Council was created to provide a wartime headquarters and to gain the support of Americans as an alternative to the old relationship with Britain.

The Emergency Council was really a front, behind which the Zionist leadership set the movement on a new course. Since the United States had been designated as the operational focus, it was tactically advantageous to redefine policy under the auspices of what appeared to be simply a consortium of American Zionist groups. During 1940 and 1941, the initial criticisms of the White Paper were transformed into a general attack on the Mandate as such. In Palestine, Ben-Gurion announced a policy of non-cooperation with the British authorities, encouraging the extra-legal activities of such extremist groups as the *Irgun Zvai Leumi*. At the same time, Dr. Weizmann was busy informing American audiences that after the war an independent Jewish commonwealth would be established in the Middle East. Here again, Weizmann was equivocal as to his own position, for though he openly opposed

violent methods, he did encourage the accommodation of means to ends.

The Zionist Organization of America strongly supported the creation of a Jewish state in the immediate post-war period, and in May, 1942, the Emergency Council convened an Extraordinary Zionist Conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Nahum Goldmann were the primary spokesmen at this gathering, and established the guidelines of the new Zionist platform. These became the basis of the Biltmore Programme, which called for the transformation of Palestine into a sovereign Jewish state and the mobilization of Zionist activity toward that end.

The Biltmore Programme was subsequently endorsed by the World Zionist Organization and the regional appendages. Its adoption marked not only a departure from established practice, but more significantly a rejection of the legal standards that had guided the administration of Palestine since its status was placed under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations.

In accepting the general principles of the Balfour Declaration, the League and the Mandatory Government had committed themselves to the development of Jewish institutional life in Palestine, but specifically within the context of the Declaration's restrictive clauses protecting the Arab majority. The Mandatory Government gave every consideration to Zionist interests, establishing the Jewish Agency and assuming a flexible position on the delicate issue of Jewish immigration. The conditions in Europe during the late 1930's made this more difficult, but the Zionist design to subordinate international commitments to the refugee problem involved an injustice to the Palestinians which the MacDonald White Paper sought to prevent.

The Biltmore Programme, by contrast, reinterpreted the Balfour Declaration in terms of Zionist aspirations alone, disregarding the very instruments through which Zionism had achieved status and enjoyed the benevolence of various

good offices. In this sense, the Biltmore Programme marks the departure of Zionism from the rule of law as an international concept and its alienation from principles of adjudication which must underlie any system of peaceful co-existence.

By transferring the focus of political action from Great Britain to the United States, the Zionists were consciously seeking to replace a system of legal relationships with one based on emotional appeal and political fluidity. The aim was to establish a sympathetic climate of opinion in America by depicting Palestine as the natural asylum for the oppressed Jews of Europe. The issue of Arab rights was obscured by these arguments, though it remained to be resolved as the foremost problem in justifying the establishment and maintenance of the Jewish state.

In the context of increasing assertiveness, Ben-Gurion emerged as the dominant figure in Zionist politics. Like Weizmann, his exact position was equivocal, although he was clearly associated with a policy of activism. The equivocation in Ben-Gurion's case lay in the fact that his Zionism was expressed in the terminology of the labour movement, which concealed the full extent of the militant Jewish nationalism that so strongly coloured his thought. But the combination of labour idealism and the chauvinistic aspects of Zionist thought formed the basis of political orientation among the *Yishuv*. As a synthetic ideology, it embraced all the major trends within Zionism and provided a viable link between the Jewish community in Palestine and the new leadership which Ben-Gurion had provided. Furthermore, it made Zionism more presentable to the world through identification with the precepts of progressive socialism.

Between the Biltmore Programme and the Palestine War, Ben-Gurion encouraged an activist front against the British and the Arabs, while enunciating a moderate position as a means of avoiding international condemnation. In his own mind, Zionism had reached a point at which the use of force to attain its own ends was both necessary and justified. It was

necessary because British policy no longer favoured the fulfilment of Zionism's real intentions. Hence, "There is no easy diplomatic way—but only our own strength" ⁸⁵ Reflecting on the outcome of such recourse, he concluded: "Whenever we used the methods of normal human beings, we have had success. Why should we not also succeed in fighting . . . ?" ⁸⁶ As to Zionism's justification in resorting to arms, he formulated two doctrines. The first was the socialist principle that right to territory is not established on the basis of political authority, but on the basis of work. ⁸⁷ The Zionists held the greater claim to Palestine since they had worked harder on the land and shown the greater interest in development. The second doctrine was based on Zionism: "The rights to Palestine do not . . . belong to the existing settlers, whether it be Jews or Arabs. The crux is the Right of Return of Jewry dispersed . . ." ⁸⁸

It was on these premises that Ben-Gurion gave full support to Zionist militarism in the years following 1939. He publicly denounced terrorism for strategic reasons, but it is questionable whether he seriously considered terror outside the scope of legitimate Zionist activity. Certainly the Jewish Agency did not hesitate to promote and support the unconventional tactic of illegal immigration, in spite of the wartime truce it had declared. ⁸⁹ Why, then, should not its defiance of British authority be extended to a sympathetic attitude toward terrorism? On at least one occasion during the war Ben-Gurion indicated his unwillingness to take action against the unruliness of the *Yishuv*. After the end of the war, the Agency's relationship to terrorism became more suspect. An official British report revealed the clear intention of the Jewish Agency in

⁸⁵ Ben-Gurion, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁸⁹ Alan R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 70–72.

1945 to employ the services of the Stern Group and the Irgun for the purpose of harassing the authorities.⁹⁰ The report was issued shortly after the Jewish Agency Headquarters had been occupied (June 29, 1946) "owing to evidence of the part it had played in organizing, directing, and co-operating with forces which had carried out violence against the Government."⁹¹ The previous March, Ben-Gurion had appeared before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and replied with such marked equivocation to questions pertaining to the relationship between the Jewish Agency and the clandestine Haganah that he earned the severe criticism of Zionist sympathisers "for the discrediting of the Zionist movement by this 'double-faced policy'."⁹² Following the occupation of the Jewish Agency Headquarters, the Haganah approved the Irgun plan of blowing up the King David Hotel, which housed the Mandate Offices.⁹³ Because of disagreement on the time of the assault, the Irgun carried it out alone. But the fact remains that the Haganah, which was controlled by the Jewish Agency, had agreed to the action, thus establishing the Agency's agreement to the use of terror as a means of operation.

It is not necessary to further belabour the point that official Zionism accepted and participated in the employment of terrorist methods as a political device. This policy continued after the King David incident and into the Palestine War which followed.⁹⁴ It represents in part the culmination of a trend in the evolution of Zionist attitudes, brought into focus by the struggle for physical dominance.

⁹⁰ *Cmd. 6873* ("Palestine, Statement of Information Relating to Acts of Violence," July, 1946).

⁹¹ Paraphrase of the High Commissioner's broadcast explaining the action, in Barbour, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

⁹² George Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 211-212.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

The British position became increasingly untenable against the background of intensified Zionist activism. An Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was formed during the latter part of 1945, and following an investigation it recommended a bi-national system with equal representation for Arabs and Jews under a democratic government. This proposal was rejected by President Truman, largely because of Zionist political pressure preceding the congressional elections of 1946. The matter was then referred to the United Nations, inaugurating a diplomatic struggle in which the Zionists sought the establishment of a Jewish state in at least part of Palestine.

The U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was divided on the question of a political solution. The majority report recommended partition, while a minority plan, proposed by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, called for a federal union of autonomous Arab and Jewish states. Owing to the strong U.S.-Soviet support for partition at a time when Afro-Asian influence in the U.N. was far weaker than it is now, the partition plan alone was established as the issue to be debated and decided. The vote itself, which required a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, went through several stages under the shadow of Zionist influence and American patronage. President Truman acknowledged in his memoirs that "I do not think that I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives—disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favourable votes in the General Assembly."⁹⁵

Despite President Truman's reservations, however, the United States did in fact pursue such a course. The delegations of Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, China, and Ethiopia were

⁹⁵ *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), II, 158.

persuaded to change their initial positions, ensuring passage of the Partition Resolution on November 29, 1947.⁹⁶ Though the Truman administration later expressed some misgivings about the decision and suggested a trusteeship, *de facto* recognition of the new Israel was extended immediately following the proclamation of statehood in May, 1948.

The Partition Resolution called for the creation of two states—one Arab and one Jewish—and an international regime in the Jerusalem area, which was to constitute a *corpus separatum*. In the war which followed, however, this plan was aborted and there emerged instead a Jewish state situated in most of Palestine, with the West Bank attached to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt. This outcome became the basis of the inequities and conflicts which ensued and has remained a continuing concern of the U.N. in particular, since it was the General Assembly which had undertaken to change the structure of Palestine, and this with questionable authority.

During the early months of 1948 the *Yishuv* drifted gradually into war, not only with the Arabs of Palestine but with various Arab forces from neighbouring countries. Zionist publicists have maintained that the action of the Israeli forces was largely defensive and that the known incidents of Jewish terrorism were the result of hasty decision in heated circumstances. Others have held that the Israeli military strategy was a carefully thought out and deliberate campaign to precipitate a mass flight of the Arab population from all of Palestine.⁹⁷ Though there are undoubtedly elements of truth in both interpretations, the evidence points to a sophisticated plan of ex-

⁹⁶ See Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine, a Lesson in Pressure Politics," *Middle East Journal*, January, 1948, pp. 1–16.

⁹⁷ See Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet," *Middle East Forum* (Beirut), November 1961, pp. 22–28; Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," *The Spectator*, May 12, 1961, pp. 672–675; and Childers, "The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees," *The Transformation of Palestine*, pp. 177–202.

pulsion which radically transformed the demographic character of the country.

The exigencies of a war situation notwithstanding, the Zionist campaign does not seem to have been a haphazard affair, and indeed most Zionist activities have been the result of careful organization and planning. The massacre of the Arab village of Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948, which Arthur Koestler has called "the psychologically decisive factor in this spectacular [Palestinian] exodus,"⁹⁸ may not have been simply the product of excessive zeal in a time of tension. For although the action was carried out by irregulars from the extremist Irgun and Stern Group, just prior to the incident the Haganah had concluded a cooperative agreement with these organizations.⁹⁹ This may indicate the development of a programme of terror designed to stimulate the mass exodus of Arab civilians. In this connection the question has been raised as to whether the broadcasts in 1948 purporting to represent the Arab high command and urging civilian Arabs to flee Galilee and other hotly-disputed areas did not really originate as "black" propaganda disseminated by the Haganah's clandestine radio Kol Israel.

It is difficult to construct a comprehensive picture of the Jewish campaign strategy through a reconsideration of these speculations. But Professor Khalidi has built a strong case for the argument that Plan Dalet, the offensive strategy adopted by the Haganah, had as its objective the evacuation of the bulk of the Arab population and the conquest of all Palestine. Jon and David Kimche accept at face value the official intent of Plan Dalet: to take over the initiative from the Arab armies and hold secure the areas of the projected Jewish state from the threat of Arab occupation.¹⁰⁰ They also recognize that: "The

⁹⁸ Quoted in Childers, "The Other Exodus," p. 673.

⁹⁹ Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.

¹⁰⁰ Jon and David Kimche, *A Clash of Destinies: The Arab Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 90-93. Netanel Lorch notes that the intent of Plan D also included the establish-

fall of Safad [which comprised part of the new offensive strategy] had a chain-reaction on the Arabs of Upper Galilee. In ever increasing numbers they left their villages and joined the stream of refugees to the Lebanon and Syria.”¹⁰¹ But this account leaves out a number of significant items which Professor Khalidi brings to attention with sound documentation. It was actually Plan C, a strategic prelude to Plan Dalet, which was concerned with defensive pressure against Arab invasion and the maintenance of contact with Jewish settlements in the area of the proposed Arab state. Plan Dalet, on the other hand, sought “control of the area given to us [the Jews] by the U.N. in addition to areas occupied by us which were outside these borders”¹⁰² Of the thirteen operations upon which Plan Dalet rested, most were concerned either with precipitating Arab flight in general or with occupying areas assigned to the projected Arab state.¹⁰³ The underlying intent of these operations is graphically portrayed by Yigal Allon, commander of the Palmach:

We saw a need to clean the inner Galilee and to create a Jewish territorial succession in the entire area of upper Galilee We therefore looked for means which did not force us into employing force, in order to cause tens of thou-

ment of control over areas outside the projected Jewish state where there were Jewish settlements or population. See Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947–1949* (New York: Putnam, 1961), p. 87.

¹⁰¹ Jon and David Kimche, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁰² Quoted in Khalidi, “Plan Dalet,” p. 23, from *Qurvot of 1948*, p. 16.

¹⁰³ These included: Operations Harel and Maccabi (occupation of Arab villages near Latrun); Operation Misparayim (evacuation of Arabs in Haifa); Operation Chametz (destruction of Arab villages around Jaffa); Operation Jevussi (destruction of Arab villages surrounding Jerusalem); Operation Yiftach (purification of eastern Galilee of Arabs); Operation Matateh (destruction of Arab villages between Tiberias and eastern Galilee); Operation Ben Ami (occupation of Acre and purification of western Galilee of Arabs); Operation Pitchfork (occupation of Arab residential quarters in the New City of Jerusalem); Operation Schifon (occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem).

sands of sulky Arabs who remained in Galilee to flee We tried to use a tactic which took advantage of the impression created by the fall of Safad and the [Arab] defeat in the area which was cleaned by Operation Matateh—a tactic which worked miraculously well.

I gathered all of the Jewish Mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages, and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs, that a great Jewish reinforcement has arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time. And the rumor spread in all the areas of the Huleh that it is time to flee. The flight numbered myriads. The tactic reached its goal completely.¹⁰⁴

If this view of Plan Dalet is as representative of Israeli high command policy as seems evident, then it would have to be said that the Palestine War cannot be regarded merely as a defensive struggle for survival on the part of the Jewish community. Nathan Chofshi, later a leader of the pacifist movement in Israel, declared, “. . . we Jews forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages . . . some of them were driven out by force of arms; others were made to leave by deceit, lying, and false promises.”¹⁰⁵ And indeed, Zionism, as a national movement aspiring to the establishment of a state in a territory it did not occupy but which was occupied by others, was of necessity and by its very nature an intrusive movement. Lord Samuel recognized this at an earlier date, and in his memoirs expressed sympathy for the Arabs as they confronted the Zionist build-up in the inter-war period:

They saw Jews from Europe beginning to come in by the thousands, buying land, building villages, starting industries. How far was this to go? Would they themselves be squeezed out of the land altogether—no place left for them in their old age and for their children after them?¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Khalidi, “Plan Dalet,” p. 28, from *Ha Sepher Ha Palmach*, II, 286.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Childers, “The Other Exodus,” p. 673.

¹⁰⁶ *Memoirs by the Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel* (London: Cresset Press, 1945), p. 169.

The military phase of Zionist intrusion into Palestine had been anticipated by Herzl in 1895. Fifty-three years later, it became a reality, as virtually the whole Jewish community devoted itself to the task of expelling the Arabs by force. Though the shortage of arms presented an initial problem, the *Yishuv* were superior in actual strength and tactical acumen. In this context, the dominant theme was based on Menachem Begin's maxim: "We fight, therefore we are."¹⁰⁷ And the state which emerged from the struggle adhered to Ben-Gurion's code: "With the establishment of Israel, we are subject to one authority—our own."¹⁰⁸

In the years between the Basle Congress and the founding of the Jewish State, Zionism achieved a victory in one sense and suffered defeat in another. Territorial sovereignty in Palestine had been the result of dedication to practical measures, but the earlier ideals of a national renaissance derived from the moral precepts of Jewish tradition and the Western enlightenment were lost in the process. This left a residue of perplexing questions for the future, which still confront Israel and the Jewish world.

¹⁰⁷ Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (London: W.H. Allen, 1951), p. 46.

¹⁰⁸ Moshe Davis, ed., *Israel: Its Role in Civilization* (New York: Harpers, 1956), p. 24.

CHAPTER V

THE JEWISH STATE

With the establishment of Israel and the dramatic changes in its demographic character and territorial scope that took place during the 1948 war, Zionism was faced with new and more complex problems. Though many of the issues which arose had been implicit in the history and development of the movement, the actuality of statehood in a transformed Palestine suddenly made them tangible and immediate. The most noticeable was the deeper dimensions which the Arab question assumed. The Palestinian community had been uprooted in the war, creating a large refugee class out of the majority which was evicted, and consigning the few who remained to a subordinate position without any political role in the new state. Meanwhile, the Arab world outside had been alienated by the defeat, and refused to recognize Israel or have any relations with it. This gave rise to a situation of continuing hostility in which peace and mutual security became increasingly elusive. But the most challenging aspect of the deterioration of Israeli-Arab relations was the ethical problem of justifying the disenfranchisement of one people in terms of the perceived needs of another. Most Zionists had looked to the creation of a model Jewish society based on the principles of justice and social harmony, but the emergence of Israel as a garrison state stood in marked contrast to this image and introduced a problem of conflicting ideals.

Another important issue which developed out of Israel's establishment concerned the nature of Jewish identity in rela-

tion to the Jewish State. The Zionists had always maintained that their own movement represented the Jewish people in the broadest sense. But this was a self-assigned role and did not take into account the rather substantial interpretive differences between Zionism and other systems of Jewish thought, many of which opposed secular nationalism as a basic *motif*. Despite the general drift toward Zionism starting in the 1930's, a monolithic allegiance was never realized and there was a sharp divergence of opinion among the Zionists themselves as to the aim and practice of Jewish statehood in the Middle East.

When the State did come into existence in 1948, it assumed an authoritative position with regard to Jewish identity, destiny, and allegiance. Though many Jews initially accepted this mandate without reflection, there remained substantive differences concerning the prerogatives of the State and the basic meaning of what it is to be a Jew. In later years, these unresolved questions provided the basis of a complex dialogue among Jews which has sought to define the relationship between Zionism, Israel, and the Diaspora.

The ethics of the Arab problem comprise a major issue confronting Zionism since the creation of Israel. There are several aspects of the State's Arab policies which come to attention. The basic position was initially formulated and subsequently maintained by the dominant Mapai Party, which inherited the tradition of directive leadership within a pluralistic structure from Herzl and Weizmann. The dominant themes of this position are containment of the Palestinian minority under Israeli control, a militant front against the neighbouring Arab states, and resistance to international pressures.

During the period from 1948 to 1967, the Arabs in Israel comprised about ten per cent of the total population. The new minority was subjected to legal controls which insured its subordination to the Jewish character of the State. The basic instruments of this system were the Emergency Laws of 1949 and the Law on the Acquisition of Absentees' Property, enacted

on March 20, 1950.¹ The Emergency Laws were really a recapitulation under Israeli auspices of the British Defence Laws of 1945, which had been designed to bring the turbulent situation in Palestine under control by placing extensive restrictions on all personal activities. These regulations had been severely criticised by Zionists at the time,² but their retention with some modification in 1948 aroused little opposition from the Jewish community.

The Emergency Laws became the vehicle through which Israel imposed martial law under a Military Government in those sectors of Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev where the Arab population was concentrated. The overall effect of their enforcement was to render the Arab community within the State politically impotent by restricting the movement of individuals from place to place and preventing the formation of any organization to represent Arab interests. The Emergency Laws also excluded Arabs from significant participation in the social and economic life of Israel, curtailing opportunities for employment and education outside their own restricted enclaves.³

A further disability to which the Israeli Arabs were subjected concerned the matter of property rights. Under the Law on the Acquisition of Absentees' Property (1950), Palestinians who were away at any time during the period from 29 November 1947 to 1 September 1948 were considered "absent" even though they returned and maintained residence. The lands of these individuals were consequently open to legal confiscation and were duly confiscated. The Emergency Laws carried this a step further. Lands of Palestinians who had always remained

¹ See Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1948–1966* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 1–90; Aharon Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 493–496; Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1958), pp. 168–191.

² Jiryis, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 119–174.

within the boundaries of what became Israel were also subject to expropriation if the areas where these lands were situated should be declared "closed" for ostensible security reasons. The designation of such sectors as "Protected Areas" or "Security Areas" by the Minister of Defence with the approval of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee became a legal justification for expropriation, and this authority has been exercised on numerous occasions.⁴

Other legislation permitting the expropriation of Arab lands include the Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands (1948), the Law for the Requisitioning of Land in Times of Emergency (1949), the Law for the Acquisition of Lands (1953), and the Law of Prescription (1958).⁵ The actual extent of expropriation from recognized Israeli Arabs under these regulations is difficult to determine, but a conservative estimate is that it approximates one million dunums, or 250,000 acres.⁶ The confiscation of property in accordance with the Absentee Law was, of course, much greater, as it involved large tracts evacuated by the Arab exodus in 1948. But the deprivation of land belonging to Palestinians who remained in place is a more sensitive issue, since it reflects a policy which cannot be justified on the grounds of a war situation. Compensation in these cases was on the basis of minimal monetary evaluations or transfer to undeveloped lands, with little recourse to juridical appeal. More importantly, the treatment of Palestinian Arabs in this respect reflects a disregard for basic rights under a system which purported to be democratic in principle but used its preponderant power to dispossess citizens who were in a minority status and could not resist the actions taken against them.

There are two cases which illustrate the general character

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 65–71.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 72–80.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81. For an earlier estimate see Walter Schwarz, *The Arabs of Israel* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), pp. 97–99.

of Israeli policy toward the internal Arab community. On October 29, 1956, forty-nine Palestinians were killed by Israeli soldiers as they returned from work to the village of Kafr Qasim.⁷ The extenuating circumstance was a curfew, of which the villagers were uninformed. Later, juridical action was taken against those who had perpetrated the action, but the episode stands as an example of Israeli psychology with regard to its own Arab citizens. The second incident was more contrived. In 1962 the Knesset approved the expropriation of three Arab villages in western Galilee (Deir al-As'ad, Bina', and Nahaf) to provide space for the new Jewish city of Carmiel.⁸ This measure could not really be justified by the existing regulations, but was nevertheless carried out against only nominal opposition from the Jewish population. In brief, the Government of Israel has seen fit to adopt any course within its own boundaries to minimize the human and property rights of its Arab minority.

The Military Government was formally abolished in December of 1966, but its functions were assumed by other authorities, so that the same pattern of disabilities still exists.⁹ There has also been further discriminatory legislation, such as the Agricultural Settlement Law of 1967, which denies Arabs any share in Jewish-owned land.¹⁰ Since the 1967 War, however, the most serious abuses have centred in the occupied territories.

The policy of Israel with regard to the neighbouring Arab states comprises a vast subject which does not properly belong within the scope of this study.¹¹ But certain salient points should

⁷ Jiryis, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–118.

⁸ See the Ihud publication, *Ner*, July-August, 1962, pp. 1–6.

⁹ See Sabri Jiryis, *Democratic Freedoms in Israel* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), pp. 43–45.

¹⁰ Sabri Jiryis, "Recent Knesset Legislation and the Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, I, 1 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 53–67.

¹¹ See Kennett Love, *Suez: the Twice-Fought War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), and Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

be cited to illustrate the significance of the events which transpired. The Suez Crisis of 1956 originated with Israel's adoption of a policy of massive retaliation against border violations, starting with the raid on the Jordanian village of Qibya in October, 1953. The borders themselves, particularly with Jordan, were often a major factor in the state of unrest, as they separated Arab villages from their fields in a number of instances. But the Israelis were intent upon developing a hard line as the most effective means of tranquillizing the frontiers. This became particularly apparent in the raid against an Egyptian military installation in Gaza on February 28, 1955. The Israeli-Egyptian border had been relatively quiet before the attack, suggesting other motives for such an action.¹² The most important consideration seems to have been the assumption of Ben-Gurion, then Defence Minister, that the only way to get the Arabs to make peace was to demonstrate Israel's military superiority. Another factor was Israel's concern over the improvement of Egypt's relations with the major Western powers during the preceding year. In July, 1954, Israeli agents in Cairo and Alexandria had bombed British movie theatres and U.S. Information Service libraries in an attempt to give the appearance that Egypt was still hostile to Anglo-American interests and well-being in the country. This incident, which became known as the "Lavon Affair," was uncovered by the Egyptian authorities, but further encouraged Israel's determination to disrupt relations between Egypt and the West.

The Gaza raid did, in fact, help to set in motion a chain of events which found Egypt increasingly estranged from Britain, France, and the United States. Egypt became more directly involved in the dispute with Israel, supporting *fedayeen* activity and seeking arms to defend itself from a possible Israeli attack. What concerned Egypt in this regard was Israel's continuing

¹² See Love, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–20, and Fred Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), pp. 198–204.

aggressiveness, manifested in the gradual seizure of the demilitarized zones (DMZs) between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in defiance of the U.N.¹³ When the United States failed to honour a modest request for arms, an arrangement was made with the Soviet bloc. This action was regarded as provocative in Washington and eventually led to the cancellation of American financial support for the High Dam at Aswan on July 19, 1956. Nasser responded a week later by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, an action which not only further aggravated Egyptian-Western relations, but also revived the issue of Israel's right of passage through both the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Though Egypt's prerogative in nationalizing the Canal and preventing access to it by ships of a belligerent power can be upheld by international law, the whole thrust of events at this point gravitated against recognition of Egypt's position by those who held the power of decision. It was in this context that France, Great Britain, and Israel, each opposed to Nasser for separate reasons, contrived the joint military operation which became the Sinai War. Had it not been for the adamant opposition of President Eisenhower, the policy which Israel had been following for the past three years would have reached a completely successful conclusion, with the added advantage of territorial increment at Egypt's expense. As it was, American pressure finally secured the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the *status quo* was reinstated under the supervision of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).

The 1967 campaign had similar origins. Kennett Love, who was the *New York Times*' Middle East correspondent from 1953 to 1956, maintains that "from the moment Israel realized she would have to withdraw, Sinai was recognized as a campaign that would sooner or later be refought. Plans for the new war were drawn immediately after the old. They were kept

¹³ Khouri, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

up to date by constant improvement.”¹⁴ Without belabouring the thesis of a planned conspiracy, though there is evidence to support it, it is clear that in a sense Israel “needed” the war.¹⁵ The relatively slow growth in the gross national product and low level of immigration in the years before 1967 pointed to the desirability of a dramatic event which would galvanize the economy and rekindle interest in the Zionist idea. There were also some who continued to cherish the formation of “greater” Israel, encompassing at least the West Bank and the eastern portion of Sinai.

That such ulterior motives were a primary factor is suggested by the post-war commentary of high-ranking Israeli military officers. General Mattityahu Peled, who served on the General Staff during the campaign, was among the first to express publicly the view that Israel was not really threatened by the neighbouring Arab states in 1967.¹⁶ On the contrary, the Arabs were in a distinctly inferior position, both in numbers and technological potential. General Ezer Weizman, former head of the air force and chief of operations in the Six-Day War, concurred with this opinion, but at the same time justified the invasion and the retention of the areas occupied. A previous chairman of the avowedly expansionist Herut Party, he allowed that Israel did not launch the attack out of necessity, but in quest of territories which are a natural part of the country “because the attachment to those very places is the essence of Zionism and without them the Jewish state does not constitute an historical wholeness.”¹⁷ Similarly, the earlier campaign in

¹⁴ Love, *op. cit.*, p. 677.

¹⁵ See E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 290, 293–294; Abdullah Schleifer, *The Fall of Jerusalem* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 79–92.

¹⁶ From an article in *Ha-Aretz* (March 13, 1972) cited in Noam Chomsky, “Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, Reflections on a National Conflict,” *Holy Cross Quarterly*, Summer, 1972, p. 15.

¹⁷ See Paul Jacobs, “The View from Tel Aviv and Beirut,” *Ramparts*, March, 1973, p. 64.

1956 "was an initiated political process, well calculated and justified . . . its timing and the manner of its execution were influenced by considerations aimed at taking advantage of international circumstances, more than by the development of the Egyptian threat."¹⁸

The immediate background of the June War involved a psychological encounter in which Egypt, Jordan, and Syria became ensnared in a situation, partly of their own making, which set the stage for an Israeli attack.¹⁹ The formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964 and the subsequent recourse to ill-considered statements by its first leader, Ahmad Shuqairi, and by the regime in Syria provided an excuse for Israeli escalation of tension. Taking full advantage of these and later developments, Israel was able to entangle the Arab world in a web of commitments and challenges far in excess of existing capabilities. In this context Israel brought forward its own counter-challenges, focusing on the issue of passage through the Strait of Tiran. Caught between weakness induced by an over-extended role and obligations to other Arab states, Nasser was forced to deny Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba and to request withdrawal of the UNEF from the border, providing both the apparent justification and the conditions for an Israeli attack. It should be noted, however, that the blockade of the Gulf was never really tested and that Egypt had indicated to U.S. officials in Cairo that a military thrust would not be initiated from that side.²⁰

The war itself resulted in a spectacular victory which brought the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights under Israeli control, a situation which remained unchanged

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ See Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1968, pp. 304-320.

²⁰ See Schleifer, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-158; David Nes, "Sharm el-Sheikh Blocks the Way to Peace," *Middle East International*, June, 1971.

for six years largely because of American reluctance to insist on Israeli withdrawal as a basic condition of peace. Though the campaign accomplished the goals which the Jerusalem government had sought, it posed new ethical problems and further alienated the Arab world.

Israel's continuing occupation of the territories seized in 1967 measurably altered the situation of the State and the direction of Zionist thought. The most basic problem was the raw accumulation of power itself, which always influences those who wield it. Israel not only assumed the role of a conqueror, but felt virtually free to make any disposition of the existing situation it saw fit, since the Arabs were apparently unable to impose a military challenge and the superpowers were not disposed to impose a settlement.

This absence of restraining forces generated a psychological climate which made it more difficult for Israelis to deal with the ethics of the Arab problem. The display of power at the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations is an example of this kind of *hubris* which remains a barrier to reconciliation with the Arab environment. Yet it is precisely such a reconciliation which Israel most needs in the long run.

The occupation poses three specific issues: the rights and status of the conquered peoples, changes in the character of the occupied territories, and Israel's ultimate intentions with regard to both. The particulars of a victor-vanquished relationship are always difficult to assess because they are based on imposed authority and a combination of acquiescence and resistance. A number of reports by responsible Western journalists, however, have provided a general picture of Israeli rule in Gaza and the West Bank.²¹ These and other sources, including articles in the Hebrew press, indicate an essentially repressive administration. Despite the image of a low profile created by restrictions on Jewish travel, the occupied territories are under

²¹ See David Holden, "Jordanian Hatred of Israelis Smolders Under Occupation," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1967; E.C. Hodgkin, "Grim

martial law and the Military Government has control over all resident activities, political, economic, and social. Of particular concern has been the adoption of punitive methods to ensure the acquiescence of the occupied peoples. These have included destruction of housing, confiscation of property, administrative detention, revocation of permits essential to economic livelihood, curfews, and torture, applied to groups or individuals who in any sense appeared to be non-cooperative, suspicious, or a threat to security. Such measures have been used less frequently recently, but largely because their earlier application brought about the gradual "Vichyization" of the occupied territories. But the manner in which Israel achieved this goal remains to be answered, as does the question of the political status of the Arab inhabitants. The policy hitherto has been to maintain the existing system without granting rights of citizenship, guaranteeing control but preventing the emergence of a large enfranchized Arab minority.

With regard to changes in the character of the occupied territories, the general thrust of Israeli policy has been to avoid incorporation (with the exception of east Jerusalem) while encouraging Jewish settlement under cover of restrictive ordinances.²² The transformation of Jerusalem began with the

Reports of Repression in Israel-Occupied Lands." *The Times* (London), October 28, 1969; John Cooley, "Gaza Refugees Caught in Middle," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 2, 1971; and John Cooley, "Misery Reigns in Gaza," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 16, 1972. The observations in these articles have been corroborated by the *Report of the Special Committee [UN] to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories* (U.N. document A/8389), October 5, 1971.

²² See George Wilson, "Housing for Jews Flanking Holy City," *Washington Post*, November 1, 1970; David Hirst, "Homes for the Boys," *The Guardian*, April 26, 1972; David Hirst, "Bulldozing Through Arab History," *The Guardian*, April 27, 1972; Michael Gross, "Israel Altering Occupied Arab Lands," *Washington Post*, September 24, 1972; Jim Hoagland, "Israel Lays Basis for Staying at Sharm el-Sheikh," *Washington Post*, May 3, 1973; John Cooley, "Israelis Put Down Roots in Arab Soil," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 30, 1973; and Jim Hoagland, "Israeli Attitude Toward Arab Return Hardens," *Washington Post*, June 5, 1973.

unilateral incorporation of the Jordanian sector by Israel immediately following the 1967 war. Subsequent activities designed to alter the character of the city and to prevent any return to the previous *status quo* include confiscation of religious and privately-owned Arab properties, reconstruction of portions of the Old City, and the establishment of an apartment house complex for Jewish tenants on the eastern periphery. A noteworthy aspect of these developments is that in spite of Israel's position that it is willing to enter peace negotiations without conditions, the actions taken in Jerusalem have established a condition which is regarded as irrevocable.

Beyond Jerusalem, Israel has gradually encouraged Jewish colonization and investment in the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula, though private purchases have been barred.²³ These settlements, now at least forty-three in number, include urban projects, collectives, cooperatives, and paramilitary units, providing the basis of an expanding Jewish tenure in the occupied regions. Equally significant have been intimations from official quarters that Israel is planning to retain at least some, if not all, of the territories seized in 1967. Mrs. Meir made it clear that total withdrawal is out of the question, while General Dayan has asserted that for one hundred years the Jewish people have been undergoing a process "of colonization to enlarge the borders here—let there not be a Jew to claim that this process is over. Let there not be a Jew to say that we are nearing the end of the road."²⁴ More specifically, Dayan has urged retention of the West Bank: "We have a right to regard Samaria and Judaea as part of Eretz Israel . . . I do not think we shall advise Jews who settled in the territories to live under an Arab ruler."²⁵ Israel

²³ See John Cooley, "Israel Rules Out Sale to Citizens of Arab Land," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 10, 1973; and Yuval Elizur, "Israel Will Assist Industries Set Up in Occupied Territories," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1973.

²⁴ Quoted in Chomsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–9.

²⁵ *Jewish Telegraph Agency*, March 16, 1973.

Galili, one of Mrs. Meir's closest associates, suggested an even broader programme: "Israel will leave no vacuum in these areas. No area is out of bounds to Jewish settlement."²⁶

In these and other statements, the Israeli Government has advised the world that its real aim in the occupied territories is retention of at least a major portion.²⁷ The whole philosophy in this respect has been summarized by Josef Weitz, former head of the Jewish Agency settlement department, who recalled in the aftermath of the Six-Day War a diary entry he made in 1940: "Between ourselves, it must be clear that there is no room in this country for both peoples The only solution is Eretz Israel, at least the Western Israel [i.e., west of the Jordan River], without Arabs, and there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries—to transfer them all—not one village, not one tribe should be left."²⁸ Such a view was echoed in the recent context by Yaacov Eiges, director of settlement for the Zionist Federation officially supervising the colonization project in the occupied territories: "We build according to government planning. We are building with an eye toward permanence Politics doesn't enter into it."²⁹ Criticizing the Government for what he considers its hypocritical settlement policy, Ezer Weizman asserted in the summer of 1972: "They are moving into the territories and they are doing it deliberately. But for fear of upsetting people abroad, they won't admit what they are doing. We in Gahal are at least honest about our intentions."³⁰ Considering the general drift of events since then, this seems to be a fairly valid judgement.

²⁶ Peter Grose, "Israel Pressing Settlement of Arab Land," *New York Times*, July 25, 1972.

²⁷ See Richard Holbrooke, "Israel's Next Step," *Washington Post*, September 9, 1973, which gives an account of the Labour Party's platform favouring extensive Jewish land purchase in the occupied territories.

²⁸ Quoted in Chomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁹ Michael Gross, "Israel Altering Occupied Arab Lands."

³⁰ Peter Grose, "Israel Pressing Settlement of Arab Land."

Since its establishment, Israel has resisted external pressures which sought to temper its Arab policies. The United Nations, in particular, has been a source of irritation, since the General Assembly and the Security Council have sought to intervene on numerous occasions with regard to the substantive issues, especially the refugee problem, the status of Jerusalem, and the occupied territories. The first major intervention of this type was General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, which resolved that the Jerusalem area should be placed under effective U.N. control and that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation would be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

In the spring of 1949, the General Assembly considered Israel's request to be admitted to the U.N. The major concern of the member states in this regard was that Israel indicate its intention to abide by the existing resolutions. Accordingly, the Israeli representative pledged that his government would pursue "no policies on any questions which were inconsistent with . . . the resolutions of the Assembly and the Security Council."³¹ He also assured the Colombian delegate in writing that Israel would not oppose the internationalization of Jerusalem.³² On the basis of these declarations of intent and with specific reference to its own resolutions of November 29, 1947 and December 11, 1948, the Assembly duly admitted Israel to the United Nations.³³ The most noteworthy aspect of this action was its conditional character and the assumption that Israel would discharge its obligations as set forth.

³¹ Khouri, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *General Assembly Resolution 273 (III)*, May 11, 1949.

On December 9, 1949, the General Assembly restated its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent regime as envisaged in the Partition Resolution.³⁴ The position on the refugee question, first contained in Resolution 194 (III), was also restated within the context of nineteen subsequent resolutions adopted between 1950 and 1972.³⁵ Israel's earlier declarations of intention notwithstanding, no move has been made on its part to implement the letter or spirit of any of these resolutions. Similarly, Israel's attitude toward the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and subsidiary agencies in the period before the 1967 war was generally uncooperative.³⁶ More recently, Israel has shown a marked insensitivity to U.N. positions on the occupied territories, refugees, and truce violations, embodied in over forty resolutions passed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Commission on Human Rights.³⁷ These resolutions have noted with concern the annexation of Jerusalem, the continuing occupation of the regions conquered in the Six-Day War, Israeli military operations beyond the post-1967 borders, and violations of human rights in the occupied territories. Accordingly, they called on Israel to desist from such activities and rescind any relevant actions already taken, but these evoked no positive response from Israel itself.

Israel's stance with respect to the United Nations raises the broader question of its position on peace in general. Commenting on the historical pattern that has evolved over the

³⁴ *General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV)*, December 9, 1949.

³⁵ See *General Assembly Resolutions 393(V)*, 512(VI), 614(VII), 720(VIII), 818(IX), 916(X), 1018(XI), 1191(XII), 1315(XIII), 1725(XIV), 1856(XVII), 1912(XVIII), 2154(XXI), 2341(XXII), 2452b(XXIII), 2535a(XXIV), 2672a(XXV), 2792a(XXVI), 2963a(XXVIII).

³⁶ See E.H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955); E.L.M. Burns, *op. cit.*; and Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace*, (New York: McKay, 1966).

³⁷ See Fayez Sayegh and Sohair Soukkary, *Palestine: Concordance of United Nations Resolutions, 1967-1971* (New York: New World Press, 1971).

years, one scholar has noted: "While officially maintaining their state of war, the Arabs have tailored their actions and legal justification for their actions to meet the requirements of peace. At the same time, Israel explains its actions not in terms of peace, but in terms of the Arab state of war."³⁸ On May 12, 1949, the U.N. Conciliation Commission, which had been established by General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), obtained the joint approval of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel that the boundaries advocated by the 1947 Partition Resolution would serve as the "starting point and framework for the discussion of territorial questions."³⁹ This agreement, known as the Lausanne Protocols, established the willingness of four Arab governments to accept a Jewish state as originally proposed by the General Assembly. Though the Arab compliance was a gesture after the fact of an expanded Israel, it represented an avenue to peace which was quickly rejected by the other side. And in the context of subsequent changes in the *status quo*, Israel always proved unwilling to reestablish a previous situation as a condition of settlement.

The residue of expansionist speculation in certain facets of Zionist ideology and the present hardening of attitudes on the future disposition of the occupied territories suggests the primacy of pragmatic considerations aimed at physical increment over the interest in pacific accommodation. Israel clearly has the option of peace with the neighbouring Arab states on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which in somewhat ambiguous language called for substantial withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for the recognition of Israel within secure boundaries. The resolution itself was the product of American and British diplomatic initiatives, and the subsequent Rogers Plan endorsed its provisions, though refusing either to establish more specific guidelines or to exert leverage on Israel.

³⁸ Lawrence de Bivort, "Paradoxes in the Conflict," Taylor and Tetlie, (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

³⁹ Khouri, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–294.

Egypt, in particular, indicated its willingness to reach an agreement in terms of Resolution 242. The sincerity of this became apparent from the general drift of Egyptian politics toward normalization. On February 8, 1971, Ambassador Jarring presented identical aide-mémoires to the representatives of Egypt and Israel, requesting both to make simultaneous commitments.⁴⁰ Israel was asked to commit itself to a withdrawal of forces to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. At the same time, Egypt was to make a corresponding commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel which would end the state of belligerency and establish the mutual acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence within secure and recognized boundaries. On February 15 Ambassador Jarring received an aide-mémoire from the Egyptian representative indicating that Egypt would accept the specific commitments requested of it and other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Resolution 242. It further called for Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as well as the Sinai Peninsula and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied in the 1967 war. Egypt also expressed its willingness to ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, and to accept a U.N. peace-keeping force at Sharm el-Sheikh and the establishment of demilitarized zones along the borders.

By contrast, Israel's response was essentially negative. Without specific reference to the commitment solicited, the reply reiterated Israel's readiness to enter into negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries, but without prior conditions. It also gave details of the undertakings which in Israel's view should provide the basis of a settlement. The general tenor of this aide-mémoire

⁴⁰ See *Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East* (U.N. documents A/8541 and S/10403), November 30, 1971.

was therefore to reject the fundamental purpose of the Jarring proposal, which was to elicit simultaneous commitments to withdrawal and recognition by Israel and Egypt, respectively, thereby overcoming the impasse created by the question of sequence. With regard to the crucial matter of withdrawal, the reply agreed only to retreat from the "cease-fire line to secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement." And it was further specified that "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines."⁴¹

Another factor in Israel's intransigence with regard to the normalization of relations with the Arabs is its attitude toward the Palestinians. With some exceptions, the Zionists had from an early date refused to take into account the interests and rights of the indigenous population of the land they sought to reconstruct as a Jewish state. Following the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Israeli victory in 1967, this tendency became more emphatic. The basic position in this respect was delineated by Professor Eliezer Schweid of the Hebrew University in an article which appeared in 1970:

... the general policy of Zionism based itself upon the certainty and primacy of the right of the Jewish people to its homeland. From this point of view, the opposition of the Arabs was a practical stumbling block that must be overcome, and not a moral problem that must be dealt with. We must emphasize again that one should not see in this approach disregard for truth and righteousness. This approach had a factual and moral basis. Arab nationalism in the Land of Israel appeared from its beginning, not as a movement whose purpose is to realize or defend the right of an existing national entity, but rather as a movement that realizes its very being in defiance of Zionism.⁴²

On the official level, the Palestinians have been consigned to oblivion. The validity of their existence as a corporate

⁴¹ *Jerusalem Post*, March 8, 1971, p. 2.

⁴² Eliezer Schweid, "New Ideological Directions After the Six Day War," *Dispersion and Unity*, No. 10 (Jerusalem, 1970), p. 48.

entity was repudiated in 1969 by the then Minister of Information, Israel Galili, who asserted: "We do not regard the Palestinian Arabs as an ethnic category, as a distinct national community in this country."⁴³ Later in the year, Premier Golda Meir endorsed this interpretation in an interview by stating: "There was no such thing as Palestinians It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."⁴⁴ A corollary to this policy of non-recognition is the implementation of retaliatory raids against Palestinian guerrillas beyond the scope of the provocative incidents themselves. Israel's responsive actions, particularly in Lebanon, have been out of proportion and reflect precisely that psychology which has stood as the most significant barrier to peaceful co-existence.

The continuing inflexibility of the Zionist establishment, which has deepened Arab alienation and obstructed peace, has not gone unchallenged in Israel itself. The initial opposition to the militant policies of Mapai centred on the Ihud Group, which had upheld the principle of bi-nationalism before the creation of Israel. In the aftermath of the 1948 war, Ihud took issue with the Military Government in the Arab sectors and with the general political orientation of the State. Martin Buber, the most prominent member of the Group, recapitulated the older moderate view in 1957: ". . .one of the unexpressed principles of prophecy is that ends do not justify means. And if the nature of the means is in contradiction to the nature of the end they desecrate it, poison it and make it a thing of horror."⁴⁵ Reflecting on the militant character Zionism assumed in 1948, he commented:

⁴³ *Jewish Liberation Journal* (New York), November-December, 1969, p. 4.

⁴⁴ *Sunday Times* (London), June 15, 1969.

⁴⁵ "Proceedings of the Jerusalem Ideological Conference," *Forum for the Problems of Zionism, Jewry and the State of Israel* (Jerusalem), IV (Spring, 1959), 146.

When I joined the Zionist movement for the rebirth of the Jewish people fifty years ago, it was with all my heart and soul. Today the first fissures are beginning to appear. I am engaged in a war despite myself and I tremble like all Israelis. Even in victory, I don't know how to rejoice for I fear the victory of the Jews means the defeat of Zionism.⁴⁶

But the position of Ihud became quixotic in the context of a polity which it recognized and opposed at the same time. Its influence was further undermined by a membership confined to ageing personalities, mostly associated with the Hebrew University. Hence the focus of dissent shifted gradually to other quarters.

Among the younger generations in Israel, new movements have emerged in opposition to existing policies and the Zionist idea as originally conceived. A pioneer in this field is Uri Avnery, recently a member of the Knesset and a critic of doctrinaire Zionist ideology.⁴⁷ Avnery was one of many whose lives were gathered up and redirected by the Zionist movement. At the age of ten he and his parents left Hitler's Germany and went to Palestine, where, in his words: "We declared our independence from our past . . . the world of our parents, their culture and their background." As a youth he attached himself to the Irgun but later became disillusioned and embarked on an odyssey of ideas and associations which reflected his frustration with the Zionist idea as formulated in the minds of diasporan Jews. Ultimately, he was attracted to the poet Ratosh and the Canaanite movement. This school rejected the cultural traditions of the Diaspora and stressed the evolution of a "Hebrew" national renaissance in Palestine, the creation of a distinct Palestinian Jewish identity. It was anti-Zionist in a qualitative sense, rejecting the international Jewish orientation and leadership of the Zionist "establishment" and the notion of continuing umbilical ties between

⁴⁶ Quoted in Amnon Kapeliouk, "Zionism: Between the Ideal and the Practical," *Le Monde*, April 12, 1973, p. 10.

⁴⁷ See Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionists* (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

Israel and world Jewry. It retained, however, the essentially Zionist idea of a new Jewish image emerging from the soil of the ancestral land.

Semitic Action, which Uri Avnery has led, is an outgrowth of the Canaanites. Its doctrines represent an increasingly significant reaction of contemporary Israelis to many of the dilemmas posed by the Zionist myth. Avnery is advocating a new "auto-emancipation," this time from the obsolete and burdensome concepts of an ideology which stems from nearly one hundred years ago. In looking to the emergence of a non-Zionist Israel, he is expressing some very deep-seated feelings in many of his countrymen, who experience the intense loneliness of being an "object" of Jews who are absent and a stranger among neighbours who are present. The Israeli is like a child whose parents dote on him to the point of stifling his identity while he is trying to find his way in a world which his parents reject because they see it as a recapitulation of old enemies and a threat to the image in which they wish to cast their offspring.

Avnery understands the shortsightedness and distortions of traditional Zionism. He takes issue with Herzl's concept of a Jewish Palestine as "an outpost of culture against barbarism," and recognizes the nature of Ben-Gurion's arabophobia. In a brilliant analysis, he portrays Moshe Dayan as an essentially pathological product of Zionism in Palestine, a "lone wolf" who cannot get close to anyone, who "never says what he really thinks," and who "was, is, and will always be an Arab-fighter." He also sees that Israeli campaigns are really reactions to the "new" Arab nationalism and that the continuing Arab-Israeli war is a product of a "vicious circle" of Zionist presumptions that the Arabs can only be dealt with by force.

These insights lend a useful new perspective to the problem, as does Avnery's proposal for a de-Zionized Israel which can become integrated into the Middle East and become a partner to a *Pax Semitica*. But there remain three very serious problems in his outlook and programme. The first is that the myths

which Avnery exposes in the Zionists are also apparent in his own thought. The idea of a "Hebrew" renaissance is a fanciful archaism which glosses over the fact that an essentially Western people is seeking an indigenous status in a non-Western land. Their feeling of isolation is understandable as is their desire to "belong" in a cultural as well as a geographical sense. But it remains a fact that the Western Israeli is no more an indigenous Middle Easterner than the Boer in Capetown and Johannesburg is an indigenous African.

The second problem relates to the Zionist concept of "emancipation." If Avnery disparages the diasporan ties and orientations of Zionism, he fully endorses the notion of Zionism as a "liberating" movement, freeing the Jews from their own stultifying past. Understandable as this may be in certain respects, it neglects the significance of the Judaic heritage and the broad dimensions of Jewish secular development in the modern age, both of which stand among the more notable achievements of man and have profoundly influenced the course of history. One cannot but question how a parochial neo-Hebraism would compare to these facets of Jewish experience.

The final problem with the Avnery thesis—and this is probably the most important in terms of a settlement to the current conflict—concerns his approach to the Arab question. His attitude toward the Arabs is condescending and academic. He sees the Arab national movement as initially "a simple idea . . . not faced with the immensely complicated problems which confronted Zionism." This is hardly true. The development and evolution of the national idea among the Arabs is as complex and involved as it has been in the case of other modernizing movements, whether they be Jewish, Russian, Indian, or Chinese. The Arabs, too, have problems of loyalty, identity, direction, and becoming.

The *Pax Semitica* which Uri Avnery has in mind is basically Israelo-centric. It suggests the construction of a Palestinian state as Israel's first Arab ally, without considering the dis-

advantages to the Palestinians of accepting a "lesser" Palestine which—economically and strategically—would inevitably become a kind of satellite to the Jewish state. It also disregards the fact that the Palestinians have now developed a national movement of their own which does not seek the eviction of the Jews, but the construction of a secular and pluralistic state. This is a challenge which Avnery does not even take into account, and considering the vast discrepancy in proportional population, it might be more appropriate to ask how Israel could fit into a broader *Pax Semitica* than how the Palestinians and the Arabs in general could accommodate Israeli schemes for integration and peace.

These criticisms aside, Uri Avnery has made a contribution to deeper understanding of a problem which has so troubled Arabs, Israelis, and the world. He is seeking a way around the dilemmas of the new Jewish presence in the Middle East, a way to escape the myths and brittle attitudes of Zionism in order to build a system of coexistence. He stands as a point of departure, a course with frailties to be reconsidered, but one which has essential merits. Should his reflections and ideas take any root, the possibilities of peace will be enhanced. Naturally, the Arabs also have a role to play. But the accent hitherto has been on what the Arabs must do and seldom on the gestures which Israel needs to make if it is to achieve a normal way of life in the Middle East.

The most prominent faction of the opposition movement in Israel derives from the political "left." The original centre of this dissenting bloc was the Mapam Party, which adheres to the ideas of Ber Borochov and has attempted to combine the precepts of traditional Marxism and secular Zionism. Ideologically, Mapam finds the Government's aggressive policies toward the neighbouring states and its discrimination against the Arab minority in Israel incompatible with the principles of the international socialist revolution. At the same time, it supports the existence of the Jewish state and participates in its political life. Hence, Mapam seeks to resolve the Arab

problem while reaffirming the essentials of Zionism, to establish justice and equity without sacrificing the fruits of Zionist development in Palestine. The difficulties implicit in this approach to the basic questions of rights and status have prevented Mapam from achieving an intermediary role, a problem further complicated by its representation in the Cabinet after the Six-Day War.

Since 1967, the leftist movement in Israel has proliferated in a number of directions. The Communist Party has split into two factions—Rakah, which maintains a Soviet affiliation, and the Zionist-oriented Maki faction. In 1962, a revisionist element within the Communist Party formed the Israel Socialist Organization (ISO), also described by the title of its publication, *Matzpen* (Compass).⁴⁸ This, in turn, splintered into separate groups which emphasize various ideological positions, but oppose in common the Government's policies with regard to the Arab minority in Israel, the occupied territories and the neighbouring states.

To the "right" of Matzpen is SIACH (New Left), which is akin to the New Left movement in the United States. This group, which is also divided, supports the implementation of Resolution 242 and the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. Related in basic approach are various splinters from Mapam including *Brit Ha-Smol* (Covenant of the Left), the Movement for Peace and Security, and dissident youth societies, all of which oppose the annexationist policies of Israel and the participation of Mapam in the coalition. The fragmentation of leftist organizations within Israel is therefore an impediment to political action, though there is a consensus on basic issues with regard to Arab relations.

Among other movements of dissent in Israel, the Israel League for Human and Civil Rights could come to exercise an increasingly important role. Headed by Dr. Israel Shahak

⁴⁸ See Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel: the Radical Case Against Zionism* (New York: Doubleday, 1972).

of the Hebrew University, the League provides an umbrella under which those dissatisfied with official policy from their various ideological positions can find a common ground. Dr. Shahak, himself unassociated with any political party, has sought to identify particular cases of abuse, providing a framework within which a broader opposition can be implemented. The League represents a small body at present, but its persistence in addressing specific issues is bound to develop a deeper impact.

On the periphery of opposition is the ultra-Orthodox *Neturei Karta*, which rejects the State on the grounds of its profane orientation. A residue of traditional Judaism, it has taken issue with the political Zionist idea as such and challenges the premise that a secular movement can have any relationship to the Messianic expectation. Emile Marmorstein, *Neturei Karta*'s most articulate spokesman in the West, has characterized Zionism as "a highly romantic version of moral triumph in tribulation . . . with occasional lapses into mythology when enthusiasm compensated for the flimsiness of available evidence."⁴⁹ He takes particular exception to the Zionist manipulation of traditional Judaism as a means of suggesting national feeling as the sole qualification of membership in the Jewish nation, and regards "the establishment of the State . . . not [as] a re-entry into history, but as a new and more grievous exile."⁵⁰ Therefore, the State, under a "forged name, had become an incinerator of Jewish souls far deadlier than Hitler's incinerators, which merely annihilated the bodies of their victims and thus guaranteed them eternal life."⁵¹ For these reasons, Marmorstein regards Zionism as "the most recent but the least reputable of a long series of pseudo-messianic attempts to forestall the redemption by human action . . . a heresy disguised in sacred vestments."⁵²

⁴⁹ Marmorstein, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 71.

Though *Neturei Karta* is regarded in Israel as an anomaly, its existence is a reminder of the broad gulf between Zionism and traditional Judaism. Emile Marmorstein has argued convincingly that the Orthodox parties in Israel have deluded themselves in assuming that their participation in the State would ultimately direct it toward religious goals, a premise which is supported by evident trends. But there is a broader significance to the disregard of Israel for Judaism as a tradition. In submerging this most basic aspect of what it is to be a Jew, secular Zionism has undermined its own *raison d'être*, for the case it has forwarded on behalf of *special* rights to control of Palestine rests on the constitution of the Jews as a religious community.

Beyond the organization of particular opposition groups, there are two other factors to be considered. One is the existence of a Jewish majority in Israel which has no roots in the Zionist movement. The Oriental, or Sephardic, Jews came to the country from Arab states in the aftermath of Israel's creation. Though embittered by the actions taken against them in former homelands, they are still Arabs and are generally regarded with disdain by Israelis of European origin.⁵³ The cultural conflict engendered by the attempt of the Ashkenazi community to impose a normative orientation in terms of its own Zionist ideology has further alienated the Sephardic Jews, whose growing majority status does not include a commensurate political influence or a proportional representation in the Knesset.

In opposition to this circumstance, the most disturbed elements among the Jewish Arabs in Israel formed a dissident organization known as the Black Panthers. Included in this group were leftists and nationalists who shared in common a rejection of Ashkenazi dominance. The Black Panthers have recently opened membership to all Israelis who sympathize

⁵³ See Michael Selzer, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State* (New York: Black Star, 1967), pp. 51–86; and Trudi Weiss-Rosmarin, "Israel's 'Panthers'," *Jewish Spectator*, June, 1971.

with their cause, but there remains a gulf between those who understand Zionism from a European viewpoint and the mass of Oriental Jews who became involved in the Israeli system through circumstances beyond their control. Particularly significant in the Ashkenazi—Sephardi friction is the Zionist premise that Jewish nationality is monolithic. Over against this assumption is the fact of cultural diversity among the Jews, which resists the common denominator Zionism has sought to construct. The idea of conformity to a socio-political doctrine, derived by the early Zionists from Western notions of state and peoplehood, are more generally at cross-purposes with the broader dimensions and directions of Jewish life in the world. If this is especially apparent in the social tensions within the Jewish population of Israel, it has deeper implications with regard to future relations between the Jewish state and the Diaspora as a whole.

The second dimension of resistance to doctrinaire Zionism among the grass-roots of contemporary Israel is found in the youth of European origin. Comprising a broad spectrum of opinion and affiliation, the younger Israelis of this background have experienced a particularly subtle and complex form of alienation. Though they “belong” to the State and support it, they also resent the ideological prescriptions that have been passed on to them and find it difficult to identify either with the psychology generated by the Holocaust or the diasporan world, which in patronizing Israel also seeks to define its character.⁵⁴

Amos Elon finds the younger Israelis troubled by the circumstantial and emotional situation in which they find themselves. The persecution of the Jews in the recent past haunts and angers them. But they did not share directly in this experience and have been called upon to play the part of assertive

⁵⁴ See Amos Elon, *The Israelis, Founders and Sons* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); and David Schoenbrun with Robert and Lucy Szekely, *The New Israelis: A Report on the First Generation Born in Israel* (New York: Atheneum, 1973).

nationalists in the service of the State. This has infused in them a sense of guilt at having escaped the suffering of earlier generations and a loneliness in the different role which has been thrust upon them.⁵⁵ The contradiction implicit in a system of affiliation stimulated by previous adversity but aspiring to prowess has created a certain ambivalence within the new Israelis. It is for this reason that they find it difficult to confront survivors of the Holocaust or to feel exuberance in the victories they have accomplished.⁵⁶

Other conditions have contributed to the psychological frustrations of Israeli youth. Particularly important is the isolation of their country from the external world. The endless state of emergency and estrangement from the Arab environment comprises a major dimension of this situation, which has been aggravated by the recent policies of the State. Another factor is the regime's discouragement of personal contact with places outside, implemented by an exorbitant foreign travel tax imposed on Israeli citizens. In these respects, Israel has become a new kind of ghetto, constructed and maintained by its own architects and leaders. It is a "closed" society which many of its citizens find unnatural and confining. Reflected in this is a sense of uneasiness with the underlying political structure of the State, which continues to assert the primary authority of doctrinaire Zionism, represented by an ageing elite, in the framework of a procedural democracy. An important circumstance which lends viability to this system is the fact that the Government receives enormous financial support from diasporan Jews, who idealize Zionism but remain outside the State. The power of the indigenous Jewish citizenry is therefore undermined by external influences which have a special relationship with the hierarchy, a situation which is unique in the world.

Following a visit to Israel before the October War, the

⁵⁵ Elon, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–213.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 240.

American Jewish journalist, Paul Jacobs, observed that "despite the country's military triumphs and extraordinary economic achievements, a nagging sense of disquiet gnaws at many Israelis . . . a feeling that all is not quite so well. And a handful of Israelis, including figures who were once respected members of the Israeli establishment, are proclaiming their profound dissatisfaction with present directions of Israeli policies—in relation to both the occupied territories and the country's internal life."⁵⁷ This disquiet is expressed by the younger generation in terms of disengagement. Another analysis, also by an American journalist, concludes from polls taken at the Hebrew University that only a small percentage of the student group are interested in political activity of any kind.⁵⁸ These students also identify themselves as Israelis rather than Zionists, and though they uphold the right of Jews to establish a state in Palestine, they also feel that war is not the solution to Israel's future.

Yet Israeli youth has no defined programme of its own, since there is no common front beyond a diversified discontent with the general situation as it now stands. From this has come a disturbed apathy which Amos Elon finds evident in the sterility of linguistic expression among the young. Even the love-letters "are notoriously dry, unimaginative, and frequently oddly impersonal."⁵⁹ From these observations, it may be concluded that the new generation of Ashkenazi Jews in Israel are in an emotional crisis, from which they will eventually emerge to exert their own influence as the older establishment disappears. If they are brought in this context to question the fundamentals of the Zionist idea as understood by their forebears, the whole character and orientation of the State may change substantially in the immediate future.

⁵⁷ Jacobs, *op. cit.*, p. 61. See also Paul Jacobs, "The Mood in Tel Aviv," *Ramparts*, January 1974, for an account of the reactions to the October War.

⁵⁸ Eric Silver, "Israeli Youth Scorn Politics, Reject Forefathers' Zionism," *Washington Post*, April 2, 1973.

⁵⁹ Elon, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

Beyond the ramifications of Israel's Arab policies and doctrinaire Zionist orientation, the existential question of Jewish identity comprises another major problem confronting the Zionist movement, the State it created, and the Jewish world at large. Before 1948, Zionism had claimed to represent the Jewish people, but this could not be established in any legal sense and remained a conjectural matter. Following Israel's establishment, however, the World Zionist Organization continued to operate as the Jewish Agency, but in this instance to support the State as the focus of Jewish interests and affiliation. The Twenty-Third Zionist Congress, meeting in Jerusalem in August, 1951, listed the basic tasks before Israel and the Jewish people as (1) the strengthening of the State of Israel, (2) the ingathering of the exiles to Eretz Israel, and (3) the fostering of the unity of the Jewish people.⁶⁰ Known as the Jerusalem Programme, and superseding earlier Zionist platforms, this statement of policy sought to subordinate Jewish activity to Zionist ideals and the welfare of Israel. But the Congress itself manifested differences of opinion and the position it endorsed was vaguely defined. This left the broad question of the relationship between Israel, Zionism, and the Diaspora essentially unanswered. More particularly, it failed to establish a clear concept of what it is that constitutes Jewishness or to specify the exact status of Jews with respect to the State.

Zionism itself had introduced a problem of Jewish identity by emphasizing kinship rather than religion as the basis of Jewish nationality. The interpretive contradiction between this view and that implicit in traditional Judaism was a source of uncertainty which has become more pointed since the creation of Israel. But the State attempted to override these difficulties through its own legislation. The Law of Return (1950) established the right of all Jews to settle in Israel,

⁶⁰ *Resolutions of the Twenty-Third Zionist Congress* (Jerusalem: Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1951), p. 19.

while the subsequent Nationality Law (1952) granted immediate citizenship to Jewish immigrants expressing a desire for such status.

The problem with these laws is that they did not define the condition of being a Jew. Initially, the State deferred to the Orthodox definition that only those who were born of a Jewish mother and had not renounced Judaism, or converts to the faith, could be considered as possessing Jewish nationality. It was on the basis of this criterion that in 1963 Father Daniel Rufeison, a Catholic priest of Jewish parentage, was denied automatic citizenship under the Nationality Law by a parliamentary action, though the residence requirements for naturalization were minimized. In the more recent Binyamin Shalit case (January, 1970), the Supreme Court of Israel ordered in a five-to-four decision that the children of a resident Jewish atheist and a Gentile mother be registered as Jewish nationals by ethnic affiliation.⁶¹

The problem facing the justices in the Shalit case was to decide between the *Halakah* (Judaic religious law) and the Zionist interpretation of Jewish nationality as the normative definition of what it is to be a Jew. The opinions were guarded, elusive, and sometimes equivocal, but the majority called on the registration authorities to accept Shalit's children as "Jewish" unless they could show just cause why this should not be done. In other respects, the case did not really resolve the problem of Jewish identity, inasmuch as the decision obliquely and by a narrow majority affirmed the subjective view without fully rejecting the significance of the religious connotation.

In reaction, the religious parties threatened to leave the coalition unless the law were modified to prevent the Court ruling from becoming a legal precedent. At this point, Mrs. Meir affirmed her belief in Jewish peoplehood as the primary

⁶¹ See "High Court Ruling in 'Who is a Jew' Case," *Jerusalem Post*, January 25, 1970.

concern of Zionism and Israel, but supported the importance of Judaism as a sustaining factor.⁶² Subsequently, the Knesset revised the legal code, granting Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return to immigrants with at least one Jewish grandparent and the status of Jewish nationality to those who qualified under the traditional Judaic interpretation.

This compromise reflects the tendency of Zionism to manipulate issues for the sake of unity under its own leadership. Considering the secular character of Zionism and of most Israelis, the deference to religious interpretations of Jewish nationality may seem anachronistic. But it is really a logical development in the light of the myths which Zionism itself fostered. The architects of the Zionist creed sought to create an ecumenical ideology which would embrace the whole Jewish people in a comprehensive system of allegiance. It was anticipated that this system would gather support by providing an asylum for the oppressed and by generating a broadly representative Jewish renaissance. There remained, however, an imposing gulf between the handful of Zionist ideologists whose basic aim was "negation of the Diaspora," and the Jewish world they wanted to transform. This Jewish world was not only socially and intellectually diverse, but rooted in the very Diaspora which the Zionists so disparaged. In this context, the reaffirmation of traditional criteria of Jewish identity became a means of diverting attention from real pluralism of Jewish life and thought by stressing the common bond which only Judaism could provide. Religious precepts thus became a cohesive force, employed by Zionists to support their own programme of political unity. But it is clear that Judaism, which sustained the Jews through the centuries, has been subordinated to Zionism as a system of secular nationalism.

In January 1972, the Supreme Court of Israel affirmed the Zionist view that national status comprises the basis of Jewish

⁶² *Knesset Debates*, XIII, 770, February 9, 1970.

identity. Professor Georges Tamarin, a critic of government positions who was forced in 1969 to relinquish his chair at the Hebrew University, petitioned the Court to change his national designation from "Jew" to "Israeli," thereby challenging the State's practice of ethnic discrimination among its own citizens. In denying the petition, the Court ruled that "there is no Israeli nation apart from the Jewish people and the Jewish people consists not only of the people residing in Israel but also of the Jews residing in the Diaspora."⁶³ This decision leaves the conflict between racial and religious criteria of Jewish identity essentially unresolved, but it serves to uphold the primacy of Zionist precepts.

The net result of these executive policies, legislative actions, and judicial decisions has been to maintain Israel as an exclusivist State. The assignment of an ethnic-religious *motif* as the guiding principle of national character and destiny separates Israel from other polities. Whereas, a naturalized citizen of France, for example, becomes "French" in the legal and social sense, a citizen of Israel does not *become* "Jewish."⁶⁴ If he is a Jew he is registered as such and gains immediate rights of full citizenship and participation in the national ideal upon entry as an immigrant. If he is a non-Jew, his status is automatically subordinate, whether it be as an undisplaced Palestinian or an immigrant subject to the residence requirement for naturalization. The discrimination, both implicit and explicit, against non-Jewish citizens is thus the measure of Israel's departure from established democratic practice.

In seeking to elaborate a programme which was at the same time comprehensively "Jewish" and existentially "national," the Zionists turned to the loosely defined concept of nationality implicit within Judaism as an ethnic religion and communal culture. This was the only avenue through which they could forward their own essentially secular and normalizing populism

⁶³ Quoted in Chomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

in a Jewish world which remained essentially suspicious of idealist prescriptions. The realities of this situation have been obscured by Zionist publicity, but the fact of diversity remains a constant factor in Jewish life.

The question of what it is to be a Jew involves a long history of religious witness and humanistic endeavour. In its present setting, however, Jewish identity has been set in the micro-cosmic framework of a Levantine state, inspired by the political and social ideals of nineteenth century Europe. The recent attempts of Israel and the Zionist movement to redefine Jewish character in terms of political nationalism can only complicate the search of modern Jews to preserve their own unique traditions in the context of modern civilization. Even more important than the correction of existing abuses, against the Palestinians in particular, is the need to recognize that Zionism is not Judaism and that Israel is not *the* Jewish State, but *a* Jewish community.

Closely related to the problem of Jewish identity is the development of certain tensions within Zionism itself. The issue of authority was first raised at the Twenty-Third Zionist Congress in 1951. Ben-Gurion opened the controversy by distinguishing between a Zionist and a Jew supporting the State. "A Zionist," he said, "must himself come to Israel as an immigrant At present there is no barrier or occasion for a Zionist not to emigrate to Israel. And the Zionists have not stood the test."⁶⁵ In the same speech he recognized the validity of "a Zionist holding duties, even though such Zionism does not advocate fulfilment in person." These duties included: (1) unconditional assistance to the State of Israel, whether the government to which the Jews in question owe allegiance desire it or not; (2) compulsory Hebrew education; and (3) the fostering of the halutzic (pioneering) movement.

The Congress endorsed this view in the Jerusalem Pro-

⁶⁵ David Ben-Gurion, "Tasks and Character of a Modern Zionist," *Jerusalem Post*, August 17, 1951.

gramme, but the stringency of the requirements created a gulf between the Israeli Prime Minister and the American Zionists in particular. At the Jerusalem Ideological Conference, convened by the Zionist Organization in 1957, Ben-Gurion developed his original thesis:

My Zionism . . . was built on the conviction that we did not form a part of the peoples among whom we lived, that we had no intention of remaining in exile, and that our deepest aspiration was to return personally to Zion. And if that meaning has now been taken out of the term Zionism . . . I regret it with every fibre of my being, and I see no difference whatsoever between these 'Zionists' and Jews who do not call themselves by that name.⁶⁶

Nahum Goldmann, then president of the World Zionist Organization, replied by rejecting "the radical Israeli standpoint of negation [of the Diaspora]," which fancied the idea of "America's being a second Babylon."⁶⁷ Envisioning the *aliyah* of Jewry to Israel as a slow process which might require centuries, he counselled the Zionists to support Jewish life and education in the Diaspora as the only constructive means of furthering this long-range migration. Other views were voiced at the Conference, but two alternative approaches to Zionism emerged as dominant—one impatient with the Diaspora and fiercely loyal to the State of Israel, and the other visualizing an extended cooperation between the State and a continuing Diaspora in which both were committed to the preservation of Jewish identity and the eventual reconstitution of the Jewish people in Israel.

At the Twenty-Fifth Zionist Congress in 1961, Ben-Gurion escalated the controversy by asserting that "Jewry in the Diaspora is on the road to assimilation and extinction."⁶⁸ Pointing the finger at American Jewry in particular, he added

⁶⁶ "Proceedings of the Jerusalem Ideological Conference," p. 149.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 227–228.

⁶⁸ See text of the address in *The New York Times*, January 8, 1961, Section I, pp. 52–53.

that "the Judaism of Jews of the United States and similar countries is losing all meaning, and only a blind man can fail to see the danger of extinction which is spreading without being noticed." These remarks led to a confrontation between American Zionists and the Israeli Prime Minister over the issue of "Ingathering." Dr. Joachim Prinz, President of the Zionist-oriented American Jewish Congress, stressed the importance of a single Jewish peoplehood, regardless of physical location, thereby endorsing a new version of Dubnow's "autonomism" in a Zionist context. In 1962, Dr. Prinz was instrumental in organizing an American-Israeli Dialogue to deal with the interpretive problems that had arisen. He opened the Dialogue by defining the American Zionist position: "We American Jews . . . have been re-affirmed and elevated by the existence of the Jewish state. [But] a new relationship between American Jewry and Israel, emphasizing the political independence that separates us while recognizing the cultural interdependence that binds us must be the cornerstone for the bridge between us which now has to be built."⁶⁹

The American-Israeli Dialogue became a continuing forum aimed at resolution of the existing differences between the two communities. But all that has really been accomplished in these deliberations is the establishment of an interpretive dichotomy in which the nominal independence of American Zionism is tacitly recognized.

It was against this background that the Six-Day War assumed a special importance. The war itself was welcomed and triggered by Israel, not so much for the sake of security and expansion, but to galvanize the Zionist image and to intensify Jewish support for the State. Professor Schweid called it "a link in a history full of suffering and heroism of the people of Israel."⁷⁰ The events of 1967 did in fact rekindle the emotional response of Jews to Zionism. In the wake

⁶⁹ *Jerusalem Post*, June 13, 1962, p. 4.

⁷⁰ Schweid, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

of increased immigration and financial support, the Jewish Agency was "reconstituted" in June 1971 to maintain the established momentum of Jewish identification with Israel.⁷¹ A sequel to Weizmann's earlier "extension" plan, this scheme effected the equal representation in the Jewish Agency of official Zionists and Jewish welfare and fund-raising organizations not designated as "Zionist." The change was premised on the assumption that the Six-Day War had obliterated the differences between official Zionists and Jewish groups concerned primarily with enlisting financial backing for Israel and Jewish interests in general.⁷² As in the earlier case, the effect was to expand Zionist influence and to identify Zionist affiliation with Jewish commitment. In this instance, the task was made easier by the fact that many of the non-Zionist participants were already implicitly involved in the movement through their work and sympathies.

Despite the aura of unity which followed the Six-Day War and the institutional changes in Zionist structure, the residual conflict between American Jewry and Israel erupted again at the Twenty-Eighth Zionist Congress in January, 1972. A group of Israeli delegates adopted a resolution in favour of dismissing Zionist officials in the Diaspora who did not immigrate within two years of holding office. In response, the Hadassah delegation, representing more than half the enrolled Zionists in the United States, walked out of the meeting. The affair was settled the following week by a ruling of the legal adviser to the World Zionist Organization that the resolution was unconstitutional. On this basis, the chairman of the World Zionist Organization, Dr. Louis Pincus, declared it invalid, thus temporarily ending the controversy.

The debate between Israel and the American Zionists in-

⁷¹ See "Founding Assembly: The Reconstituted Jewish Agency," *Jerusalem Post* (Special Supplement), June 21, 1971.

⁷² *Jerusalem Post*, June 22, 1971.

volves basic issues, the most important of which are the validity of diasporan existence and Israel's claim to set standards and represent ultimate Jewish interests. Beneath the conflict is the fact that a vast majority of Jews still live outside Israel, mostly by choice and in affirmation of the societies in which they participate. The current campaign to focus attention on the disabilities of Soviet Jewry is designed to reinforce the premises of Zionism, and has been clearly exaggerated toward this end. But it remains a fact that the modern Jewish world is too sophisticated, too involved in broader cultural and social pursuits, to be confined within the narrower vision of a parochial state and a particularist ideology. If this can be observed among Zionists, it is an even more pronounced disposition among Jews in general.

CHAPTER VI

THE ZIONIST ISSUE

The transition of Zionism from an aspiring movement to a political state intensified the latent antagonisms between the exclusivist nationalism of Israel and the broader facets of intellectual orientation in modern Jewish and Gentile life. From a variety of particular positions, Jews of our own time have questioned the ultimate validity of the Zionist thesis and the character of the State it fostered. This is an expanding trend which will certainly exert a profound influence on Zionism as an ideology and Israel as a political entity.

There is also an implicit conflict between certain aspects of Zionism and some of the prominent contemporary value systems, though this fact has not been clearly recognized and is often almost completely obscured. Much of Christian tradition, for example, does not have a natural affinity for nationalism in any form or for an emphasis on the importance of lineage and racial ties. Though some contemporary churchmen support Zionism and Israel, Christianity can be said to be separated from Judaism through a revisionist interpretation of the Covenant. Modern secular liberalism is also at odds with political Zionism on a number of points, not the least of which is the latter's double standard with regard to Jewish and Arab rights. It is to be noted as well that the juridical basis of the international system as constituted after World War I is committed to the principle of self-determination, which was clearly violated in the transformation of Palestine into an exclusively Jewish State.

The Zionist "issue" stems from a conflict of values concerning the implications of Zionism as a political ideology and the practices of Israel as a national state. The critique of the Zionist idea and the policies of Israel has been most pointed from Jewish sources, some of which have been already cited. The initial purpose here is to provide a cross-section of Jewish concern as expressed from various perspectives.

A number of Jewish intellectuals, representing different generations and professions, have regarded Zionism and Israel's policy orientation as problematical and disturbing. Commenting on the initial British proposal to partition Palestine in the 1930's, Albert Einstein concluded:

I should much rather see reasonable agreement with the Arabs on the basis of living together in peace than the creation of a Jewish state. Apart from practical considerations, my awareness of the essential nature of Judaism resists the idea of a Jewish State, with borders, an army, and a measure of temporal power, no matter how modest. I am afraid of the inner damage Judaism will sustain—especially from the development of a narrow nationalism within our own ranks, against which we have already had to fight strongly, even without a Jewish State. We are no longer the Jews of the Maccabee period. A return to a nation in the political sense of the word, would be equivalent to turning away from the spiritualization of our community which we owe to the genius of our prophets. If external necessity should, after all, compel us to assume this burden, let us bear it with tact and patience.¹

The historian, Hans Kohn, was attracted to cultural Zionism in his youth and was one of the founding members of *Brit Shalom*. But eventually he became more particularly identified with a broadly liberal approach to all questions of social justice. "The Jewish problem," he insisted, "is but part of the human problem."² The Zionists were unable

¹ Quoted in Moshe Menuhin, *The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), p. 324.

² Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea," p. 53.

to understand this because they subscribed to Herzl's notion of a hostile and inevitably anti-Semitic world, in which the Jew's only recourse was an aggressive and uncompromising nationalism.

The prevalence of such attitudes, in Hans Kohn's view, prevented the Zionists from developing a cooperative and humanitarian relationship with the Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, Zionism was not only a departure from the liberal tradition, but a modern expression of the negative theme in Jewish history which seeks to divorce itself from the ethical legacy of Judaism:

"Zion" meant to live according to the word of the Lord. Such a life was a heavy burden. The Bible tells the story of the ever-repeated attempts of the Hebrews to escape the burden, to liberate themselves from the yoke, to live a "normal" life. The unending processions of rejections started at the very beginning, with the dance around the Golden Calf. It is still going on. It has been one of the unifying threads of Jewish history. It took various forms at various times. Seen in a secular light, it can be interpreted as a search for the meaning of the Jewish national idea, for the realization or rejection of the message of Zion.³

For Hans Kohn, Zionism rests in the lesser dimension of the dichotomy. Its seeming fulfilment of Jewish aspiration is really a chimera, a misrepresentation of the "message of Zion."

I.F. Stone, who is widely regarded as America's leading Jewish journalist and a champion of the liberal tradition, has analyzed the dilemma of modern Zionism in these words:

It must also be recognized, despite Zionist ideology, that the periods of greatest Jewish creative accomplishment have been associated with pluralistic civilizations in their time of expansion and tolerance: in the Hellenistic period, in the Arab civilization of North Africa and Spain, and in Western Europe and America. Universal values can only be the fruit of a universal vision; the greatness of the Prophets lay in their overcoming of ethnocentricity. A Lilliputian nationalism

³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

cannot distill truths for all mankind. Here lies the roots of a growing divergence between Jew and Israeli; the former with a sense of mission as a Witness in the human wilderness, the latter concerned only with his own tribe's welfare.⁴

Rabbi Elmer Berger, formerly executive director of the American Council for Judaism, represents the traditional anti-Zionism of the Reform movement in America. A critic of Israel's transgressions against the Arabs, he has also explained his personal opposition to Zionism as such:

It had been motivated, largely, by the integrity of my own spiritual tradition, trying to keep it separate and apart from the politics of Zionist nationalism. For I knew—as did many others—that *any* fusion of religion and politics corrupts the one and makes the other into a travesty of the liberal, open-society, democratic tradition. And I had been motivated by my concern for the integrity of my own American nationality. For the central idea of Zionism, I knew, was the *ex cathedra*, authoritarian, legal-political claim that “the Jewish people” was a nationality entity which, in international law, had been recognized to have nationality rights in, and nationality obligations to, the Zionist political-territorial entity in Palestine.⁵

Maxime Rodinson, a French Orientalist of Jewish origin, has developed a similar position on the Zionist issue:

... It must be said that Zionism has inadmissibly reinterpreted religious aspirations in terms of modern nationalism. These religious aspirations hinged upon a messianic vision of the end of time, when the final Golden Age would unfold in Palestine ... for many years the Zionists had no more implacable enemies than the Jewish rabbis. On the other hand, it is possible that the religious vision itself contained an element of primitive nationalism. Zionism could then be viewed as the secularization of a religious tendency with a partly nationalist content ... Whatever the truth of the matter, it is hard to see how an analysis of these tendencies ... is

⁴ I.F. Stone, “For a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab Conflict,” *The New York Review of Books*, August 3, 1967, p. 4.

⁵ Elmer Berger, *Who Knows Better Must Say So!* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970), pp. xii-xiii.

relevant in defining the basis of the conflict. When a people is subjected to foreign conquest, the moral wound it receives is in no way alleviated by the spiritual tendencies observable within the conquering group, nor by the motives for the conquest or the aspirations which they express.

... The same applies to the suffering of the Jews. Those sufferings might, perhaps, justify the aspirations felt by some Jews to form an independent state. The Arabs cannot be made to see this as sufficient reason why such a state should be formed at their expense They are perfectly justified in maintaining that if the Europeans feel responsibility for the Jews, it is up to them to provide them with a territory, not to make the Arabs give up some of theirs.⁶

A number of younger Jewish intellectuals have also perceived certain frailties in the Zionist thesis. Arthur Cohen, a knowledgeable scholar of Jewish history and thought, has observed: "Notwithstanding the grandeur and heroism of the Zionist achievement, it is questionable whether the Zionist solution—to normalize the Jew by integrating Jewish destiny with the dubious destiny of the national state—effects that reunion of nature and supernature which is the historicity of *Jewish* existence."⁷ Another contemporary Jewish author, Michael Selzer, holds that the political orientation which Zionism thrust upon the Jews undermined the basis of Jewish values, which had been sustained by Judaism's aversion to common systems of polity. In a pointed analysis, he concludes:

The age-old tension between "the saving remnant" of those who would save Judaism itself and those who opt for the false salvation of comfort and normalcy now once again confronts the Jewish future. Not since the inglorious days three centuries ago when the Smyrnian adventurer Sabbatai Zevi was widely acclaimed Messiah have the dangers of a massive consensus challenging the very basis of Judaism become as acute as they are today. Now just as then an utterly mundane

⁶ Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, trans. by Michael Perl (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 219–220.

⁷ Arthur Cohen, *The Natural and the Supernatural Jew* (New York: Pantheon, 1962), p. 59.

phenomenon is being proclaimed as the culmination and fulfilment of Jewish history. Now just as then the despair engendered by massive catastrophe has given rise to the false and dangerous illusion of redemption.⁸

Noam Chomsky, known primarily as an outstanding linguist and a severe critic of American policy in Vietnam, has taken a particular interest in examining the current sources of conflict and supports bi-nationalism as the ultimate framework of a peaceful solution. He maintains "that Israel is already a bi-national state, at least in the sense that it is a state that contains two identifiable national groups, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs."⁹ For this reason, "Israel will have to come to terms somehow with the fact that it is a Jewish State governing a society that is in part non-Jewish. This fact, rarely faced in a serious way, has always been the Achilles' heel of political Zionism. If a state is Jewish in certain respects, then in these respects it is not democratic."¹⁰

In Zionism itself, Chomsky sees a paradox of values, which lies at the root of present problems:

Throughout the history of Zionism there has been a certain tension between radically opposed conceptions, one socialist and "universalist," the other nationalist and exclusive. On the one hand, the Jewish settlement (*Yishuv*) in Palestine, later Israel, developed the most advanced socialist institutions that exist anywhere, institutions that might be described—without exaggeration, in my opinion—as a model in microcosm for decent human survival. These represent the positive side of a revolutionary development that combined socialism and nationalism.

At the same time, the Zionist movement incorporated expressions of the value of national identification and racial purity that I, at least, find quite objectionable. To cite one case, Joachim Prinz wrote in 1934 that the "German revolution" signifies the end of the liberal era and the decline of

⁸ Michael Selzer, *The Wineskin and the Wizard* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 206.

⁹ Chomsky, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

parliamentary democracy: "The development from the *unity of man* of the Enlightenment to the *unity of nation* of the present contains within itself the development from the concept of mankind to the concept of the nation", a development which he appears to regard favourably and which, he states, places the "Jewish question" in a new light. In place of assimilation, natural to the era of liberalism, he proposes the principle of "recognition of the Jewish nation and the Jewish race."¹¹

Between the alternatives of an exclusivist and a genuinely bi-national society, Chomsky finds contemporary Israel essentially escapist in orientation. Like an ostrich, it hides its head in the sand and refuses to face the realities of its own ideological dilemmas. One hopeful sign is the integrity of some Israelis, who question not only the problem of malpractice but the deeper issues posed by certain aspects of doctrinaire Zionism.

The prominent American Jewish journalist, Paul Jacobs, has dealt with other aspects of the situation as it now stands. Commenting on the media-oriented reaction to the Munich episode, he observed that preoccupations with such incidents "obscure the real issues, cover up the real grievances, throw a heavily charged cloud of emotionalism over injustices and allow micro-violence to be castigated, bitterly, while macro-violence goes unnoticed and unheeded."¹²

Considering the ultimate significance of events in the Middle East for the Jewish community in the United States, Jacobs feels that "at some point, perhaps not too far away, American Jews will be forced to deal with their own relationship to Israel and to ask whether the success of Zionism in achieving state power had to be built on the elimination of Arabs from Palestine, their homeland, too."¹³

These concerns have also been expressed by personalities

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

¹² Paul Jacobs, "The View from Tel Aviv and Beirut," *Ramparts*, March 1973, p. 37.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

more closely associated with Israel and Zionism. Among the prominent representatives of the dissenting movement within Israel, Dr. Israel Shahak and Professor Georges Tamarin have been particularly articulate in their criticisms of the State. As chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Dr. Shahak has taken issue with the racist character of Zionist policies, which he regards as the basis of social injustice in Israel and the occupied territories. The institutional structure of discrimination rests on the perpetuation of the British Defence Regulations and the Jewish National Fund. The former consigns the Arabs under Israeli control to a subordinate and vulnerable status, while the latter is the vehicle through which land is systematically designated as "Jewish" and made available to Jewish occupancy only.¹⁴

Professor Tamarin concurs with Noam Chomsky's appraisal of Israel's ideological dichotomy:

A contradiction ... characterizes Israel's social and spiritual reality: the opposition between "Israeli creed"—the ideal of a democratic, egalitarian, progressive and enlightened society—and theocratic-racist laws, a chauvinistic atmosphere, parochial culture and the often totalitarian measures of the authorities.

This conflict is reflected in the antagonism between the tendencies oriented towards a physical and spiritual ghetto and those striving for a free and open society. This contradiction, as well as the dilemma stated above, namely—whether the direction of development of the country progresses towards a harmonious integration in contemporary civilization, or towards enclosurement—is *the* Israeli problem. The solution of this problem will determine not only the socio-cultural physiognomy of the State, but, in my personal opinion, its political future as well.¹⁵

¹⁴ See Alan R. Taylor and John P. Richardson, *The Jerusalem Debate* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Affairs Council, 1972), pp. 4–6, 12–14.

¹⁵ Georges R. Tamarin, *The Israeli Dilemma, Essays on a Warfare State* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1973), p. 9.

As a resident in Israel and a trained psychologist, Professor Tamarin is rather pessimistic about the future:

Among the most negative and alarming features of the actual development is the almost total paralysis of those forces whose *natural* role it is to tear down obsolete fences and traditional barriers—the rising generation. Because of an almost total lack of contact with the youth of other countries and as a result of the educational system, classes leave school, year after year, crippled in their general education and handicapped in their preparedness for higher studies as well as in their general outlook. Years will pass (and crises will follow) before they are able to overcome their parochial, intolerant and ethnocentric conceptions.¹⁶

From Zionist apologists, as well, the sequence of events surrounding the Israeli system has evoked concern and criticism. Nahum Goldmann, former president of the World Zionist Organization, reflected in 1970 that after fifty years of Zionist activity he was “beginning to have doubts as to whether the establishment of the State of Israel as it is today . . . was the fullest accomplishment of the Zionist idea . . .”¹⁷ In particular, he felt that Israel had failed to recognize the gravity and importance of the Arab problem, and that its legacy of militarism had endangered the future of Israeli-Jewish relations. Though he saw some justification in resorting to military action, he also noted that “this development does not diminish its tragic character . . . victories have not, for the time being, brought nearer any solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Victories in themselves . . . are meaningful only if they lead to stability and peace.”¹⁸

Probing more deeply into the consequences of Israel's orientation as a warfare state, Goldmann notes that though success on the battlefield had been admired in the world, “this is certainly nothing either unique or specific to the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Nahum Goldmann, “The Future of Israel,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, p. 443.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

Jewish people, nor have other peoples and civilizations been admired and remembered in history primarily for their military accomplishments.”¹⁹ Furthermore, “The tremendous effort which Israel had to make in order to maintain its military strength and superiority, and which it will have to continue to make to an ever-increasing degree, naturally deflects a large part of its creative resources from cultural and spiritual endeavours.”²⁰

The future of Israel, in Goldmann’s view, hinges on a correct solution of the Arab problem, not only for the sake of peace but also to revitalize those aspects of Zionism which are concerned with the Jewish cultural renaissance. With this in mind, he asked the Israeli Cabinet in 1970 to approve a possible meeting with President Nasser. After deliberation on the matter, the Cabinet rejected the request, which in itself is indicative of the inflexibility Israeli policy had assumed at that stage.²¹ The whole episode raises the question of the degree to which a humanistic interpretation of the Zionist idea can be implemented in the context of current predispositions.

Two leading Zionist academicians, Arthur Hertzberg and Jacob Talmon, have expressed similar reservations as to Israel’s intransigency, and more especially its refusal to recognize the existence of the Palestinians as a legitimate political entity. Dr. Hertzberg has remarked:

Israel’s leading politicians have said repeatedly that there is not, and never has been, a Palestinian Arab nation The trouble with this argument is that it evades the facts both of history and of the present. Israeli politicians know that all the modern nationalisms, including their own, arose relatively recently, no later than the nineteenth century in Europe and later still in Asia and Africa. To deny the existence now of a Palestinian Arab national consciousness because it did not

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

²¹ See *New York Times*, April 12, 1970, Section 4, p. 4.

exist as such in 1917 is a delusion. The very creation of the state of Israel and simultaneously of the Arab refugee problem . . . opened a new era in the history of the Arabs of Palestine. A strong national consciousness and, now, a revolutionary younger leadership have been arising in the last several decades. Why then do Israelis try to deny the obvious?²²

In an open letter to Information Minister Israel Galili, who had denied the existence of the Palestinian Arabs as an ethnic category or a distinct national community, Professor Talmon carried the point further:

In the eyes of the world, and in my eyes too, the recognition or lack of recognition of the Palestinian Arabs as a community with the right of self-determination is the cardinal question at issue. It is the acid test that will determine whether we are bent on settlement and reconciliation or on expansion—on respect for the rights of others or on ignoring them. This is the measuring rod for determining the democratic character and moral qualities of our State.²³

In a deeper analysis of the moral problems surrounding modern Israel, Professor Talmon has argued in a recent article that despite Israel's need for military security, "it is something else entirely to contend that an engineered war is a means to advance 'national interests' and territorial expansion, and to be guided in one's attitude by the urge for power and that type of military adventurism which chases 'maximum chances.' He that lives by the sword shall die by it in the end."²⁴ The tragic dimension of Israel as presently constituted lies in the fact that "It is . . . the lot of triumphant messianic ideology to be institutionalized into a machine of power and might, and to regard its accomplishments and victories as a

²² Arthur Hertzberg, "Palestine: The Logic of Partition 'Today,'" *Columbia Forum*, Fall 1970, p. 17.

²³ "Self-Determination for Palestinian Arabs: An Open Letter by Professor J.L. Talmon," *Jewish Liberation Journal* (New York), Nov.-Dec. 1969, p. 4.

²⁴ Yaacov Talmon, "Is Force Indeed an Answer to Everything," *Dispersion and Unity* (Jerusalem), No. 17/18, 1973, p. 15. This article is also the final chapter of Talmon's book, *The Violent Era*.

mark of the vigour and superiority of its ideas. The resistance of its rivals inflames its passion for power and makes its quest for might an end in itself. In brief, only a thin partition divides noble idealism from oppressive imperialism.”²⁵

On the question of power as such, Professor Talmon maintains that excessive strength has a paralyzing effect on societies that wield it:

Those who contend that force is the answer to every problem live by the hour and ignore the future. For them, the fleeting success of force is the last word in history They are characterized by an egotism that prevents them from understanding the mind of their antagonists, or paying heed to what goes on in their hearts For extreme nationalism is saturated with profound contempt for other peoples, its disciples are persuaded that force will solve every problem, and they have signed an eternal treaty with the Almighty, designed to ensure them invincible and everlasting might.²⁶

While defending the unique bond between Jewry and the Land of Israel, Professor Talmon is concerned that the reconstitution of the Jewish State as it stands may have compromised essential values: “the vision of a just society, the dream of a creative life and of a spiritual revival—all these have differentiated our Zionist enterprise not only from other campaigns of conquest, but from all other settlement and colonization enterprises in history. Without them, we are just another imperialist invader.”²⁷ He fears that contemporary Israel may have lost this broader sense of purpose, and that if Jewry “reneges on its rejection of anarchy and kills its own respect for the values and representatives of the mind . . . the saying that ‘there is nothing so unsuccessful as success’ will come true.”²⁸

The relationship of modern Christianity to Zionism has

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

become a controversial subject in the present setting, and relates to complex issues in Christian theology. The Church has always been perplexed by the Jewish question in general, uncertain as to the religious significance of unconverted Jewry after the New Covenant had been established. St. Paul had rejected the ethnic interpretation of the doctrine of election,²⁹ but also expressed a special respect for his kinsmen by race.³⁰ This left an unresolved theological problem with regard to the proper Christian response to Judaism as a continuing religious tradition.

The early and medieval churches, for the most part, tended to look on the unbelieving Jews as cut off from God's grace and having no further role in his redemptive plan. This was based on the assumption that the Jews had placed a curse on their own heads forever when they said to Pilate: "His blood be on us, and on our children."³¹ This position was balanced only by the consideration that Christ in his manhood was Jewish and that God chose a Jewish girl as the vehicle of the Incarnation. But otherwise the traditional churches have until recently remained negative in their attitude toward the Jews.

The Protestant reformers, however, reopened the Jewish question in Christian theology by reexamining the doctrine of election. If the sacraments were not the key to salvation, but rather the continuing election of God's grace, then it was not possible to say that the Church alone was heir to the promise. Because many Protestants believed the Reformation marked an apocalyptic turning point in history, the idea of a restoration of the Jews to Palestine and their conversion to Christianity as a prelude to the Millennium gained currency. This view continued to play a role in sectarian thought over the centuries, and has been revived by the creation of the State of Israel.

²⁹ Rom. 9:6-8.

³⁰ Rom. 9:4-5.

³¹ Matt. 27: 25.

In less fundamentalist Protestant circles, two interpretations have been dominant. One holds to the traditional position that the election has passed from the Jews to the Church and that "Israel as a people has no part at all in the blessings of the New Age that has dawned,"³² for "What is old is gone; the new has come."³³ The alternative view, stemming from the neo-orthodoxy of Karl Barth, maintains that the election of the Jews remains intact. As Barth has put it, "The covenant of God with man is once and for all his covenant with the people Israel."³⁴ This election is confirmed in the crucifixion of Jesus, a continuous appointment of a righteous remnant from the disobedient Jews, and the calling of the Gentiles.³⁵ For through all of these acts, God's promise to Abraham is fulfilled.

More specifically, Barth rejects the "idea that the Jews are no longer chosen because they crucified Jesus—that the Church is the historical successor of Israel, thus making Israel a thing of the past."³⁶ The refractory Synagogue which grew out of Israel's rejection of the Messiah continues to bear witness to God's mercy, for the resurrection of Christ cancelled the finality of that rejection, while the calling and conversion of the Gentiles established God's radical refutation of human unbelief and prepared the way for the restoration of natural order in Israel.³⁷ For this reason, "there stands a bond of peace between the Church and the Synagogue,"³⁸ since the establishment of the Church is through and in confirmation of the election of Israel.

³² Charles Harold Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (London: Fontana, 1959), p. 164.

³³ Quoted from II Corinthians 5:17 in *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³⁴ Karl Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline*, trans. by G.T. Thompson (London: SCM Press, 1949–1960), p. 74.

³⁵ Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, ed. by G.W. Bromley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936–1962), II (2), 231, 259–305.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II (2), 290–291.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II (2), 298.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, II (2), 295.

The Roman Catholic Church also has sharply altered its earlier position on the Jews. The first movement in this direction was the assertion by Pope Pius XI (1922–1939) that the Church is Semitic in origin. The Catholic writer Jacques Maritain later held that it was the incredulity of the Jews which enabled the Church “to appear in the world with a character of . . . universality,”³⁹ and that Israel remains “even in its misfortune, God’s witness in human history,” and “ever the people of God—stricken, but ever beloved because of its fathers.”

It was in this spirit that the Second Vatican Council, convened by Pope John XXIII, undertook to redefine the Church’s official stand on the Jews. The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (October 28, 1965)⁴⁰ emphasized the indebtedness of the Church to “the people with whom God in his inexpressible mercy deigned to establish the Ancient Covenant.” It also asserted that through the Cross, Christ “reconciled Jew and Gentile, making them one in Himself (cf. Eph. 2: 14–16).” Rejecting the traditional belief that the Jews should be held responsible for the crucifixion, the Declaration held that “what happened in His passion cannot be blamed upon all the Jews then living, without distinction, nor upon the Jews of today. Although the Church is the new people of God, the Jews should not be presented as repudiated or cursed by God, as if such views followed from the holy Scriptures.” It was further stipulated that “mindful of her common patrimony with the Jews, and motivated by the gospel’s spiritual love and by no political considerations, she [the Church] deplores the hatred, persecutions and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews at any time and from any source.”

³⁹ Jacques Maritain, *The Living Thoughts of St. Paul* (Philadelphia: McKay, 1941), p. 83.

⁴⁰ See text in Walter M. Abbot, S.J. (ed.), *The Documents of Vatican II* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), pp. 660–668.

Much of contemporary Christian thought is favourably disposed toward the Jews, and has stimulated inter-faith conferences and dialogues designed to develop closer relations among Christians and Jews. But in this context, the Zionist issue has become a matter of sharp controversy. Support for Israel's establishment as an event of religious significance has come mainly from fundamentalists and Barthians who see it as an eschatological sign, and from churchmen either involved in the ecumenical movement or of the opinion that Christians should support Zionism as a means of making reparation for the suffering which anti-Semitism has inflicted upon the Jews.

Prominent among the fundamentalist sympathizers is Billy Graham, whose widely-disseminated film, "His Land," maintains that the founding of the State of Israel represents the literal fulfilment of prophecy in modern history. The immigration of Zionists into Palestine is depicted as the realization of Ezekiel's vision of the resurrection of Jews from "dry bones" and their restoration to the Holy Land. The remainder of the film matches modern events with biblical prophecies and predicts the Second Coming in this context.

With less dramatic emphasis, Karl Barth considered the events in Palestine as a symbol of God's election and providence toward Israel.⁴¹ In a discussion with students in Basle, transmitted by the Netherlands Broadcasting Company on December 28, 1967, he called the State of Israel "an eschatological sign" which confirms the hope of the church for the earth and its renewal. What had transpired in the Middle East since 1948 was "a repetition of what the Bible tells us about the entry of the people of Israel into the promised land."⁴² Yet Barth also suggests that the religious significance of Jewish continuity lies outside the sphere of politics or of a Christian

⁴¹ *Church Dogmatics*, III (3), 238.

⁴² Quoted in H. Berkhof, "Israel as a Theological Problem in the Christian Church," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Summer 1969, p. 345.

humanitarianism which "welcomes the Jewish bid for independence . . . in Palestine."⁴³

Some who are close to Barth in theological orientation have qualified his speculations. Dr. H. Berkhof of the Netherlands Reformed Church, for example, regards the establishment of Israel as an important development in the preservation of Jewish identity, which reflects God's faithfulness and promises. At the same time, he asserts that "No Christian is divinely legitimated to say that this exciting and endangered political event is more than a sign, namely the fulfilment of prophecies. . . . If it is a preliminary sign, it leads us as Christians to a sympathetic attitude but does not bind us to approve all that this state does. The theological line which we draw here does not necessarily imply a pro-Israeli attitude in the Middle East cause. And yet most of the supporters of this line are also firm supporters of the state."⁴⁴

The frequent coincidence of the philo-Jewish theological position, which in itself commends serious attention, and a blanket support for Zionism and Israel is precisely the problem which the Barthian school has yet to resolve. Some have gone so far as to reject out of hand any criticism of Israel by other Christians. Alan Davies, a minister in the United Church of Canada, has suggested that "anti-Zionism sooner or later reveals a distressing tendency to shade into anti-Semitism."⁴⁵ He goes on to reject Jewish opposition to Zionism as an anomaly involving pathological self-hatred, but without really substantiating either argument. Dr. Roy Eckhardt, professor of Religion at Lehigh University and an ardent champion

⁴³ Karl Barth, "The Jewish Problem and the Christian Answer," *Against the Stream*, ed. by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 195.

⁴⁴ Berkhof, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

⁴⁵ Alan T. Davies, "Anti-Zionism, Anti-Semitism, and the Christian Mind," *The Christian Century*, August 19, 1970, p. 987.

of Israel,⁴⁶ supports Davies' contentions and takes particular exception to the Quaker report, *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1970).⁴⁷ Though this document is widely considered an objective and inoffensive study, which aims to present the positions and grievances of both sides, Dr. Eckhardt finds it opinionated and anti-Zionist. The appraisal itself is indicative of a pointed partisanship apparent among some Christians who are at pains to vilify any examination of the subject not fully in accord with the Israeli position.

Within the Catholic clergy, Father Cornelius Rijk of the Vatican Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations, and Father Edward Flannery of the U.S. Bishops Committee Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations, have been particularly outspoken in their defence of Israeli practices in Jerusalem,⁴⁸ an especially sensitive point among Catholics. But considering the ecumenical commitments of both officials, their testimonies should be examined against the extensive criticism of Israel's Jerusalem policies from other sources, including an editorial in the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano* (March 22–23, 1972), which listed specific cases of expropriation and condemned Israel's unilateral alterations in the character and status of the city.

Christian philo-Zionism stems from a variety of perspectives. Fundamentalists and some associated with the neo-orthodoxy of Karl Barth consider modern Israel as an eschatological sign. Others support the State for the sake of ecumenical relations, regarding its popularity among Jews as an indication that Zionism is broadly representative of Jewish interests and the receptacle of Jewish religious tradition.

⁴⁶ See A. Roy and Alice Eckhardt, "Again Silence in the Churches, The Case for Israel," *The Christian Century*, July 26, 1967, pp. 970–973.

⁴⁷ A. Roy Eckardt, "Anti-Israelism, Anti-Semitism and the Quakers," *Christianity and Crisis*, September 20, 1971, pp. 180–186.

⁴⁸ See Taylor and Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–27.

There is also a common notion among Christians that Zionism is the natural solution to the Jewish problem and that it is incumbent upon Gentiles to assist this movement as a way of atoning for the anti-Semitism of previous generations.

Common to most of these views is a general unfamiliarity with the history of Zionism and the circumstances surrounding Israel's establishment. Those Christians who have taken issue with the pro-Zionist assumptions of their co-religionists comprise, for the most part, individuals who either have direct experience with the Middle East or have analyzed the character of political nationalism as a modern institution and its implications in terms of theology.

Among leading American clergymen, Archbishop Joseph T. Ryan of Anchorage and Dean Francis Sayre of the Episcopal Cathedral in Washington, D.C., have expressed particular concern over Israeli violations of Arab rights in Jerusalem.⁴⁹ These observations are based on personal visits to Jerusalem and careful examination of reports on the continuing situation there. Other direct observers from the clergy who have taken issue with Israel's policies in general include Dr. A.C. Forrest of the United Church of Canada and Father Joseph L. Ryan, S.J., currently associated with St. Joseph's University in Beirut. Their remarks do not reflect an anti-Semitic bias, but an inner imperative to bear witness to specific injustices of which they have first-hand knowledge.⁵⁰

On the question of Jewish nationalism as such, Dodd, Tillich, and Toynbee have found it essentially foreign to the thrust of Christian theology. "Behind all the scholastic arguments of Romans and Galatians," Dodd argues, "lies the crucial question of whether religion is a matter of national

⁴⁹ See Joseph T. Ryan, "Some Thoughts on Jerusalem," *The Link* (published by Americans for Middle East Understanding in New York), September-October, 1972, pp. 1-7; and Taylor and Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁰ See A.C. Forrest, *The Unholy Land* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972); and Taylor and Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

inheritance and external tradition, or a matter of ever-fresh personal response to the gracious dealing of God.”⁵¹ St. Paul, he asserts, “saw rightly that in his struggle with Jewish nationalism within the Church he was fighting the battle of prophetic idealism afresh.”⁵² Paul Tillich regarded the Church’s rejection of Israel’s national orientation as an acclamation of religious principle in Time as opposed to Space, a victory over egoistic deification of place heralded by the prophetic message and realized in the Messiah.⁵³ Toynbee sees a similar conflict between Christianity and Jewish nationalism, stemming from the earlier struggle within Yahwism which attended its transition from a parochial to an ecumenical religion.⁵⁴ In the post-Exilic period, this inner struggle reached its climax in the nationalist issue, which ultimately divided Christianity from Judaism. The earlier concept of the Messiah as a parochial national leader was revived in apocalyptic terms, and thus the messianic figure which the Jews expected in Jesus’ time was that of a Jewish empire-builder.⁵⁵ But this was precisely the role which Jesus refused to accept. The gentle spirit of his own ministry was diametrically opposed to the insurrectionist programme of the Zealot party.⁵⁶ Therefore, the Church, in acclaiming Jesus the Messiah of Israel, was at the same time rejecting the way of Jewish national glory.

With regard to contemporary Zionism, Toynbee has summarized the fundamental problem confronting it in these words:

⁵¹ C.H. Dodd, *The Meaning of Paul for Today* (London: Swarthmore, 1920), p. 38.

⁵² C.H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans*, p. 181.

⁵³ Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 30–39.

⁵⁴ Arnold Toynbee, *An Historian’s Approach to Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 88.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁵⁶ Toynbee, *A Study of History*, V, 382.

... How was a God-fearing Jewry to reconcile itself with a secular Zionist movement that numbered agnostics among its members, and whose programme had been inspired, not by the messianic visions of post-Exilic prophets, but by the blue-prints of a Western Gentile Nationalism whose prophets had been a King Louis XI of France, a King Henry VII of England, and the Florentine publicist Niccolo Machiavelli?

These theological and moral difficulties in the ideology of Zionism were matched by its political awkwardness; for in deliberately departing from the political quietism that had been Jewry's consistent practice for some sixty generations ending in A.D. 1897, it had abandoned a traditional Jewish attitude that had made Jewry's survival in diaspora possible....⁵⁷

"The practical achievement of the Zionist Movement's political aims," Toynbee feels, "had in fact brought a new Jewish problem on to the stage of history."⁵⁸ Specifically.

In its diminutiveness, its fanaticism, and its Ishmaelitic enmity with its neighbours the new Zionist Israel in Palestine was a reproduction of the Modern Western national state that, in its faithfulness, verged on being a parody; and it was a misfortune, for both Jewry and the World, that this statelet—begotten of so much idealism, self-sacrifice, crime, injustice, and suffering—should have seen the light at a moment when it might be hoped that the species of community of which this was the youngest member was at last approaching its eclipse. This hope could be cherished mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian Era because a Modern Western Nationalism was an archaistic throw-back to a rustic parochial past state of the Western Society which was being stamped as an untenable anachronism, at the very time when it was being revived, by the simultaneous flowering of a Modern Western technology which was expanding the range of Western life in all its aspects from a parochial to an ecumenical scale.⁵⁹

As to contemporary Israel's present and future, Toynbee maintains that the basic challenge confronting the State

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, VIII, 300.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII, 311.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 312.

today is its ability to achieve a peaceful system of coexistence with its neighbours. He has pointed out that "military victory is like gold. It has no intrinsic use or value. It is worth no more than what the victor can manage to purchase with it."⁶⁰ And in Israel's case, what is most needed is an end to the prolonged state of belligerency.

Toynbee also notes that one result of the Six-Day War was "to bring out into the open some previously latent fissures in Israel's body politic."⁶¹ This has provided a background against which the doctrinaire aspects of Zionist ideology will be thoughtfully reexamined, and therefore "It seems possible that the Israel with which the Arabs will be dealing in the next chapter of Middle Eastern history may prove to be a less bad neighbour than the Israel that has been dominated by the pioneer generation of fanatical Ashkenazi Zionists. This is the glimmer of light that catches my eye on the sombre Middle-Eastern horizon."⁶²

In a particularly astute analysis of the argument among Christians that the State of Israel represents the fulfilment of prophecy, Professor Bert de Vries of Calvin College in Michigan holds that "Many Old Testament prophecies were already fulfilled in Old Testament times. Ezekiel, for example, addressed his prophecies to the Israelites in captivity in Babylon. His prophecies of Israel's return to Palestine were fulfilled in the sixth century B.C. when Cyrus released the Israelites from bondage."⁶³ He notes further that "the prophets always spoke in a specific historical context. They did not simply go around making predictions of events some 2500 years in the future. No, they were commissioned

⁶⁰ Arnold Toynbee, "Reflections on the Crisis," *Reflections on the Middle East Crisis*, ed. by Herbert Mason (Paris: Mouton, 1970), p. 193.

⁶¹ Arnold Toynbee, "Israel's Future," *Middle East International* (London), May 1973, p. 9.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶³ Bert de Vries, "Billy Graham's 'His Land' and Prophecy," *Middle East Perspective* (New York), May 1972, pp. 4-5.

by God to preach salvation and pronounce judgement on their contemporaries.”⁶⁴

Criticizing the producers of the Graham film, “His Land,”⁶⁵ de Vries feels that : “In their eagerness to make Old Testament prophecies fit events of twentieth-century history, they lift prophecies out of their own historical context.” Missing from Graham’s interpretation is the fact that “prophecies of return and restoration cannot be divorced from prophecies of spiritual conversion and the renewal of the covenant.” More especially : “The direction of prophetic revelation in the Old Testament is from particular to universal,” and therefore “Whatever special status Paul attributes to Israel and the Jew has to be considered in the light of his major emphasis: special status is based on election by God, not on a distinction between Israel and the Gentiles. . . . A charting of God’s role in history from Old Testament times to the present just doesn’t make any sense if the climactic events of New Testament times are excluded.”

Professor George Buchanan of the Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C., a revisionist thinker with regard to the doctrine of election, has suggested that the general notion of covenant communities as such has provided the religious basis upon which sectarian groups assert “that they are upper-class citizens of the world and are justified in using almost any means to claim their ‘just’ position.”⁶⁶ He further maintains that : “Once a group accepts the premise that it alone constitutes the saints of the world and looks upon all others condescendingly, members within the group begin to relate themselves as the only true saints and consider even other covenanters as those whom God has rejected.”⁶⁷ He regards modern Israel as a case in point, not unique,

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5–6.

⁶⁶ George Wesley Buchanan, “Jewish and Christian Relationships,” *Religion in Life*, Summer 1971.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

but simply a recent example in which religious concepts have been employed to justify particular acts of abuse.

Underlying the belief of certain Christians today that the State of Israel represents a prophetic sign or deserves unqualified support is a combination of pride, sense of guilt, and ignorance. The assertion by individuals or groups that they hold the key to the Providential plan of Salvation is based on the illusion of imminent participation. It is also evident that most millenarian movements reflect a disturbed age rather than a perception of God. The seventeenth century, for example, was a time of upheaval in which distorted interpretations of history and susceptibility to charismatic leaders and false messiahs was common. Our own age is also cataclysmic and has witnessed a variety of social and religious experimentation, stimulated by the climate of anxiety. Movements that arise in such circumstances are best understood as institutionalized reactions, and not as what their followers say they are.

Another source of Christian Zionism involves the problem of anti-Semitism, either as manifest abuse or personal prejudice. The appalling dimensions of Hitler's persecution of the Jews and the pettiness of anti-Jewish attitudes in everyday life have promoted a sense of collective guilt and responsibility among some Christians, a conviction that it is incumbent upon the Church to make reparation for the injustices inflicted upon the Jews by Christian communities. The good intentions implicit in this contention notwithstanding, there are several important weaknesses in the argument that should be mentioned. The notion of collective guilt itself is open to serious question. It was, after all, precisely the idea of collective Jewish blame for the crucifixion which engendered Christian anti-Semitism, and the rejection of this doctrine in recent times has done much to enhance inter-faith relations. It is also clear that both Christianity and Judaism consider the problem of guilt a matter of individual responsibility, for otherwise the concept of final judgement and resurrection

would be rendered meaningless.

The premise that Christians can and should make reparation to the Jews by supporting Zionism does not take into consideration the basic Christian belief that atonement for defiance of all kinds, whether anti-Semitism or Israel's rejection of its own election, is accomplished solely through the sacrifice of the Cross. As Barth has put it succinctly, it is doubtful whether the pious maxims of Christian humanitarianism with regard to the Jews

...are specifically Christian, whether they give to the Jews the honour due to them, and whether they have the power to accomplish anything practical in the matter of the Jewish problem. This problem opens up a gulf which is too wide to be bridged by mere human reason and ethics. And we Christians are too firmly linked with and indebted to the Jews to be able, on those grounds alone, to put them off with a few assurances of goodwill and refusals to countenance anti-Semitism.⁶⁸

Aside from the theological inconsistencies of Christian Zionism, it is questionable whether unqualified support for contemporary Israel is warranted by purely humanitarian considerations as such. The insensitivity of Zionism to the ethics of the Arab problem and its emphasis on racial exclusivity and nationalistic prowess are alien to the humanistic approach. Zionist ideology as originally conceived gave priority to heroic secular ideals derived from the West over the compassionate precepts of Judaism and Christianity. It would therefore be difficult to justify a Christian deference to this movement on humanitarian grounds, since the orientation of the State reflects a political philosophy which is not particularly concerned with the rights of another people it was designed to displace. A humanitarian position would necessarily be equally concerned with a comprehensive system of justice superseding partisan politics.

One does not have to reject the belief in God's continuing election of Israel or the struggle against anti-Semitism to

⁶⁸ Barth, "The Jewish Problem and the Christian Answer," p. 200.

see Zionism in perspective. As a secular movement aimed at the normalization of Jewish life, it marks a departure from Judaism and has no religious significance in itself. From a theological viewpoint, it could be argued that the Jewish State as presently constituted has only the negative value of providing an image of alienation, against which proper order can be measured. Particularly pertinent, however, is the moral issue of Arab rights in Palestine, which remains basic to any judgement of what Israel is and should be. The neglect of Christian Zionists to recognize the injustice perpetrated upon the Arab Palestinians as a major problem comprises one important oversight. It should also be noted that the underlying notion of some Christians that the creation of Israel will ultimately lead to an apocalyptic development, in which Jesus is universally recognized as the Messiah, could not be further from the imagination of any Jew. So there is a tacit understanding between Israel and its Christian supporters that the ecumenical exchange in which they are involved is somehow of mutual benefit, without either side taking seriously the expectations of the other.

The prominent theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, though a champion of Israel as a Jewish asylum, was deeply aware of the complex problems of justice surrounding the Middle East situation and saw the dangers inherent in a one-sided support of Jewish rights in Palestine from a purely religious perspective:

The rivalry between Jews and Arabs in Israel is a conflict between two races and religions, involving not only the natural will-to-live of two collective racial organisms, but the economic differences between the feudalism of the Arabs and the technical civilization which the Jews are able to introduce into Israel. How can a high enough rational and moral perspective be found to arbitrate the issue between them? How is the ancient and hereditary title of the Jew to Israel to be measured against the right of the Arab's present possession? Or how is one to judge the relative merits of modern Jewish against ancient Moslem culture without

introducing criteria which are involved in and do not transcend the struggle? The participants cannot find a common ground of rational morality from which to arbitrate the issues because the moral judgements which each brings to them are formed by the very historical forces which are in conflict. Such conflicts are therefore sub- and supra-moral. The effort to bring such a conflict under the dominion of a spiritual unity may be partly successful, but it always produces a tragic by-product of the spiritual accentuation of natural conflict. The introduction of religious motifs into these conflicts is usually no more than the final and most demonic pretension. Religion may be regarded as the last and final effort of the human spirit to escape relativity and gain a vantage-point in the eternal. But when this effort is made without a contrite recognition of the finiteness and relativity which characterizes human spirituality, even in its moments of yearning for the transcendent, religious aspiration is transmuted into sinful dishonesty. Historic religions, which crown the structure of historic cultures, thus become the most brutal weapons in the conflict between the cultures.⁶⁹

There is also an implicit but unrecognized conflict between Zionism and the political philosophy of liberalism, though some liberals have been pro-Zionist. The liberal tradition was initially formulated by John Locke and was later systematized by the English utilitarians. It subsequently provided the theoretical foundation of political institutions in the Western democracies and the world organizations of this century. Though liberalism originated in a rejection of the monarchical and aristocratic principles of government that dominated Europe before the English and French Revolutions, it also stood in opposition to the *a priori* political concepts popularized by German idealism in the nineteenth century. The liberals were concerned with the pragmatic realities of a changing social structure and remained sceptical of visionary political theories which looked to a transformation of human nature and the founding of utopian states. Edmund Burke,

⁶⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 116–117.

for example, took the position that any political system that assumes the existence of superhuman or heroic virtues can only result in vice and corruption.⁷⁰ This political realism was later summed up by Gaetano Mosca's assertion that utopianism "can mean nothing more than triumph for the worst people."⁷¹

The states which developed in the liberal tradition were based on the principles of "open society" and "checks and balances," designed to uphold the rights of citizens and prevent the abuse of power. Against this background, liberals increasingly opposed existing systems of minority discrimination, and became associated with the fight against anti-Semitism. This inclined them to support all programmes identified with the amelioration of Jewish disabilities, and ultimately led to liberal support for the Zionist movement. It was assumed that Zionism was rooted in liberal doctrines and comprised an important development in the search for Jewish political and social emancipation in the modern world. But though Zionism was working to establish an asylum for persecuted Jews, it also sought to redefine the Jews in a narrow political context, giving priority to nationalist and idealist considerations over liberal principles. Nevertheless, Zionists have reinforced the illusion of a common cause with liberalism to maintain support for their own movement. As one disaffected liberal has put it succinctly, he was made to feel that "he has to choose, so to speak, between Dachau and Israel."⁷²

The fact remains, however, that though liberal institutions do exist in Israel, Zionism and liberalism are quite different in ideological orientation. It is the very notion of a racial state which separates them, and as this fact becomes recognized, it is to be expected that within liberal circles a general dis-

⁷⁰ Paraphrased in Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 288.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Roland Puccetti, "The Last Ghetto, a Liberal's View of Zionism and Israel," *Middle East Forum* (Beirut), March 1961, p. 29.

illusionment with Zionism will take place. There is already a clear trend in this direction, and Arnold Toynbee, who is known for both his liberal and Christian affiliations, has asserted: "In basing the Jewish people's title to the soil of Eretz Israel on the physical ground that they were a master race in view of having Abraham for their father, the Zionist was unwittingly testifying that he had been ensnared by the lure of a post-Modern Western Gentile Racialism in which a Late Modern Western Gentile Nationalism had denounced itself . . . as being the naked Neo-Paganism that it was."⁷³

Earlier, the American philosopher and teacher, Morris Cohen, noted a basic discrepancy between Zionist ideology and the American liberal tradition:

Though most of the leaders of Zionism in America are sincerely and profoundly convinced of the compatibility of Zionism and Americanism, they are none the less profoundly mistaken A national Jewish Palestine must necessarily mean a state founded on a peculiar race, a tribal religion, and a mystic belief in a peculiar soil, whereas liberal America has traditionally stood for separation of Church and State, the free mixing of races, and the fact that men can change their habitation and language and still advance the process of civilization.⁷⁴

This type of implicit conflict is also apparent in Israel's relationship to the world system as presently established. The United Nations accepted Israel as a member on the understanding that earlier U.N. resolutions would be recognized and implemented. But Israel consistently refused to abide by this commitment and followed a course of unilateral actions, holding to each alteration in the *status quo* as a *fait accompli*. The United States has been generally permissive in its approach to Israel, but periodically seeks to impose its own notion of what is "reasonable" on its client, most

⁷³ Toynbee, *A Study of History*, VIII, 601.

⁷⁴ Morris R. Cohen, "Tribalism or Liberalism," Taylor and Tetlie, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72. Originally from an article in *The New Republic* (1919).

notably with regard to alterations in Jerusalem.⁷⁵ But Israel does not really take cognizance of external standards of right behaviour, and relies on the leverage it has enjoyed thus far in the United States to have its own way, regardless of international disapproval and without fear of corrective action.

In this context, Israel has forwarded a Zionist argument to justify its actions—the right of the Jews to exclusive possession of Palestine on historical grounds. Yet the world system as constituted since 1919 adheres in theory to the right of tenured communities to self-determination. It is not really possible to entertain territorial claims based on archaic association within international law as reconstructed after the First World War. Otherwise, we would have an international anarchy in which a variety of disparate claims vied with each other for ascendancy. When the General Assembly endorsed the right of Jews in Palestine to form a state of their own, it did so on the condition that the new Israel would be confined to those sectors where there was a Jewish majority. The progressive revision of this condition has therefore set Israel apart from the world system and accounts for the general disapproval of Israeli policies by most members of the U.N.

In conclusion, a climate of tension surrounds Israel and its Zionist sponsor. Within the State itself, there are significant and articulate forces of dissent. Beyond the borders, others question its policies from a number of positions. In a very real sense, therefore, there is a Zionist “issue” in the world today, and Israel’s future will depend on the way in which this issue is viewed and addressed.

⁷⁵ See Ambassador George Bush, “Statement on Jerusalem” (Security Council, September 25, 1971), in Taylor and Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

CONCLUSION

The Zionist movement originated in the search of nineteenth century European Jews to create a synthetic system in which a Jewish world caught up in the complexities of emancipation and enlightenment could retain its own identity while participating in modern civilization. This was a natural and essential endeavour from a Jewish point of view, and gave rise to many ennobling and liberating traditions, the most important of which was a cultural renaissance based on the Hebrew language. But it also contained a number of inherent problems which have become increasingly serious with the passage of time and demand the full and sustained attention of Israel, Zionism, and the Jewish people.

The movement which Herzl organized in 1897 itself embraced a variety of Zionist interpretations—cultural, religious, socialist, and political. The political faction remained dominant from the start, and established a militantly nationalistic leadership which subsequently drew added support from the religious and socialist parties, and rendered the cultural Zionists an articulate but ineffective minority. In fashioning Zionism as an aggressive settler movement with the aspiration of transforming Palestine into an exclusive Jewish State, the political elite opened a Pandora's box of existential and ethical problems. Perhaps most important was their radical departure from the political quietism that had characterized Jewish life for nearly two millennia. This raised the question of the degree to which the kind of nationalism which Zionism introduced was consistent with Jewish

tradition and the maintenance of Jewish identity. For in adopting the trappings of modern chauvinism, the Zionists were redefining the Jews in terms of Western secular ideals with which Judaism had nothing in common. How, then, was it possible to preserve a specifically Jewish identity within a system that conformed to an alien culture, and more especially, to aspects of that culture which had become widely discredited as violent and unethical?

The Zionists maintained that they had preserved Jewish identity by rediscovering the ancient tradition of statehood. But it has to be asked whether this does not involve an archaistic interpretation which assumes a continuity with the distant past that may not really exist. It seems more plausible that the Zionists were really manipulating history to confirm their own arguments, and disregarding the more immediate past to which they were directly related. It could be argued that, in any case, religions do evolve new forms of expression in time, and that Zionism is simply a modern redefinition of Judaism. But it is also a fact that religious thinkers have always distinguished between accrued tradition and innovation. On this basis, for example, the rabbinical communities accepted the Jewish rationalists and mystics, but rejected Karaism and the movement of Sabbatai Zevi. In the present case, the assumption of the Orthodox parties in Israel that they can ultimately direct the future of the State is not only questionable, but has prevented the reexamination of Zionism as an innovative and essentially un-Jewish development.

In relating Jewish continuity to Judaism, it is not suggested here that Jewishness can be defined only in purely religious terms. There has always been a national orientation within Judaism, but to separate this from the role of religious witness is to cut the Jews adrift from their own past and to submerge their unique identity in the wilderness of modern secular politics. It is precisely the rejection of this course which has maintained the Jews as a distinct community through many

centuries of travail and temptation.

Another existential problem which Zionism created concerns the character of modern political ideologies. The intense interest in a nationalist goal has the effect of confining the expression of opinion to a narrow interpretation of what a society is and aspires to be. We have already seen the distortions of reality and the dehumanization of men wrought by the totalitarian systems of our time. And it is clear that political ideologies geared to nationalism alone as the sole criterion of value are in every respect anti-intellectual and defiant of the humanistic tradition. In gravitating toward a chauvinistic form of national orientation, Zionism has stultified the intellectual resiliency of Israelis and Jews, and cast an aura of conformism within which the participants have already expressed their own discomfort. But it is this negative response and not the system itself which holds the only hope for a more promising future.

The architects of Israel sought to embrace the benefits of two worlds—the secular and the religious. The Jewish State was to be normal in one sense and special in another. This allowed it the prerogative of constituting Israel as a common polity while asserting its right to disenfranchise an existing population on the basis of particular privilege derived from religious tradition. But this was really a contradiction in terms, and served only to excuse the massive injustice perpetrated upon the Palestinian Arabs. In this context, the inherent sense of guilt which the Zionists experienced on various levels of consciousness was temporarily alleviated by what they considered a greater cause and by the tendency to dehumanize the Arabs as an insignificant and irrational entity. Yet it remains that the community displaced by Zionism is fully human, and its cause is as valid, though less pretentious, than that which the Zionists themselves proclaim. The ethical issue is therefore an essentially Zionist problem, and the actions taken by the Palestinians, however untoward they may be, should be regarded as a response to the transgressions

they have sustained, to their elimination as a legitimate and recognized community,

The contradictions of loyalties, political commitments, and ethical standards implicit and explicit in the Zionist revolution are most deeply perceived in Israel itself, where they are focused. The diasporan world, which is disposed to idealize the Jewish State, is often unaware of the difficulties involved. But the Zionist problem is a common Jewish affair, and the way in which it is addressed will determine the future course of Jewish history. The most valuable possession in this regard is the legacy of self-examination, which stands as the greatest treasure passed down to the modern Jews from their own past. In a basic sense, everything depends upon the ability to recognize this as the cardinal value in a time of uncertainty.

The October War occurred after the initial preparation of this book. It is still too early to assess the full impact of the events that have taken place on the psychological and intellectual orientation of Israel and Zionism. But there is no question that the war and its aftermath have created new conditions which will profoundly affect the structure of Zionist thought.

The most important aspect of the recent hostilities is that the relationship between Israelis and their Arab neighbours has radically changed. Though Israel continues to hold the edge in military superiority, the Arab states have demonstrated the ability to sustain themselves in combat and to coordinate operations in a campaign. They have also developed aplomb in diplomatic bargaining and the use of economic leverage in international politics. What this means for Israel is that the former ineptitude of the Arabs as adversaries has become a diminishing factor, and that it is no longer possible to pursue idealized goals without regard to Arab resistance.

In the past, the Zionists have progressively expanded their

territorial and political influence, climaxed by the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights in 1967. Since the October War, however, Israel has been faced with the prospect of physical contraction and adjustment to the demands of external forces. This has produced a variety of reactions within the country which relate directly to the theory and practice of Zionism. The Zionist emphasis on the necessity of "auto-emancipation" in an "anti-Semitic world" is basic to Israeli psychological perceptions. It involves an essential distrust of non-Jewish communities, however overtly sympathetic they may be. For this reason, many Israelis feel insecure in a situation that involves accommodation to foreign pressures. The Likud coalition, representing an extreme Zionist interpretation, has opposed any compromise and called for retention of the occupied territories. The Labour Alignment appears to be less intransigent on the question of territorial revision, but has indicated that at the very least East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are irrevocably part of Israel. Also, the general mood in the country is indisposed to concessions and determined to reestablish the structure of power which prevailed before the war.

Zionist and Israeli anxiety has always centred on two questions: the Arab environment and world opinion. In building the Jewish state, the Zionists constructed in their own minds a dehumanized image of the Arabs as politically and socially unworthy. This helped them to dismiss the ethical problem of displacement and to justify the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state. The established powers generally supported the Zionist claim, especially after the Holocaust. It was in this context that Zionism moved effectively toward its goals and continued to sustain a momentum in its favour for a quarter century after the founding of Israel. But today a different set of circumstances prevails. Arab society has grown in terms of civic responsibility, political acumen, military prowess, and public relations. The world community has also changed. The proliferation of diverse interests and

the dependency on Middle Eastern petroleum resources has minimized the willingness of many nations to assign special priority to Israel. In these respects, Israel's situation is measurably different from what it has been, and the refusal of some political leaders to recognize this fact cannot alter the reality.

The future of Israel will be determined by the ability of the younger generation to construct a more pragmatic and flexible national philosophy. This will inevitably entail a revision of the Zionist thesis as originally conceived. In an age which has become increasingly sceptical of ideological formulations, such a development would be both appropriate and rewarding. The conditions under which Israel has existed thus far—continuing war with the neighbouring states and dependence on the assistance of foreign patrons—have deprived the country of a normal life style. The October War may therefore be regarded in later years as a turning point which made it possible for Israel to achieve a positive and natural relationship with the Arab environment and the community of nations.

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